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LEGAL IDEOLOGY AND INCORPORATION IV: THE
NATURE OF CIVILIAN INFLUENCE ON MODERN
ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LAWt
DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE*
"It is further clear that the equity to which [Lord Mansfield] was referring
is not 'an equity' in the sense in which it was used in the Court of Chancery.
... [He] was referring to the jus naturale of Roman law which ... has had a
considerable influence in moulding our common law."**
Lord Justice Farwell
This Article is the fourth in a four-part series entitled Legal Ideology and
Incorporation. In this series, Dean Coquillette demonstrates that, although
England has fostered a strong common law system, significant intellectual
work was done in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by
students of the civil law systems dominant on the Continent, particularly in
their mercantile and diplomatic specialties. Dean Coquillette traces the
development of the juristic works of these English civilians, and examines
the civilians' intellectual influence on the English common law. It is his
central thesis that the English civilian jurists never intended to achieve a
direct "incorporation" of civil law or mercantile doctrines into the common
law. Rather, their lasting achievement has been the significant influence that
their ideas about law-their "legal ideology"-have exercised on leading
common lawyers and on modem commercial and international law.
Dean Coquillette divides the development of English civilian jurispru-
dence into three periods. The first period includes the years from the publi-
t @ 1987 by Daniel R. Coquillette.
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chusetts Bar; A.B. Williams College, 1966; B.A.(Juris), M.A. Oxford University,
1969, 1980; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1971; Reporter, Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States.
Earlier versions of this Article were presented on October 21, 1983, at a confer-
ence, Courts and the Development of Commercial Law, held at the Universita di
Genova and sponsored by the Henkel Foundation, and on October 20, 1984, at the
American Society for Legal History, Annual Meeting. It is appropriate to thank here
my Administrative Assistant, Mr. David W. Price, whose dedication and intelligence
was invaluable in bringing this work to successful completion. I am also particularly
grateful for the assistance of Professor Charles Donahue, Jr. of the Harvard Law
School and Professor James S. Rogers of the Boston College Law School. All errors,
of course, are my own.
** Baylis v. Bishop of London, [1913] 1 Ch. 127, 137 (1912).
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cation of Christopher St. German's seminal Doctor and Student in 1523 to
the storm of protest from common lawyers following the publication of John
Cowell's highly controversial The Interpreter in 1607. During this significant
period, English civilian writing tended to promote synthesis and accommo-
dation with the common law, and formed a pioneering venture in compara-
tive law-a remarkable ideological effort that rewards study for its own
sake. This period was discussed in the first Article in this series, Legal
Ideology and Incorporation 1: The Early Civilian Writers, 1523-1607, which
appeared in the January 1981 issue of the Boston University Law Review.
The second period of English civilian juristic development includes the
years from the publication of the civilian Sir Thomas Ridley's major work, A
View of the Ecclesiastical and Civile Law, in 1607 to the publication of the
common lawyer Charles Molloy's great Treatise of Affairs Maritime and of
Commerce in 1676. During this period, the common lawyers, initially led by
Coke, mounted increasing jurisdictional and political attacks on the civilians
and at the same time attempted to co-opt civilian methodology in those vital,
growing fields in which the civilians had exhibited particular expertise, most
notably the law merchant. In response, the civilians became defensive in
their juristic attitudes. Instead of continuing previous attempts to synthesize
civil and common law, they began to try to isolate and maintain whatever
pockets of influence they had already established. The critical struggle was
both literary and intellectual, and it centered on the traditional civilian
strongholds of the international law merchant and the Admiralty jurisdiction.
This period was discussed in the second Article in the series, Legal Ideology
and Incorporation 11: Sir Thomas Ridley, Charles Molloy, and the Literary
Battle for the Law Merchant, 1607-1676, which appeared in the March 1981
issue of the Boston University Law Review.
The third period of English civilian juristic development was the subject of
Ideology and Incorporation III: Reason Regulated-The "Post-Restora-
tion" English Civilians, 1653-1735, which appeared in the March 1987 issue
of the Boston University Law Review. This period commences with the
years during and after the Commonwealth, and extends into the eighteenth
century. By then, the common lawyers were succeeding in their attacks,
leaving civilian scholars, such as Godolphin, Duck, Wiseman, Zouche,
Exton, Leoline Jenkins, Wood, Strahan, and Ayliffe with what could have
been an increasingly narrow and specialized role in the English legal system.
In this concluding Article, Dean Coquillette argues that the most important
contribution of these later civilian writers to Anglo-American law lies in the
nature of their influence, direct and indirect, on such leading common
lawyers as Bacon, Selden, Hale, Holt, and Mansfield.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF CIVILIAN INFLUENCE ON MODERN
ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LAW
The juristic writings of the Interregnum and post-Restoration civiliahs
provide a fascinating picture. These civilians clashed with common lawyers
as they attempted to establish an ideological foothold in the developing
English mercantile law during the Interregnum.I The Restoration saw them on
the defensive as they struggled to protect the jurisdiction of the Admiralty. 2
Finally, as hope faded, the civilians retreated to the sanctuary of academia to
regroup and redefine their goals. 3
We are left with serious questions. Was the greatest civilian promise, as
Ayliffe has asserted, in the reign of Elizabeth after the first Admiralty
settlement of 1575? 4 Did the civilians achieve any substantial incorporation
of civilian doctrine during their control of the Admiralty? And what caused
their later political defeats? These occurred during a period, the Restoration,
which should have been at least a neutral political environment.5 Finally,
what influence did the civilians actually have on the law merchant?
J.H. Baker asked this fundamental question: "Why did it emerge as a
'peculiar and novel principle' [at common law] in the seventeenth century
that a 'custom prevailing between merchants could originate a legal duty'?" 6
See Coquillette, Ideology and Incorporation III: Reason Regulated-The Post-
Restoration English Civilians, 1653-1735, 67 B.U.L. REV. 289, 300-23 (1987).
2 See id. at 323-42.
3 See id. at 342-60.
4 J. AYLIFFE, THE NEW PANDECT OF THE CIVIL LAW ii (London 1734).
, Coquillette, supra note 1, at 324.
6 Baker, The Law Merchant and the Common Law Before 1700, 38 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 295, 298 (1979).
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After conclusively demonstrating that this notion was not derived from some
preexisiting common law theory, Baker examined whether the law merchant
had ever existed as a source of law and, if so, whether it was treated by the
common law courts as law, custom, or usage. 7 Baker concluded that the
common law had never adopted the expedited procedures of the lex mer-
catoria.8 Nor did the substantive mercantile law exist as a coherent system
befor the common law began to give it expression. 9 Even this process had
not developed much by 1700 because mercantile usage "was still treated as a
matter of fact within the province of juries rather than judges." 10 If there was
a law merchant before the early eighteenth century and Mansfield, it was not
imported from the ius gentium. I" Nor was it the law of the specialist mercan-
tile courts. 12 It was, in fact, "nothing more than a refinement of the common
law that always governed mercantile affairs.' "1 3 This process of refinement,
asserted Baker, cannot be characterized as "doctrinal incorporation," that
is, the grafting of ready-made law from other jurisdictions.14 Rather, it was
"a crystallization of principles which had previously been left to the general
knowledge and common sense of city juries." 15 The common law courts, he
concluded, "did not operate those procedures by 'incorporating' a law
merchant, in any of the usually accepted senses of that term. They used
them to create it.' 16
It is striking that Baker simply did not mention the civilian specialists or
the Admiralty. The implication is that, incredibly, they were not a source of
emerging legal doctrines for governing modem commercial transactions. But
I have a thesis that may appear even more odd, at least for someone who has
spent years studying English civilians. It is that Baker is absolutely right.
The direct civilian contribution was surprisingly small. Further, I believe
that this thesis will help explain why the civilians behaved as they did during
the Interregnum and Restoration, and why, despite their great juristic tal-
ents, they lost their key struggles for jurisdiction.
This thesis, if true, raises fundamental questions about the nature of
civilian influence. First, if the common law lex mercatoria was developed
eatirely by common lawyers from mercantile custom, did the civilians also
adapt inchoate mercantile custom in the Admiralty, or at least custom that
was "touched up" for their purposes by reference to civil law? Second, were
civilian legal ideas isolated in the specialty jurisdictions? Was there no direct
Id. at 299.
Id. at 321.
Id.
10 Id.
"1 Id.
12 Id.
3 Id. at 321-22.
14 Id. at 322.
15 Id,
1t6 Id.
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"importation from the ius gentium" into the common law before Mansfield,
either by way of the civilians or any other way? Finally, let us assume that there
was no "incorporation" of a law merchant "in any of the usually accepted
senses of that term" and no "borrowing of ready-made law from other
jurisdictions." 11 Did civilian doctrines simply disappear when civilianjurisdic-
tions were first crippled, and then effectively eliminated? 8
This last hypothesis, if true, would certainly explain the fervor of the
jurisdictional battles of the Interregnum and Restoration, as well as the
emphasis by the civilians on juristic writing. 19 If civilian jurisdictions were
shrinking, and if the common law courts were proving impregnable in prac-
tice to civilian doctrines and procedures, then ideological advocacy and
political action were all that was left to them. If they could not succeed in the
competitive marketplace for legal services or prevail through the established
legal process, political change was their only hope.
Baker's common law research appears to be very convincing. 20 But,
again, he ignores the civilian presence. How can his conclusions be tested in
light of what we know about civilian writing, civilian law practice, and
"special" civilian doctrines? To test his conclusions, I decided to focus
directly on the early development of a famous "special" doctrine of the law
merchant, the bill of exchange. I will then examine the later "modem"
commercial law cases of Holt and Mansfield.
There will be two digressions from commercial law, which are neverthe-
less essential to my conclusion. These concern: 1) civilian influence on
Bacon, Hobbes, Selden, and Hale; and 2) certain of Mansfield's opinions
that do not concern commercial law, but are eloquent as to Mansfield's
judicial philosophy. The reason for these digressions lies in my ultimate
conclusion, that, as Baker's work implies, there was no direct incorporation
of specific civilian doctrines in the commercial law area, but that Holt's and
Mansfield's approach to commercial law problems was influenced by civilian
methodology and jurisprudence. In particular, Holt and Mansfield searched
for an articulable body of principle independent from the strictures of com-
mon law forms of action. This methodology was adumbrated by Holt, but
failed to obtain full fruition until Mansfield.
II. BILLS OF EXCHANGE: A MERCANTILE SPECIALTY
Bills of exchange were originally a method of transporting value without
17 Id.
18 Coquillette, supra note 1, at 342-61.
19 Id. at 300-42.
20 In fact, Baker's article, supra note 6, is the most original discussion of the topic
since Sutherland's brilliant piece appeared in 1934. See Sutherland, The Law Mer-
chant in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, in 17 TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL HIST. SOC'Y 149 (1934).
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carrying bullion and for facilitating mercantile credit." They were probably
first used in Italy in. the twelfth century.2 English merchants were using
21 For the best extant account of the history of bills of exchange in England, see J.
HOLDEN, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAW 4-65
(1955). See also 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 151-70 (2d ed.
1937); W. MITCHELL, AN ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT
34-35 (1904); F. SANBORN, ORIGINS OF THE EARLY ENGLISH MARITIME AND COM-
MERCIAL LAW 215-24 (1930); T.A. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY
323-418 (1906); Beutel, The Development of Negotiable Instruments in Early English
Law, 51 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1938); Fifoot, The Development of the Law of Nego-
tiable Instruments, 1938 J. INST. BANKERS 433; Jenks, The Early History of Nego-
tiable Instruments, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 51-71
(1909) [hereinafter 3 SELECT ESSAYS]. For an account of the earliest English writers
on bills of exchange, see infra note 30.
For two great "classical" accounts, see Cranch, Promissory Notes Before and
After Lord Holt, in 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 367 app. (1804), reprinted in 3 SELECT ESSAYS,
supra, at 72-97 (with some omissions); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
BILLS OF EXCHANGE 1-25 (Boston 1843).
These works built in turn on the leading eighteenth-century treatises, such as J.
BAYLEY, A SHORT TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE (1st ed. Dublin
1789); J. BYLES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY
NOTES, BANK NOTES AND CHEQUES (1st ed. London 1829); J. CHITTY, A TREATISE
ON THE LAWS OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE (1st ed. London 1799); T. CUNNINGHAM, THE
LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY NOTES, BANK-NOTES, AND INSURANCE
(1st ed. London 1760); S. KYD, THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY
NOTES (1st ed. London 1790); P. LOVELASS, A FULL, CLEAR AND FAMILIAR EXPLA-
NATION OF THE LAW CONCERNING BILLS OF EXCHANGE ... (1st ed. London 1789);
and the extensive descriptions in the eighteenth-century law dictionaries and ab-
ridgements, see, e.g., 3 M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 602-14 (3d
ed. London 1768); 1 R. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY
(unpaginated; entry under "Bill of Exchange") (London 1771); G. JACOB, A NEW
LAW DICTIONARY (unpaginated; entry under "Bill of Exchange") (London 1732).
For an account of the earliest English writers on bills of exchange, see BAKER, supra
note 6, at 356-360; see also infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. I am very
indebted to my colleague James S. Rogers for his assistance in compiling this list.
For other interesting treatises of the day, see T. BOND, DIGEST OF FOREIGN
EXCHANGES: CONTAINING AN ABSTRACT OF EXISTING LAWS (Dublin 1795); G.
CROKE, THE MERCHANT, TRADESMAN, AND FARMER'S DIRECTOR: CONTAINING THE
RULES . . . FOR DRAWING, ENDORSING, ACCEPTING, NOTING, AND PROTESTING
FOREIGN AND INLAND BILLS OF EXCHANGE ... WITH ... CASES, DETERMINED BY
LORD MANSFIELD, AND OTHERS (London 1778); S. GODFREY, THE GREAT QUES-
TION OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, CALLED FICTITIOUS, CONSIDERED IN A LETTER ...
(London 1790). For an interesting treatise by a Scottish advocate, see W. FORBES, A
METHODICAL TREATISE CONCERNING BILLS OF EXCHANGE (Edinburgh 1703).
22 See F. SANBORN, supra note 21, at 220-21; Jenks, supra note 21, at 51; Thayer,
infra note 27, at 148. Sanborn located a simple one (drawer only) dated 1156 in
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them by the middle of the fourteenth century, 23 just about the time the
Admiralty court was established.24 By the middle of the sixteenth century,
they had become common in England.15 Bills of exchange were eventually
Genoa, and a standard short form bill dated 1207. The statute, None Shall Take Any
Benefice of an Alien or Convey Money to Him, 3 Rich. II, ch. 3 (1380), mentions bills
of exchange as a way of conveying money out of the Kingdom, but also states that
they were not in use in England. F. SANBORN, supra 21, at 220-21.
23 See A. HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 319 (1973); A.
KIRALFY, A SOURCE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 244-45 (1957); Baker, supra note 6, at
304. See the example of 1300 contained in the London Mayor's Court Rolls. CALEN-
DAR OF EARLY MAYOR'S COURT ROLLS 1298-1307, at 94 (A. Thomas ed. 1924) (entry
of July 11, 1300). I am very indebted to my colleague, James S. Rogers, for this
citation, and for insights into what follows.
24 See J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 106-09 (2d ed.
1979).
25 Id. at 310. Although the bills were eventually used for many purposes, see infra
note 26, a simple example of an early bill arrangement is useful.
Suppose merchant A wished to get a sum of money from Bruges to London without
transporting bullion. A would arrange with B, a Bruges banker or merchant with a
partner in London, C, to direct C to give A or A's agent the specified sum in English
currency. A, the remitter, would give the sum to B, the drawer, who would charge a
commission. B would then provide A a letter without a seal directing C, the drawee,
to give the money to A or to A's agent, or to another payee, or "to bearer," or later,
to A's order. That letter was the "bill of exchange." See 1 W. STRAHAN, THE CIVIL
LAW IN THE NATURAL ORDER TOGETHER WITH THE PUBLICK LAW ... WRITTEN IN
FRENCH BY MONSIEUR DOMAT ... AND TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY WILLIAM
STRAHAN LL.D.... WITH ADDITIONAL REMARKS ON SOME MATERIAL DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THE CIVIL LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND 231 (2d ed. London 1737).
This is obviously a simplified picture, but it is important to focus on two facts.
First, there was no legal relationship between C, the London partner, and merchant
A unless C "accepted" the letter, usually by writing on it. If C did not provide the
money as agreed, A could bring an action only against B, the drawer. C was not
under a duty to pay A, and the key question was what kind of duty C had to B.
Second, these bills were eventually often made to "A, on his order." In this form, A
could assign the note to another party, D, by writing something as simple as "pay to
D" on the back of the letter and signing it. What rights did an endorsee, like D, have
against the acceptor, against the drawer, or against the endorser?
For an excellent reproduction of a typical bill by Hubert Hall, see 3 SELECT CASES
CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT 117 (Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 49, 1932). The bill
dated from 1436 and was made at
Bruges in the parts of Flanders, by John Audeley, factor and attorney of Elias
Davy, merchant, written, made and directed to the same Elias, his master, to
pay the same thirty pounds to a certain John Burton, merchant, or to the bearer
of the letter aforesaid, in these words: "To my very honoured master Elias Davy,
mercer, at London, let this be given: Very honoured sir, please it you to know
that I have received here of John Burton, by exchange, £30. payable at London
to the aforesaid John or to the bearer of this letter of payment on the 14th day of
March next coming, by this my first and second letter of payment. And I pray
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used for things that had nothing to do with their original purposes, perhaps
even before they were being routinely enforced. They were used as de facto
promissory notes, documents of insurance, vehicles for speculation and
limited risk sharing, negotiable instruments, vehicles for discounting, a kind
of primitive traveler's check, and even as a means of gambling.26 In England,
you that it may be well paid at the day. Written at Bruges, the 10th day of
December, by your attorney John Audeley, etc."
The bill was featured in a case brought by the payee, John Burton, and the bearer,
John Walden, against the drawee, Elias Davy. On proof that Audeley had received
Burton's money "by exchange," Elias was ordered to pay the bearer "according to
the law merchant and custom of the city of London, in such cases used and approved
from a time of which no memory survives." Id. at 117-18. This came from an order by
the Chancery to the London "court merchant" to produce the record, doubtless so
that Elias could appeal liability as a drawee. Id. at 117. It had already been brought up
before "his [King's] justices at Westminster" and remitted back to the London
court. Id. at 118-19.
The depiction of early bill of exchange transactions here presented represents the
consensus of the standard works on the legal history of bills of exchange. Indeed, it
had become the conventional story as early as the time of the first real English legal
treatises on bills of exchange. See, e.g., S. KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BILLS
OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES 1-3 (London 1790). My colleague, James S.
Rogers, however, is engaged in research on the history of negotiable instruments law
and practice, and he has advised me that his tentative conclusion is that the tradi-
tional picture-especially the assumption that early bill transactions were solely a
matter of funds transmission through bankers or other financial professionals-may
be rather misleading. See, for example, the picture of early bills of exchange in
Powers, The Wool Trade in the Fifteenth Century, in STUDIES IN ENGLISH TRADE IN
THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 68-70 (E. Power & M. Postan eds. 1932).
26 As Sutherland has pointed out, bills of exchange and policies of insurance were
"instruments of a strong legal similarity." Sutherland, supra note 20, at 176. Malynes
demonstrated how bills of exchange were actually used like insurance. See generally
G. MALYNES, CONSUETODO, VEL, LEX MERCATORIA 260-74 (2d ed. London 1685)
(London 1622), discussed in J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 4-65; see also infra note
110. The voyage could be financed in part by one who accepted a bill of exchange in
return. The bill, payable within a certain number of days from the safe arrival of the
ship, would be carried on the ship itself. The speculator would calculate the risk into
the exchange rate. If the ship were lost, the note would not be payable. Thus an owner
could hedge risk on a voyage by part financing through such bills. See generally W.
BEAWES, LEX MERCATORIA REDIVIVA 448-92 (4th ed. London 1783); 8 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 273-93; 2 C. MOLLOY, DE JURE MARITIMO ET
NAVALI 86-118 (10th ed. London 1778); Vance, The Early History of Insurance Law,
in 3 SELECT ESSAYS, supra note 21, at 98-116.
Eventually, the form of the bill of exchange was adapted for at least fourteen
purposes, some closely related, and I am certain there were more: 1) transfer of funds
without risk of transporting bullion; 2) changing currency; 3) a crypto-promissory
note; 4) loans outside the usury laws; 5) insurance contracts; 6) commercial specula-
tion; 7) risk sharing; 8) pure gambling, see C. MOLLOY, supra note 26, at 113; An Act
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their most important use was as an instrument of credit. This had a definite
effect on their English development.2 7
English bills of exchange were enforceable against the drawer at both
common law and in the Admiralty. By the middle of the 1500s, they were
enforced in the King's Bench by "general assumpsit." The Admiralty's
concurrent jurisdiction over bills of exchange was assured by the Settlement
of 1575, along with bills of lading, insurance, and bottomry. 28 One fair
question would be whether these bills were treated differently by the civilian
jurisdiction than by the common law courts and, if so, could the differences
be attributed to civil law doctrines or procedures? 29
for the Better Preventing of Excessive and Deceptful Gaming, 9 Ann., ch. 14 (1709);
9) negotiability; 10) for money advanced on a letter of credit, see C. MOLLOY, supra
note 26, at 114; 11) discounting by purchase before a due date, see A. HARDING,
supra note 23, at 319 (1973); 12) as an absolute substitute for currency in places such
as Scotland and America, see id. at 320; 13) primitive traveler's checks, see T. HILL,
HILL'S MANUAL OF SOCIAL AND BUSINESS FORMS 96 (Chicago 1886); and 14) as bank
checks, see T. PARSONS, THE LAWS OF BUSINESS FOR BUSINESS MEN 94 (Boston
1866) (observing that "[a] check on a bank is undoubtedly a bill of exchange").
21 See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text; see also M.D. CHALMERS, DIGEST
OF THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE xlix (10th ed. 1932); Thayer, Comparative Law
and the Law Merchant, 6 BROOKLYN L. REv. 139, 149-50 (1936). As Thayer ob-
served:
The importance of the bill of exchange in medieval commerce lay in the
essential fact that by its use the necessity for a physical transfer of money from
place to place could be avoided. The entire theory of French law in regard to bills
of exchange from the ordinance of 1673 until 1935, had been grounded in this
basic mercantile view of the transaction. In England, where the absorption of the
law merchant into the common law was taking place during the same century
that witnessed the evolution of commercial banking, the chief function of the bill
of exchange was conceived to be as an instrument of credit rather than as the
documentary representative of an actual exchange transaction.
Id.
28 There is some question whether the Settlement of 1575 was, in fact, actually
signed, or even concluded. Coke denied it. E. COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 136 (6th ed. London 1681). It may not have
been signed by the Judges. See 2 SELECT PLEAS IN THE COURT OF THE ADMIRALTY
xiv (Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 11, R. Marsden ed. 1897) [hereinafter 2 SELECT PLEAS].
Copies of the agreement dated May 12, 1575 do exist. There is one curious fact: the
Act Book for 1574, where the agreement was supposed to have been entered,
disappeared. Id. at xiv. See also 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 313-32 (1st ed.
1903).
29 Even the application of civil law did not automatically mean that the bills would
be treated differently from the common law. Matthew Hale, among others, argued
that civil law was applied at common law in maritime and other appropriate cases, as
by the law of England it should apply. 2 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 28, at lxxx; G.
KEETON, ENGLISH LAW, THE JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION 185 (1974).
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A. Problems in Practice Associated with Bills of Exchange.
Before looking at legal doctrine it is worth examining bills of exchange
from the perspective of seventeenth-century merchants who, like their coun-
terparts today, were concerned more with practical execution than legal
theory.30 For example, determining who, as a matter of custom, could
legitimately use bills of exchange was an important practical issue. Malynes
defined bills as valid between merchants only, 31 and there is some evidence
of an even narrower early construction, in which only merchant strangers
trading with English merchants could use the bills.3 2 Although not clearly
30 Thanks to the early English merchant writers, particularly Gerard Malynes,
John Marius, Richard Dafforne, John Carpenter, and, somewhat later, Wyndham
Beawes, we know quite a bit about these problems, even though there are limited
legal records. See supra note 26; J. CARPENTER, A MosT EXCELLENT INSTRUCTION
FOR KEEPING MERCHANTS BOOKES OF ACCOUNTS (London 1632); W. BEAWES, LEX
MERCATORIA REDIVIVA (1st ed. London 1751) (reprinted in 1761 (2d ed.), 1771 (3d
ed.) and 1783 (4th ed.)) R. DAFFORNE, LATE ACCOMPTANT, THE MERCHANTS MIR-
RORS (London 1684); L. ROBERTS, THE MERCHANTS MAPPE OF COMMERCE (London
1638). The Dafforne and Carpenter books have recently been reproduced in fac-
simile, by Professional Books Ltd. (Abingdon 1981) and Walter J. Johnson (Amster-
dam 1975), respectively.
Wyndham Beawes' great LEX MERCATORIA REDIVIVA (1st ed. London 1751)
(hereafter REDIVIVA), was reprinted in 1761 (2d ed.), 1771 (3d ed.), and 1783 (4th
ed.). The latter edition has also been republished in facsimile by Gregg International
Publishers Ltd. (Farnborough 1970). There were five later editions of REDIVIVA,
including a sixth edition which was considerably enlarged and improved by Joseph
Chitty (London 1813). See 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 384-85, 754-56.
Worrall gives the first edition as 1751. See J. WORRALL, BIBLIOTHECA LEGUM
ANGLIAE 229 (2d ed. 1788); see also Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorporation
II: Sir Thomas Ridley, Charles Molloy, and the Literary Battle for the Law Merchant
1607-1676, 61 B.U.L. REV. 315, 356-63 (1981) (discussing the contributions of
Malynes and Marius).
Collections of commercial records in London and elsewhere have only been
examined with any care in relatively recent times, and they could tell us even more.
See, e.g., SELECT PLEAS AND MEMORANDA OF THE CITY OF LONDON, 1381-1412 (A.
Thomas ed. 1932) [hereinafter SELECT PLEAS AND MEMORANDA]; CALENDAR OF
EARLY MAYOR'S COURT ROLLS 1298-1307 (A. Thomas ed. 1924); CALENDAR OF
PLEA AND MEMORANDA ROLLS 1323-1364 (A. Thomas ed. 1926); CALENDAR OF
PLEA AND MEMORANDA ROLLS 1364-1381 (A. Thomas ed. 1929); CALENDAR OF
SELECT PLEA AND MEMORANDA ROLLS 1381-1412 (A. Thomas ed. 1932); CALENDAR
OF PLEA AND MEMORANDA ROLLS 1413-1437 (A. Thomas ed. 1943); CALENDAR OF
PLEA AND MEMORANDA ROLLS 1413-1457 (P. Jones ed. 1954); CALENDAR OF PLEA
AND MEMORANDA ROLLS 1458-1482 (P. Jones ed. 1961); THE LAWES OF THE MAR-
KET (Walter J. Johnson, Inc. rev. ed. 1974) (London 1595).
3' G. MALYNES, supra note 26, at 378.
32 See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 169 (2d ed. 1937) (quoting Bromwich
v. Lloyd, 125 Eng. Rep. 870 (1697)).
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articulated by the mercantile writers, there was a notion that bills of ex-
change were a "specialty" in the old sense, not as a document under seal,
but literally "special" because of the peculiar status of the participants
which, in turn, customarily attracted "special law," as did so many transac-
tions in medieval England. ' 33
33 The definition of a "specialty" found in modern law dictionaries is "a contract
[or document] under seal." BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 1571 (4th ed. 1968) [hereinaf-
ter BLACK'S]; THE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 1683 (2d ed. 1959); see also 3
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 3100 (8th ed. 1914) [hereinafter BOUVIER'S] (a spe-
cialty is a writing sealed and delivered) (quoting Taylor v. Blasser, 2 Serg. & Rawle
501, 503 (Pa. 1816)). Modern courts have expanded the definition. See Carruthers v.
Peninsula Life Ins. Co., 150 Fla. 467, 469, 7 So. 2d 841, 842 (1952) (A corporate seal
not necessary where "formality indicates that the instrument was intended to be a
specialty."), quoted in BLACK'S, supra, at 1571.
The word as used in English law up until the eighteenth century, however, had a
broader definition. Anything which, because of its form or content, attracted "special
law" was called a "specialty," 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 90, including
some agreements not in writing. A deed was only a kind of a "specialty," which
depended for its special status at law, not just on a seal, but on writing and delivery,
as well. Goddard's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 396 (London 1584). In fact, it was the
exception made by the law which was originally termed "a specialty," rather than the
writing itself. See, e.g., J. COWELL, THE INTERPRETER OR BOOKE CONTAINING THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF WORDS (unpaginated, under "Specialty") (T. Manley ed. London
1701) (Cambridge 1607) ("A specialty is taken for a Bond, Bill or such like Instru-
ment.") (emphasis added). By 1732, a "specialty" was defined as being the writing
itself, but "under the Hand and Seal" was given only as an alternative meaning to
"any Bond, Bill, or such like Instrument." G. JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY
(unpaginated, under "Specialty") (2d ed. London 1732). Good bills were often not
under seal if they were mercantile documents, see W. WEST, THE FIRST PART OF
SYMBOLEOGRAPHY §§ 1659-61 (rev. ed. London 1615) (1st ed. London 1590); C.
MOLLOY, supra note 26, at 288 (8th ed. London 1707), and therefore "mercantile
specialties were given special treatment" in Lord Nottingham's Chancery. See H.
NOTTINGHAM, PROLEGOMENA OF CHANCERY AND EQUITY 315 (D.E.C. Yale ed.
1965) (demonstrating that "specialties" were used widely for mercantile bills). As in
the modern case of Carruthers, the Chancery looked beyond the form and to the
parties where a "special" setting was alleged.
The Year Books show that Cowell's definition was the one originally used at
common law. For example, covenant "required a specialty" but, as Holmes ob-
served, "prescription was said to be a sufficiently good specialty." O.W. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 394 (1892); see Y.B. 32 & 33 Edw. I, 430. For a "special
custom" attracting a "specialty," see 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 136 and
cases cited. For another example, see J. COWELL, supra (unpaginated). Finally,
Bracton never mentions the seal, but problems of "special" law by prescription,
which supersede ordinary common law rules, are discussed at length, see 1 BRACTON
ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND *f. 180 (S. Thorne trans. 1968), and
described as analogous to conditions which could be attached to the Roman
Stipulatio. Id. at *f. 17b; 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 90. 2 F. POLLOCK &
F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 208 (2d ed. 1898).
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Merchants needed to convey purchasing power across international bor-
ders without the hazards attendant with carrying bullion. They also needed
the convenience of having the right currency payable in the right place.
Lastly, and perhaps most important, they needed bills of exchange as a
vehicle for credit. This credit need, central to trade, was recognized in
England by at least the 1560s. 34
Limiting bills of exchange to merchants was still prevalent in 1622, at least
in Malynes' view. By the time Marius' little treatise3 5 appeared in 1651,
however, bills of exchange were no longer tied, even in theory, to the
Such an historic use of "specialty" is consistent with three possible origins of the
word as used at English law. Holmes, Holdsworth and Salmond all seem to assume
that it came from the English Law. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 90; J. W.
SALMOND, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL HISTORY 93-94 (1891); O.W.
HOLMES, supra, at 394. But it would seem more likely that it came from the Law
French, the language of the Year Book cases, where it is first found. "Specifer," in
the old French, meant "to make mention of." E. NUTT & R. GOSSING, LAW FRENCH
DICTIONARY (unpaginated) under "Specifier." (London 1718). Did mention of"spe-
cial" law in the covenant originally attract such law? Indeed, the covenant originally
had to "recite" the form. Goddard's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 396 (1584). Was the same
true of "mercantile specialties"? Certainly early mercantile bills did recite "special
law," even where there was no seal, and the parties were labeled "Merchant" at
every point and their names were given in the sample instruments contained in the
SYMBOLEOGRAPHY. W. WEST, supra, at §§ 655-75. Even more intriguing would be a
direct Latin origin from the medieval "Roman" law's interpretation of the original
Institutes' use of"Specificatio" as a way of acquiring property. INSTITUTES II. I. 19,
Comment 98-99 (7th ed. T.C. Sandars ed. 1883); W. BUCKLAND, A TExT-BOOK OF
ROMAN LAW 215-19 (3d ed. P. Stein ed. 1966). Such a connection would require
more research. But see H. VULTEJUS, IN INSTITUTIONES JURIS CIVILIS A JUS-
TINIANO COMPOSITAS COMMENTARIUS 167 (4th ed. Frankfurt 1629) ("Specificatio,
Quid Sit"). According to Buckland, the term "Specificatio" is entirely medieval.
W. BUCKLAND, supra, at 215; see also H. JOLOWICz, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 144 (2d ed. 1954). Could the idea of "making your own
thing" have slipped to the Law French "specifer" and then into Cowell's meaning of
"Specialty"? This argument, if proven, would serve to illustrate the importance of
medieval Roman Law in shaping the Law French vocabulary, despite the traditional
views of English legal historians to the contrary.
As late as 1803, "specialty" still had a dual meaning, with the narrower one, "deed
under seal," given second. T. POTTS, A COMPENDIOUS LAW DICTIONARY 541 (1803);
see G. JACOB, supra (under "Specialty"). How did it attain its "modern" narrow
definition, even at a time when men like Holmes and Holdsworth knew and used the
word in its proper historical sense? One likely possibility is that Blackstone used
"specialty" only in the narrower sense. See 2 W: BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*465 (London 1766). 1 have a set of eighteenth-century student law notes that use the
narrower definition; the student attributes Blackstone. There are undoubtedly other
possible explanations.
34 A. HARDING, supra note 23, at 119.
'5 J. MARIUS, ADVICE CONCERNING BILLS OF EXCHANGE (London 1651).
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function of changing money for international transfer, and so-called "inland
bills" between merchants in the same country were explicitly recognized.3"
Finally, by the end of the seventeenth century, bills of exchange could be
used by anyone.3 7 This expansion created serious theoretical problems for
civilians and common lawyers alike,3 8 yet it must have been a great relief to
the merchant, whose ability to convey wealth and credit through bills of
exchange no longer depended on the status of the parties involved.
Defining legitimate uses for bills of exchange was another issue confront-
ing merchants. The old prohibitions against usury promoted bills of ex-
change, particularly as a means of establishing credit, although both
Malynes and Molloy decried the so-called "dry exchange," or cambio sicco,
and the "fictitious exchange," which were transactions designed solely to
conceal a usurious loan.3 9 By the time of Holt, and perhaps much earlier,
bills of exchange were being used as vehicles for loans and insurance, quite
apart from any need to transfer wealth. 40 As new uses developed, old
restrictions grew cumbersome.
A third common concern among merchants related to the actual
mechanics of bills of exchange. There was many a slip between the cup and
the lip in these transactions and, in time, every conceivable mix-up oc-
curred. For example, a typical arrangement can be understood in legal terms
as involving the performance of two obligations: the undertaking between
the remitter and the drawer, and the undertaking, if any, between the drawer
and the drawee. The remitter conveyed value to the drawer in exchange for
the bill. It was understood, at least between these two parties, that the bill
would be accepted and paid by the drawee. The payee, the one intended to
receive the money, was not party to any of these contracts, unless he was
the original remitter, and his rights appeared to be entirely derivative-even
assuming no negotiability. To make matters even more complex, drawees
frequently did not have any formal relations with drawers, and some bills
were honored, or not, entirely as a matter of discretion. Indeed, sometimes a
bill would be "accepted for honor" by a party who was not the named
drawee. 41
Most bills were payable a specific time after the date of the bill (i.e., "'at
usance" or "double usance," a "usance" being the conventional time for
exchange between two particular cities), or a certain number of days
36 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 169.
37 Id. at 169. See Witherly v. Sarfield, 89 Eng. Rep. 491 (Ex. Ch. 1690), in which a
"Gentleman" traveling in Paris drew a bill on his father in England, who refused. Per
Holt: "But this drawing a bill must surely make him a trader for that purpose, for we
all have bills . . . which all must be avoidable, if the negotiating of a bill will not
oblige." Id. at 492. My gratitude again to James S. Rogers.
38 See infra notes 60-251 and accompanying text.
39 G. MALYNES, supra note 26, at 201.
40 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
41 See G. MALYNES, supra note 26, at 273; see also supra notes 141, 241.
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"sight." The payee would present the bill to the drawee for "acceptance,"
frequently before the bill was payable. Once the drawee "accepted" the bill,
usually by writing on it, a third relationship was established-the relation-
ship between the acceptor and the payee. This relationship was one of
reliance; the payee would naturally rely on the acceptor's promise to honor
the bill at the specified time. 42
A staggering number of things could go wrong in these three relation-
ships-remitter to drawer, drawer to drawee, drawee/acceptor to payee-
ranging from the ludicrous to the infinitely complex. The bill could be lost in
transit, or lost by one of the parties before it was accepted. It could be lost
by the drawer after it was accepted but before it was due. 43 It could also be
stolen, forged, or damaged. One solution to these problems was to issue two
or three identical bills with the condition that each was payable by the
drawer unless one of the other bills in the set was accepted earlier. 44 Al-
though each bill was usually numbered and indicated on its face that there
were others, multiple bills increased the risk of error and forgery. On which
party did these risks fall?
Other problems could arise. The payee, despite a "diligent search, ' 45
might never find the drawee. The bill might be delayed "by contrary wind"
beyond the period regarded as reasonable. 46 One of the parties to the bill
may have died. 47 Bad faith and bankruptcy opened new vistas of complexity.
A drawee, upon learning of the drawer's insolvency, might choose not to
accept the bill. News of the drawer's insolvency might not reach the drawee
until after acceptance. The drawer may have countermanded the bill, per-
haps because the remitter had defrauded him or, as sometimes happened,
because his servant had drawn the bill and absconded with the money.
The relationship between the acceptor and the payee was also full of
potential difficulties. What constituted a valid acceptance was far from
self-evident. Suppose the bill was "accepted," not by the drawee, but by his
wife or servant, which happened fairly often. Was the acceptance good?
What about conditioned acceptances, parol acceptances, or partial accep-
tances? Suppose the payee did not appear, but his agent or some other party
came to call for the money. Or suppose the "payee" section of the bill was
blank. Was the acceptance good under these circumstances? Did it bind the
drawee? Could the drawee safely pay someone other than a named payee?
What apparent authority should be required on either side?48
42 W. BEAWES, supra note 26, at 452. For a discussion of "usance," see G.
MALYNES, supra note 26, at 268-69. Again, I am grateful to my colleague James S.
Rogers for this citation.
43 See 2 C. MOLLOY, supra note 26, at 105-07.
44 Id. at 294-95.
45 Id. at 112.
46 Id. at 107-08.
47 Id. at 297.
48 See generally W. BEAWES, supra note 26, at 448-87.
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The payee could bring an action against the drawer for repayment if the
drawee did not accept the bill, but the bill had to be presented, rejected, and
a formal "protest," usually notarized, made before recourse could be had
back to the drawer. Inadequacy of protest was a standard defense of draw-
ers, so its mechanics, too, became a source of numerous disputes. The
protest had to be "reasonable." Due notice had to be given to the drawer,
who only then would be responsible for repayment, together with "interest
and charges." 4 9 These requirements sparked endless wrangling; the form
and reasonableness of the protest were hotly contested as every conceivable
complication arose. Who, if anyone, could protest the bill if the payee
died? 50 Was a protest necessary if the acceptor had become insolvent before
payment?"1
These practical problems concerned merchants far more than any legal
theory. Merchants wanted certain, clear mechanical answers to these prob-
lems, as well as a law that was sufficiently flexible and sensible to do
practical justice in unforseen circumstances.5 2
Yet the merchants eventually wanted one thing more-negotiability. They
wanted to use bills of exchange, not as a limited medium for the transfer of
money and credit, but as the money itself. For this to succeed, bills had to be
freely transferable from named payees to other parties through endorse-
ment. This was done by making the bill payable to the payee "on order" or
"to his assigns" and by treating each transfer by endorsement as, in effect,
the drawing of a new bill. 53 Thus if the payee, X, endorsed the bill to Y, X
became a drawer and Y became the new payee; this could go on ad
infinitum. Some bills contained so many endorsements that attachments had
to be added just to make room for the new signatures.
But all this required that the drawee accept the bill. But no drawee in his
right mind would pay to a fourth or fifth endorsement "payee" or 'to
bearer" without some very specific guarantees. For example, a drawee had
to be assured that a bill could be validly transferred by endorsement and
delivery alone. He also needed the benefit of an irrebuttable presumption
that the bill was transferred for received value on "consideration," and that
such value need not actually move from the holder of the bill. 54 This pre-
sented a severe theoretical barrier to a final "payee" trying to enforce a bill
by a common law action of assumpsit.55
Finally, by the eighteenth century merchants became concerned about
defects in the chain of endorsements that cut off rights of action against the
49 2 C. MOLLOY, supra note 26, at 98.
50 Id. at 197.
SI Id. at 98 (noting that usually there was an affirmative answer to this question).
52 See Coquillette, supra note 30, at 346-63.
51 See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 163.
54 Id. at 167.
55 See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
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drawee; a bona fide holder did not want to worry about anything besides the
good credit of the drawee and original drawer. The protection of the holder
in due course was the most massive doctrinal leap of all. It was the alchemy
that turned paper, quite literally, into gold. 56
But the doctrinal barriers were formidable. A simple, non-negotiable bill
was bad enough, but here there could be dozens of secondary "drawers"
and "payees," all with potential rights against each other in the event of
default, as well as a final holder at the end of the line whose faith in the bill
must be protected at all costs.
Who ought to be sued first if the chain broke? The most proximate
endorser, the only party with whom the ultimate endorsee might have
privity? The drawee? The original drawer? 57 What kind of notice was re-
quired? What form of protest? Did it make any difference if the bill was sold
rather than endorsed?18 Was an endorser an agent of the payee (procurator
in rem suam)? How could one be certain that, on its face, the bill was in good
order (omnia rite acta)?59 Who would bear the risks? Who should benefit
from the presumptions?
B. The Early Legal Experience with Bills of Exchange in England
The scope of these problems-both in practice and in theory-goes a very
long way toward explaining the early English experience with bills of ex-
change. Without recapitulating all of the extensive research on this subject,
five generalizations can be safely made. 60
First, non-negotiable bills of exchange were used in England by the
fourteenth century, undoubtedly inspired by commercial dealings with the
Italian trading cities, where they were used even earlier. 6' Second, the bills,
or at least the obligations they represented arising from the exchange trans-
action, were being enforced in the staple courts, in the borough courts, in the
11 The common law "black letter" characteristic of negotiable instruments re-
quires an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money payable on
demand or at a fixed or determinable future time. See Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242
N.Y. 38, 48, 150 N.E. 594, 597 (1926); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 165. An
instrument payable on a contingency is not negotiable, even after the event occurs in
fact, nor is it negotiable if there is any promise in the instrument to do any act but pay
a sum certain. Id. My colleague, James S. Rogers, is engaged in fundamental
research on the distinction between early concepts of negotiability, which focused on
the ability to transfer freely, as opposed to later notions, which focused on cutting off
defenses against a holder in due course.
57 2 C. MOLLOY, supra note 26, at 90.
51 Id. at 115-16.
19 T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 667 (5th ed.
1956).
60 See supra note 21 and sources cited.
"' See F. SANBORN, supra note 21, at 220-21; T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 59,
at 659-62; C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 320 (1949).
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courts of the cinque ports, and, later, in the Admiralty Court.62 Third, recent
research by Baker and others suggest that bills of exchange were also being
enforced in the common law courts through action on the case, although
more as an issue of fact alleged in a general assumpsit count than pursuant to
some separately articulated legal principle. 63 Finally, there is no evidence of
a conscious incorporation of foreign legal doctrines as to the enforceability
or assignment of the early non-negotiable bills. Nor is there evidence that
doctrines of negotiability were thus imported. Rather, bills of exchange
developed more as a "specialty"-a special law apart from the common
jurisprudence, designed to accommodate the special needs and purposes of
a particular group.
6 4
By the middle of the fourteenth century, at approximately the time that
bills of exchange were becoming prevalent among English merchants, 65 the
Again, I am grateful to James S. Rogers for the valuable distinction between
enforcing "a bill" and protecting the obligation arising from the exchange relation-
ship represented by the bill. The closest genuine early civil law influence would be
through the Venetian and Genoese mercantile customs, to the extent these utilized a
civilian basis. See R. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 66 (4th ed. 1976).
There was certainly a major Genoese trade with England, as the numerous "spoiler"
cases indicate. See, e.g., I SELECT PLEAS IN THE COURT OF THE ADMIRALTY
xxviii-xxix (Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 6, 1894) [hereinafter I SELECT PLEAS]. See
generally S. SCACCIA, TRACTATUS DE COMMERCIIS, ET CAMBIO (Rome 1618); B.
STRACCA, DE MERCATURA SEU MERCATORE TRACTATUS (Venice 1553).
63 See Baker, supra note 6, at 308-22.
4 See supra note 33 and sources cited (describing the use and development of the
concept of "specialty"). The earliest mention of bills of exchange in England were
often oblique references in connection with more central concerns. Thus, "letter[s]
of exchange" were mentioned in the statute of None Shall Take any Benefice of an
Alien or Convey Money to Him, 3 Rich. 2 ch. 3 (1380), as one vehicle for draining
money out of the Kingdom-widely regarded as a major economic evil at the time.
See F. PULTON, A COLLECTION OF SUNDRIE STATUTES 205-06 (London 1632); see
also R. POUND & T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, READINGS ON THE HISTORY OF SYSTEM OF
THE COMMON LAW 226-33 (3d ed. 1927) (reviewing the opinion of Cockburn, C.J., in
Goodwin v. Robarts, 10 L.R.-Ex. 337, 346 (Ex. 1875)).
15 By 1360, bills payable to bearers or assigns were circulating among London
merchants, often in connection with Lombard dealings, and they can be found from
then on in the London Corporation records and other municipal collections. See
Postan, Private Financial Instruments in Medieval England, 23 VIERTEL-
JAHRSCHRIFT FUR SOZIAL-UND WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICTE 26 (1930), reprinted in M.
POSTAN, MEDIEVAL TRADE OF FINANCE (1973). (My thanks again to James S.
Rogers). An excellent example is Camby v. Surdouch, London Corporation Records:
Plea and Memoranda Roll, ref. A. 10, m.4 (A.D. 1364) (Equitable Jurisdiction),
discussed in A. KIRALFY, supra note 23, at 244-45. The Borough court was puzzled
by the exact form of the transaction, which was like a bill of exchange-payable in a
different currency in a foreign country, but with the drawer and drawee being
identical, which made it also like a promissory note. See infra note 98. Distinguished
scholars, such as Joseph Story, would agonize about whether a bill of exchange could
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Admiralty Court began to emerge as an important, specialized element of the
English legal system. 66 The Admiralty's success and growth through the late
fourteenth century is reflected by statutes enacted in 1389, 1391, and 1400 to
curtail its influence. 67 These ultimately failed, and the beginning of the
sixteenth century saw a powerful monarch, Henry VIII, dispensing with
most statutory limits on the court's jurisdiction and providing it, and its
civilian practitioners, with a clear mandate for growth and influence.
6 8
Although bills of exchange had always been an important part of the
Admiralty's jurisdiction, the Admiralty was neither the first, the last, nor
even the most important forum for the development of negotiable commer-
cial paper in England. 69 Rather, the Admiralty, as Beutel has demonstrated,
was prominent in only one of the four stages of this development. 70 The first
stage, consisting of the period before the adoption of the Statute of Staples in
1353,71 was dominated by the development of Jewish obligatory notes and
have only two parties and whether the drawer and drawee had to be separate
individuals. Story concluded that "[T]he Drawer may at once become Drawer,
Payee, and Drawee; as, for example, if he should draw a Bill on himself, payable to
his own order, at a particular place, naming no Drawee, and then should indorse it
over, the Indorsee might sue him as Acceptor of the Bill, or as maker of a Promissory
note, at his election." J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS or Ex-
CHANGE 50 (3d ed. Boston 1853). On the other hand, the drawee and the payee had to
be distinct persons, "for every Bill of Exchange presupposes a duty of the Drawee to
pay the money to some other person than himself." Id. at 56.
That such bills were enforced by the borough courts, particularly when foreign
traders were involved, has been established. A. KIRALFY, supra note 23, at 244-45;
see Goodwin v. Robarts, 10 L.R.-Ex. 337, 346 (Ex. 1875); J. HOLDEN, supra note 21,
at 21-29; R. POUND & T.F.T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 64, at 227
66 See T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 59, at 661; Steckly, Merchants and the
Admiralty Court During the English Revolution, 22 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 137, 141-42
(1978); F. WISWALL, JR., THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND
PRACTICE SINCE 1800, at 4-6 (1970). See generally Marsden, Introduction to 1
SELECT PLEAS, supra note 62, at xvii-xliii (explaining and summarizing early Admi-
ralty cases).
67 See A Remedy for Him Who is Wrongfully Pursued in the Court of Admiralty, 2
Hen. 4, ch. 11 (1400), In What Places the Admiral's Jurisdiction Doth Be, 15 Rich. 2
ch. 3 (1391), What Things the Admiral and His Deputy Shall Meddle, 13 Rich. 2, ch. 5
(1389), reprinted in A. KIRALFY, supra note 23, at 353-54; see also J. BAKER, supra
note 24, at 107-08; C. FIFOOT, supra note 61, at 292.
61 See Marsden, supra note 66, at xi-xix; Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorpo-
ration I: The English Civilian Writers, 1523-1607, 61 B.U.L. REV. 1, 13-19 (1981); 1
W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 313-32 (1st ed. 1903); Steckley, supra note 66, at
141.
69 See generally Beutel, The Development of Negotiable Instruments in Early
English Law, 51 HARV. L. REV. 813, 813-47 (1938).
70 Id. at 834-37.
7' See Statute of Staples, 27 Ed. 3, stat. 2 (1353).
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"fair bonds." 7 Although these instruments were assignable, they did not cut
off bona fide purchasers for value and had nothing to do with the Admi-
ralty. 73 There is also no evidence of civilian influence in the development of
these instruments,7 4 although they were to be found both inside and outside
of England.7" There was far more Roman law to be found in Bracton and
other great common law treatises.
7 6
The second stage began after the Statute of Staples and lasted until Henry
VIII strengthened the Admiralty in the early sixteenth century.7 7 The staple
towns during this period not only boasted a fairly sophisticated recording
system, but also permitted widespread assignment of promissory notes
and bills of exchange.78 Bearers were suing on assigned notes as early as
1414, and by 1437 something very close to a modem bill of exchange had
evolved.7 9 Payees and holders could recover against drawees and drawers,
and against endorsers and transferrers, as well. 80
Of course, this second stage was still vastly different from a modem
system of commercial law. Almost all of these cases were recorded in the
special statutory courts of the staple, and they involved merchants only.8'
Further, apart from the statutory scheme itself, and a few primitive books of
customs such as the Little Red Book of Bristol,12 there was no written law
merchant, and no discernable doctrinal framework, either from civilian or
72 See Beutel, supra note 69, at 814-21 (for a discussion of "fair bonds").
73 See id.; see generally 1 SELECT CASES ON THE LAW MERCHANT 70-127 (Selden
Soc'y Pub. No. 23, 1908); SELECT PLEAS, STARRS & RECORDS OF THE JEWISH
EXCHEQUER 39, 94 (Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 15, 1901); 3 EXCHEQUER OF THE JEWS
264-65 (J. Jenkinson ed. 1929).
74 For a discussion of the additional flexibility of civilian systems in mercantile
cases and the difficulties they have experienced because of the "basic dichotomy
between 'civil' and 'commercial' law," see Schlesinger, The Uniform Commercial
Code in the Light of Comparative Law, 1 INTER-AM. L. REV. 11, 36, 40 (1959).
According to Schlesinger, English "incorporation" of commercial law prevented
those problems in Anglo-American systems. Id. at 40. For an analysis of the impor-
tant growth of the theory of ius gentium, see Sutherland, supra note 20, at 158-59.
75 The French Ordinance of Exchange of 1673 and the Ordinance of Marine Law
and Insurance of 1681 were examples of complete "reception of the Law Merchant
into national law." Sutherland, supra note 20, at 358. To English civilians, however,
they were evidence of the ius gentium. See Coquillette, supra note 30, at 351-53; see
also infra note 448.
76 See 1 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND xxvi-xxxvii (S.
Thome trans. 1968).
77 See Beutel, supra note 69, at 826-33.
71 See id.
79 See, e.g., 3 SELECT CASES, supra note 25, at 117; Beutel, supra note 69, at
830-31.
80 Beutel, supra note 69, at 830-31.
81 See id. at 826-32.
82 THE LITTLE RED BOOK OF BRISTOL (F. Bickely ed. 1900) (original c. 1280). See
Coquillette, supra note 1, at 298 n.24.
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common law sources. 83 The staple system itself owed much to the experi-
ences of the Jewish Exchequer, and the instruments involved were also
influenced by the continental trade and practices, especially those of the
Lombards.8 4 But there was no doctrinal structure comparable to the "sys-
tem" of the canon law or the civilian curriculum of the universities.15
This absence of a doctrinal structure was relevant to the practical prob-
lems of the merchants. Open-ended reference to the "custom of mer-
chants," which was the extent of the incorporation of any "law merchant"
achieved by the Statute of Staples and the staple system, did little to resolve
the fundamental problem of negotiability. 81 In addition, these special courts
were limited only to merchants and to the specific staple towns, and left no
formal legal doctrines. The best that could be said for this "law" was that,
without a conceptual framework, there was no legal doctrine that made
things worse for merchants.8 7
The third stage of the development of commercial paper in England, the
so-called "transitional period," occurred between 1525 and 1670.88 Now the
first treatises about law merchant emerged in England, and commercial
cases began to be decided by centralized, national courts, including the
Admiralty, rather than specialized local tribunals. 89 The Admiralty was also
83 See Coquillette, supra note 30, at 347-48 & n.348.
84 See Beutel, supra note 69, at 829.
815 For a description of the civilian intellectual tradition in the English universities,
see de Zulueta, Introduction to THE LIBER PAUPERUM OF VACARIUS xv-xxii (Selden
Soc'y Pub. No. 44, 1927); Coquillette, supra note 68, at 15-17 (1981).
86 See, e.g., Statue of Staples, 27 Ed. 3, stat. 2 (1353).
87 See C. KEETON, ENGLISH LAw-THE JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION 179 (1974). As
Keeton put it:
The law merchant, thus spoken of with reference to bills of exchange and other
negotiable securities, though forming part of the general body of the lex mer-
catoria, is of comparatively recent origin. It is neither more nor less than the
usages of merchants and traders, in the different departments of trade, ratified by
the decisions of courts of law,.which, upon such usages being proved before
them, have adopted them as settled law, with a view to the interests of trade and
the public convenience, the courts proceeding herein on the well-known princi-
ple of law with reference to the different departments of trade. Courts of law in
giving effect to the contracts and dealings of the parties, will assume that the
latter have dealt with one another on the footing of any custom or usage
prevailing generally in the particular department. By this process, what was
before usage only, unsanctioned by legal decision, has become engrafted upon,
or incorporated into, the Common Law, and may thus be said to form part of it.
Id.
88 Beutel, supra note 69, at 834-87
819 Beutel defined this period according to the rise and fall of the Admiralty. His
thesis is that Henry VIII gave the Admiralty and its civilian practitioners a fundamen-
tal opportunity to develop the commercial law. Id. at 834-36; see also Steckley, supra
note 66, at 141-47; Yale, A View of the Admiralty Jurisdiction: Sir Mathew Hale and
the Civilians, in LEGAL HISTORY STUDIES 1972, at 86, 89-92 (D. Jenkins ed. 1975).
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recognizing bills of exchange as fully negotiable, 90 and civilian law practice
and juristic writing were at a high point.9' Although this stage represented a
golden opportunity for the civilians to develop the commercial law, it ended
in the civilian failures of the 1670s.92
The fourth and final period in the development of negotiable instruments,
according to Beutel, dated from the first common law prohibitions to the
Admiralty in the late 1500s until the epoch of Lord Mansfield. This was
largely a period of self-contained common law development.93 The Admi-
ralty was, according to Beutel, from the beginning, separate from this line of
development and eventually became irrelevant.9 4
Beutel's thesis concerning this insular common law development of nego-
tiable instruments anticipated Baker's more recent discoveries.9 5 The only
significant difference is that Baker asserts that this development began not in
the early 1600s, as Beutel assumed, but much earlier, at approximately the
same time that the rival Admiralty practice was flourishing.
So here we have an excellent test. The critical period appears to have been
roughly 1525 to 1675. The demands of a thriving English commerce for a
cash substitute and a vehicle for credit and insurance presented a real
challenge. How did the Admiralty and the common law courts respond, both
practically and juristically?
To set an appropriate starting reference, let us take a look at some bills of
exchange enforced in the staple and borough courts during what Beutel
would call the "second period." 9 6 They share some common characteristics.
Many involved Lombards, and many involved the wool trade. They could be
both three- or four-party bills, as the drawer and drawee were occasionally
identical persons. The rates of exchange were often predetermined and set
out in the bill, and often payable quite soon after sight. The earliest bills were
payable to a specific payee "or to his attorney," but later bills were payable
to "the bearer" or "the bringer of this letter.' 97 These bills, however, were
neither negotiable cash substitutes nor vehicles for sharing in the risk of a
venture.98 Rather, they functioned both to transfer wealth in appropriate
90 Beutel, supra note 69, at 836; infra notes 99-127 and accompanying text.
91 See Coquillette, supra note 68, at 37-39; Coquillette, supra note 30, at 320-46.
92 See Coquillette, supra note I, at 323-42.
91 Beutel, supra note 69, at 837-45.
94 Id. at 837.
95 Compare id. at 837-45 with Baker, supra note 6, at 320-22; see supra text
accompanying notes 6-16.
96 Beutel, supra note 69, at 826-33.
97 See id.
98 See, e.g., Camby v. Surdouch, reprinted in A. KIRALFY, supra note 23, at 244.
The drawer of the bill, one Surdouch of Lucca, received from one Camby of Pistoia
in London, 30 pounds "by Exchange." The bill named Vane "or his attorney" as
payee in Bruges, to be payed in Flemish crowns "worth 3 shillings each" the "15th
day after sight." Id. Vane delivered by letter to one John Paul for collection in
1987]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67: 877
currencies without transporting bullion and, more importantly, to provide
"float" or credit in international transactions.
Such bills of exchange were enforced with little or no attention to legal
doctrine. They were simply the special affairs of commerce, and the mercan-
tile custom of fair dealing was the "law." This mercantile custom, however,
had only fragmentary rationales, at least as explicitly expressed. Further,
what custom existed had to have been cosmopolitan, since bills of exchange
of this classic sort were, by definition, international. But there was not a
scrap of Roman law related to these bills, and they certainly were not
negotiable instruments. There was no evidence that a bona fide purchaser for
value could cut off the legitimate defenses of a drawer.
Now let us look at some early bills of exchange enforced in the Admiralty.
First, most involved ships.9 9 Indeed, some of the earliest known Admiralty
bills 0 were directly secured by ships. '0' One of the earliest recorded bills of
exchange in the Admiralty, dated 1538, essentially substituted the ship for
the drawer. 0 2 By 1541, this practice had become explicit in certain cases.
0 3
Bruges, but Nicholas did not pay. In the Court of the Mayor and Alderman of
London, Nicholas said that he had paid to a certain "Paul John." Id. Camby replied
that "he assigned Nicholas to pay the money to John Paul and not to Paul John or any
other person than John Paul alone." Id. The London Corporation Records show that
a "settlement" was negotiated whereby "Nicholas should procure certain" Letters of
Payment and satisfaction of the said debt from the person to whom the debt was paid,
and also letters from the authorities of the Town of Bruges authenticating the
payment of the said debt." Id. at 245. Regrettably, it is unclear if Nicholas paid to
the bearer of the "Letter of Exchange," or the exact nature of the problem, but
exchange arrangements were clearly enforceable by the London court as between
merchants. The only issue was whether the exchange obligation had been properly
discharged.
In 1437, in Burton v. Davy, the Mayor's Court of London gave judgment directly
both to the payee and to a bearer of a letter of exchange. 3 SELECT CASES, supra note
25, at 117. The drawer, a John Audeley in Bruges, addressed the bill to a London
mercer, Elias Davy. Id. The bill was for 30 pounds "by exchange," payable at
London on March 14, to one John Burton "or to the bearer of this letter." Id. This
bill was typical. There were many, drawn in Bruges or Calais in the wool trade,
payable in sterling to "the bearer" or to "the bringer of the letter." See Beutel, supra
note 69, at 826-33.
19 In the first half of the sixteenth century the local mercantile courts, although
severely restricted in 1477 and 1483 by the statutes of Edward IV and Richard III,
were not extinct. Id. at 833; see 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 300-37 (1st ed.
1903). We must also bear in mind Baker's thesis, that bills of exchange became
enforceable early at common law as "part and parcel of the general development of
assumpsit." Baker, supra note 6, at 310.
"I Systematic Admiralty records began in 1524. See T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, supra
note 59, at 661.
"o" See id.
102 2 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 28, at 65.
1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 62, at 92.
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The prevalence of this practice, which contributed to the success of the
Admiralty, was attributable to the maritime remedy of "bottomry" or, to
use the more elegant and civilian term, "hypothecation." Bottomry was
essentially an in rem proceeding against a ship pledged as security for
repairs, necessities, and, in some jurisdictions, cash advances to replace or
supplement goods-all for the "necessary use of the ship," in usum et
utilitatem ac necessitatem dicte nauis."°4 The rationale was simple: it was
fair to bind the ship, and thus the ship's owners, for contracts that secured
vital necessities in distant ports where, unless the money was made avail-
able, the venture could fail. The master of the ship, in desperate need of
cash, would pledge the ship, its equipment, and his own goods as collateral.
The debt would be payable almost immediately upon the successful comple-
tion of the voyage, usually within twenty days and sometimes within
twenty-four hours.10 5 The writing evidencing the deal, the quoddam suum
scriptum obligatorium ad modum chirographi sua manu propia subscripti,
would promise payment in the currency of the port of arrival.
The bill of exchange was a perfect vehicle for this arrangement. Because
of the risks involved, including the very real possibility of disaster at sea, the
interest demanded by the lender would be high, most likely usurious. The
bills sheltered such usury by masking the true gain in the rate of exchange,
and the risk of the voyage warranted the profit. Also, the bill of exchange
was widely enforceable. If it could be enforced in a forum that could proceed
in rein against the boat as well, why that would be ideal!
Many bills of exchange enforced in the sixteenth-century Admiralty took
this form. The bill was drawn by the master of the vessel, and was payable
to the local agent providing the needed funds, or to his attorney, or to bearer.
The purpose of the loan, in usum et utilitatem ac necessitatem dicte nauis,
was carefully recorded, as well as the liability of the ship itself, although
there were frequently other personal sureties given that were located at the
ultimate destination." 6 Often, two or three copies of the bill were executed,
With copies sent by other ships to the creditor's agent or assignee in the port
of destination. The owner of the ship would pay the first presented. Oth-
erwise the ship, along with tackle and master's goods, would be seized
through the Admiralty.1 0 7
This process had many advantages. First, the bill of exchange, secured by
bottomry, offered a convenient way to speculate on a voyage with a mini-
mum of harrassment. If the ship made it to its destination, the gain would
be great. If it was lost at sea, there might still be some recourse against the
owner. Further, carefully drafted bills of exchange could be used to specu-
"04 Id. at 55.
105 Id.
106 See 2 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 28, at 7, 65-77, 126-27, 192-95.
17 See 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 62, at 38-41, 92-94.
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late on the voyage. s08 For example, suppose the voyage was particularly
hazardous, and the owners wished to reduce their exposure. They could
finance part of the voyage with a bill of exchange, pledging the ship, but
payable only after the ship had arrived safely. The payee would specifically
incur "the peril and adventure" of the voyage, and the highly advantageous
rate of exchange would, in effect, be the return. 10 9
It is not, therefore, surprising that the first insurance policies appeared
close in time and in form to the earliest known bills of exchange, or that they
were closely associated with Lombard Street merchants. The earliest known
English insurance policy was actually written in Italian with an English
translation attached. 110 Nor should it be surprising that insurance disputes
concerning ships appeared as early as 1545 in Henry VIII's revitalized
Admiralty. I I
As with non-maritime bills of exchange, however, the Admiralty ulti-
mately proved unsatisfactory for the determination of insurance causes.112
But the problem was certainly not with the instrument itself. In the years
1533 to 1564, there were many examples of bills of exchange used for both
maritime speculation and insurance, and they were consistently enforced by
the Admiralty. 1 3 The old objectives of the bills of the Staple courts, the
transfer and exchange of money for its own sake and for mercantile credit,
101 See supra note 26; Vance, The Early History of Insurance Law, in 3 SELECT
ESSAYS, supra note 21, at 98-116.
109 See 2 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 28, at 75.
110 See Vance, supra note 108, at 110; 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 283.
To be true insurance, a premium must be paid, and the insured amount paid out only
if a loss occurs. Some early bills were high risk financing, rather than true insurance,
as the full sum was paid out at the beginning of the voyage, to be repaid at safe
arrival. For this observation, I am again indebted to James S. Rogers. The first true
insurance developed in Italy in the fourteenth century. See 3 THE CAMBRIDGE
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE 99-100, 209-10 (M. Postan ed. 1963). There were
pure insurance transactions in the London Mayor's Court Rolls as early as the
fifteenth century. James S. Rogers brings to my attention CALENDAR OF PLEA AND
MEMORANDA ROLLS 1413-1437, at 208-10 (A. Thomas ed. 1943) (entry of March 10,
1427).
"I Vance, supra note 108, at 110.
112 See id. (observing that "for some reason, not easily understood, the courts of
the Admiralty did not prove satisfactory tribunals for the determination of insurance
causes"). The first English insurance act was passed in 1601. See An Act Concerning
Matters of Assurance Used Among Merchants, 43 Eliz., ch. 12 (1601); G. MALYNES,
supra note 26, at 105-06; 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 286-89; Vance, supra
note 108, at 113.
113 See 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 62, at 38-41, 92-94; 2 SELECT PLEAS, supra
note 28, at 65-77, 126-27.
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were relatively inconspicuous in the fifteenth-century Admiralty records. 1 4
While these Admiralty bills were not negotiable in the modern sense,
many were assignable, and often the assignees ended up being the plaintiffs.
The typical formula for an assignment included the name of the payee, and
14 Of course, there were exceptions. Some of the-early Admiralty bills concerned
"merchaunt of the staple" and closely resembled the instruments recognized by the
borough and staple courts two centuries before. See, e.g., 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra
note 62, at 38 (providing an example of a bill dated 1533). But as the sixteenth century
progressed, more and more bills concerned ships, insurance, and venture capital.
Take, for example, the experience of the ship "St. Michael" of Barnstable in 1541.
Id. at 92. One John Semer, a factor of Messrs. Nicholas Thornes and Thomas
Ballarde, "merchants of the town of Bristol," was residing in Messina, Sicily, where
he was described as "noble John Semer merchaunt also of England dwelling in
Messyna." Id. at 93-94. In this "noble cytty ... charged withe wynes Mallmesye"
was the good "shypp Saynt Mighell." Cash was needed to complete the voyage.
John Semer advanced against a bill of exchange "ducats clxxxxij of goolde ...
whiche saide ducats... shall go in all this viage at the adventure and perryll as well of
god as of the see." Id. at 93-94. Only if "shall god willyng" the ship "saffely arryve"
in the defined ports "and doste case her ffurste anke and xxiiii hours expyred" are
the ducats "or their juste valew in Englyshe monney" due to the bill's payee, the
brother of John Semer's English partner, William Ballarde of Bristol. The debt would
be payable in "xxx daies," but the obligation, as a matter of risk, would be fixed on
arrival plus one day. Id. The bill was drawn by the ships "scrybe," John Andreas and
Hohn Aborow "patron of the shypp." Id. The bill concluded with joint and several
covenants of Andreas and Aborow to pay the money, with power for the lender to
seize the debtors and their goods, "but not mentioning the ship expressly." Id.
Nevertheless, a first decree was obtained in Admiralty on default by Semer's English
patrons against the ship itself, the freight, and the ship's "apparel." Id. at 92.
Interestingly, the bill was to a specific payee, with no "bearer," or "attorney"
clause. The issue was not negotiability, but speculation and security.
There were many such bills. Take the bill drawn by "Jamys Castelyn of London
capitayn of the shipe namyd Senct George being at ankor" close to Cadiz, Portugal. 2
SELECT PLEAS, supra note 28, at 65. The bill was secured by "my person and goodes
• ..the person and goodes of. . .my brother and especially the .sayed shipe her
fraight and apparell in especiall." Id. at 66-67 (emphasis added). There was also "for
your more suertye" a "Williams Parkear mercaunt of Yngland which is present and
carye the marchaundizes in the sayed shipe the whiche being present did accept the
suerty sshipe." Id. at 67. The bill also contained clauses giving "power complete and
sufficientt unto all Justyces and Judges of whatsoever cities townes or villages where
so ever or beffore whome this writing shalbe showid or sene... and of every of them
we do submytt our sellffes with our personys and goodes." Id. at 67. But when
trouble struck, the payee's assign, Richard Austen, went to the Admiralty to secure
the ship in rein. See id. at 65, 68. It made no difference if the parties to the bill were
not English or even if they were foreign governments. See, e.g., id. at 192-95. Nor did
it matter that the bill was not in English, or that the bill was not to be performed in
England. Indeed, many bills in the Admiralty records are in foreign languages, or in
Latin. See, e.g., id. at 76 (a Dutch bill).
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the words "his assynys,"" 5 or "hys certyn atturney,'116 or "ys assyg-
neres. '" 11 The bills also often cited the risks assumed by the payee, such as
the safe passage of the ship. 1 ' Because of the risks involved in passage, two
or three "bylls of one tenor" were usually executed, "the one to be com-
plyde the other[s] to stande ase yoyde." 119 The bills were commonly sent by
different ships, presumably so that the payee would be ready on arrival or so
that the bill would be in the custody of someone other than the drawer or the
drawee.
Some of the bills were "bearer bills," that is, payable to the payee, "or to
the bringor of this presentt,' ' a20 or to "the lawfyll brynger,' ' 121 or "bringer
hereof."' 22 These bearer bills were enforced when they "came to the hands
and possession" of undesignated third parties, apparently without endorse-
ment. 1
23
Oddly enough, given the unique value of bottomry to the Admiralty's bills
of exchange jurisdiction, the courts were reluctant to make absent part-
owners of a ship liable, to the extent of their shares in the ship, for contracts
which the part-owners did not sign, or even know about until later. Thus, in
Cogley v. Taylor,124 the court bound the ship Margaret "upon a certain civil
and maritime contract," but only "as regards the part of [the ship] of which
[the drawer] was owner and possessor." 125 Indeed, the Admiralty orders, at
least those edited by Marsden, were singularly absent of rationales or doc-
115 2 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 28, at 68.
116 Id. at 69, File 16, No. 125-26 (1543).
117 Id. at 73, File 33, No. 133 (1557). See also id. at 66, File 6, No. 10 (1536) ("or
unto whom shalbe for him [payee] that ys to saye . . ."). Some bills were to specific
payees only. See, e.g., id. at 69, File 17, No. 70-69 (1540) ("pay to D. Barnard
Calvalcanti one hundred and eighteen pounds eighteen shillings gross in current
money"); id. at 70, File 22, No. 32 (1553) ("pray you to paye by this my first bill of
exchaunge . . .to the worshipfull Nicholas Bell"); id. at File 24, No. 63 (1554)
("dothe knowlyge my selfe to owe unto Harye Browne merchant of London the some
of therty fyve poundes"); id. at 73, File 33, No. 133 (1557) ("dothe knowlege my
sellfe for to be in dyttyd to David Carlotte of London"); id. at 72, File 32, No. 43
(1561) (most paye ...to Lewes Lopes merchaunt PortingaUl beinge in Anworpe
twenty duckets").
118 Id. at 69, File 6, No. 16 (1538) ("sayed Rychard Awsten beerys the adventure of
the fore sayde . . .unto him [the ship's] saffe aryvyng").
119 Id. at 68, File 6, No. 16 (1538).
120 Id. at 70, File 18, No. 46-47 (1549).
11 Id. at 71, File 25, No. 71-72 (1553).
122 Id. at 73, File 33, No. 192 (1562). The wording is "bringer hereof," though
"brynger hereof" was also used. See id. at 73, File 35, No. 323-324 (1563).
123 Id. at 126-27, Denaker v. Mason, File 35, No. 116 (1564).
124 Id. at 7, File 16, No. 56 (1548).
125 Id.
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trinal structure for secured transactions through bottomry, assignability of
bills, liability of drawers and drawees, or anything else the Admiralty was
doing regularly with bills of exchange. Further, the cases demonstrated no
real introduction of such doctrinal structure, even after much time passed.
True, cases before 1540 revealed the greatest influence of the staple and
borough court forms of the preceeding centuries, but by 1540 the "bottomry
bill" was fully developed, and little was added by way of negotiability or
security. This state of affairs lasted until after the Settlement of 1575 assured
the Admiralty of a continuing jurisdiction, albeit an embattled one, over
foreign bills of exchange. 126 Beutel has argued that "[w]ithout the writs of
prohibition by the common law courts," which had commenced seriously by
the late sixteenth century, the Admiralty "probably would have received all
these [commercial paper] cases."'127 But he gives no particular reason why
this should be true, and there is no evidence that this would have occurred in
those cases where the Admiralty's in rem power over ships was useless.
Were the common law courts any better? The conventional view of the
common law "incorporation" of the bill of exchange follows the explanation
originally provided by Holdsworth12 s who, in turn, had built on an extraordi-
nary essay written by William Cranch in 1804.129 According to Holdsworth,
the first attempt to enforce bills of exchange at common law was reflected in
a pleading in Rastell's Entries in 1564, with later sample pleadings dating
from 1586, 1595, and 1596.130 Holdsworth noted that "in Martin v. Boure
(1602)-the earliest reported case on a bill of exchange-assumpsit was
again adapted to enforce the rights of some of the parties, and again with
success." 
131
The key words here are "some of the parties." Certain relationships were
harder for the common law to handle than others. For example, let us
assume a case like the precedent in Rastell's first edition. There the remitter
conveyed value to the drawer who, in return, promised that the drawee
would pay a certain sum to the payee, who was a factor of the remitter. If the
drawee did not pay, then the drawer must do so "with all damages and
interest thereof."' 32 Thus, Rastell's case was ostensibly an action by the
remitter against the drawer for nonpayment by the drawee.
It is tempting, yet misleading, to define conceptual difficulties in cases
126 See Coquillette, supra note 1, at 324-42; Coquillette, supra note 30, at 323-36.
127 Beutel, supra note 69, at 813.
129 See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 159-70.
129 Cranch, supra note 21.
130 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 159; see Cranch, supra note 21; see also 8
W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 159 (discussing another successful example in
1586 set out in JOHN HERNE'S PLEADER (London 1657)).
131 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 159.
132 W. RASTELL, COLLECTION OF ENTRIES 10b (1564), reprinted in Cranch, supra
note 21, at 77.
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such as this by reference to modem notions of privity and consideration.
These doctrines, however, did not exist in their modern form during the
relevant period.' 33 Thus, it would be easy to say that the initial relationship
of the remitter to the drawer was a natural candidate for the developing
assumpsit remedy. Certainly, there was privity, an undertaking, and value
received for the promise. In fact, however, a remitter's right to be repaid by
a drawer on protest of the bill by the drawee was, as Baker points out,
"effectively a quasi-contractual claim, which could only be accommodated
within assumpsit by fiction."'1 34 For example, what if the drawer had duti-
fully forwarded the money or other appropriate value to a dishonest
drawee?' 35 Only with some difficulty it was held that "[b]y the common law
a man may resort to him that received the money if he to whom the bill was
directed refuse."' 36 Even in 1691, Holt had to emphasize that "the drawer is
chargeable by the value received [of the remitter]. 13 1
More manageable in assumpsit was the undertaking between a payee and a
drawee who had "accepted" a bill, that is, agreed to pay it when due,
usually by adding a "subscription," or written annotation, to the bill. The
doctrinal difficulty presented by this relationship was the usual absence of
any value paid by the payee to the acceptor in return for the promise.
Initially, this was overcome by treating the payee as a factor or agent of the
remitter, although in fact the remitter often was the payee. 138 While it was
held "that the payee could not sue in debt or indebitatus assumpsit," action
on the case was permitted; the "payee could sue the acceptor on the basis
that his acceptance amounted to an undertaking to pay," either as a matter
of general or local custom.' 39 Even Rastell's early Entries had a declaration
by a payee against an acceptor.'40
Because many drawees did not receive value to "accept" from the drawer
or from anyone else, 14' actions against a drawee could be conceptually
hazardous. The real reason for enforcement was that the payee and, as we
shall see, often a string of endorsees, may have relied on the acceptor. The
133 See Baker, supra note 6, at 311 (observing that the doctrine of privity was "still
of very uncertain scope" even by the seventeenth century).
134 Id.
135 This was not uncommon. See Maynard v. Dyce, KB 27/1125, m.110 (1542),
cited in Baker, supra note 6, at 311-12.
3,; Woodward v. Rowe, 84 Eng. Rep. 67, 67 (K.B. 1666), quoted in 8 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 161 n.4; see W. RASTELL, supra note 132, at 338b.
137 Mogadara v. Holt, 89 Eng. Rep. 597, 598 (K.B. 1692), quoted in 8 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 161 n.4.
,311 Compare 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 162, with Baker supra note 6, at
311 (as to error of looking for "privity" doctrine in such early transactions).
139 See Baker, supra note 6, at 310 & n.60.
141 See Cranch, supra note 21, at 77.
141 See J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 41, 49, 137-38, 185 (discussing "acceptance
for honor"); see also G. MALYNES, supra note 26, at 273; infra note 241.
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"factor" or "agency" approach was a legal fiction when applied to the
relationship between the drawer and the drawee. Thus a drawee who did not
accept a bill was liable to the drawer only, and was not liable to payees or
endorses. By the time of the classic case of Oaste v. Taylor,1 42 decided in
1612, the common law had made true acceptors liable to payees. But even
then it was moved in arrest of judgement that "the Defendant is not averred
to be a Merchant at the time of the Bill accepted."'143 Liability was not,
however, premised on general principles of fair.dealing or reliance, but on
the "speciality" of the mercantile custom, the secundum usum mercatorum,
and even this rationale remained conceptually murky. 144
The legal relationship of the drawer to the drawee was also not clearly
defined. Holdsworth argued that "their relations were based, either upon the
fact that the drawee was the agent of the drawer, or that he is the debtor of
the drawer."'' 45 But this really would not do. Consider, for example, the
conceptual problems of the defense in the famous case of Martin v. Boure.146
Martin drew a bill in exchange for approximately 283 pounds received in
England. The bill was addressed to Boure, who resided in Aleppo, Spain,
instructing him to pay one Harris 1326 "Dollars called Royals of eight.' '1 47
Boure refused, and Martin sued. Boure pled "non assumpsit," but he lost in
the King's Bench. On appeal to the Exchequer Chamber, Boure argued that
"because the considerations are executory, [and] ought to be precisely
alledged to be performed according to the agreement," he had two de-
fenses.148 First, Martin's bill was not "signed with his hand ,"' 4 which was
required under secundum usum mercatorum. Second, it required Boure to
pay the 283 pounds in equivalent dollars, which, he argued, was not a good
assumpsit, "for he thereby ties himself to pay that kind of money, and not
generally." 50 As Boure reasoned:
"[F]or where I have election to pay it in any money,
he ties me to pay it in that kind of money only, so
as he takes from me my election in what money I will
pay it, and makes me peradventure to be at the charge
of exchanging it into that money." '15 1
142 79 Eng. Rep. 262 (K.B. 1612).
143 Id. at 262.
,44 See supra note 33 and accompanying text for a discussion of "specialty."
145 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 162; see Cramlington v. Evans, 86 Eng.
Rep. 456, 457 (K.B. 1691).
146 79 Eng. Rep. 6 (K.B. 1602).
147 Id. at 6. This was certainly one of the earliest references to dollars in a law suit,
although hardly the last.
148 Id.
149 Id.
15( Id. at 7.
151 Id.
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In a sense, Boure was right. He was not really a debtor if the consideration
was all executory. Nor was he really an agent-at least in the sense that he
was not the alter ego of the drawer. But the Exchequer Chamber made short
work of Mr. Boure and affirmed on the allegation of the secundum usum
mercatorum. 152
The relationship between the payee and drawer was even more difficult,
particularly if viewed in the light of what would later become the norms of
privity and consideration. The payee and drawer may not have dealt with
one another, and no value was given by the payee to support any undertak-
ing by the drawer. Yet the courts tenaciously followed mercantile custom
and continental law, "basing the payee's right of recourse against the
drawer, in the event of non-acceptance or of non-payment by the acceptor,
upon the existence of some sort of agency between the payee and the person
who had given value to the drawer."153
Now this really was a fiction and the "agency" was often merely pre-
sumed. By 1660 and the case of Woodward v. Rowe," 4 the presumption
became explicit. Finally, by the time of Holt in 1700, the fiction was aban-
doned and a new notion invented: "the act of drawing a bill implie[d] a
warranty to the payee that it will be paid."' 55 As Holdsworth keenly recog-
nized, such a warranty, in addition to conferring contractual rights, made a
bill operate as a "conveyance."' 56 The common lawyers, however, saw no
reason to develop the conceptual ramifications of this implied warranty.
Once again the day was saved by simply reciting the "custom of the mer-
chants." 157
Finally, there was the hardest task of all: defining the rights of endorsers
and endorsees "to order," and of bearers of bills made out to "A or bearer."
This was the issue of negotiability, pure and simple. Privity goes by the
boards in fully negotiable instruments, as does consideration, which be-
comes a rebuttable presumption.' 5 8 The three key elements-transfer by
endorsement and delivery, the presumption of consideration, and, eventu-
152 Id.
153 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 162. Early assumpsit actions implied "an
undertaking by the drawer [to the payee] that the drawee would pay," again based on
tiMe secundurn usem mercatoruim. Baker, supra note 6, at 310.
'54 84 Eng. Rep. 84 (K.B. 1666), noted in 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at
162.
155 See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 162 & n.7 and cases cited.
5 Id. at 163.
157 Id. For the eventual development of this idea, see Bills of Exchange Act, 45 &
46 Vict., ch. 61, §§ 54-56.
151 See id. at 143-44, 167 (discussing the "presumption of consideration"). For
Lord Mansfield's views, see J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 133-39. As Holt stated, "If
the drawer mention it 'for value received,' then he is chargeable at common law."
Cramlington v. Evans, 89 Eng. Rep. 410 (K.B. 1685), noted in 8 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 21, at 167 n.3.
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ally, the cutting off of defenses against a bona fide endorsee for value-
demanded major conceptual innovation. But such innovations did not occur
on a juristic plane until Lord Mansfield. 1 9 Meanwhile, ad hoc negotiability
had become so established that, by 1729, Jacob's Law Dictionary stated that
a bill of exchange "generally passes as money.' '160
The process began by distinguishing bills of exchange payable to "A or
bearer" from those payable to "A or order" or to "A or assigns." Only the
last two permitted transfer by endorsement. A "bearer" bill entitled the
bearer to sue only in the name of the payee and not in his own name,
although payment to the bearer discharged the acceptor.161 The drawbacks
were obvious. Because there was no chain of endorsements, a lost bill could
be cashed by a stranger. Worse, the lack of endorsements meant no record
of prior holders. As a result, because endorsees had potential rights against
prior endorsers, common law judges began to regard each new endorsement
as the drawing of a new bill with the endorser as drawer and the endorsee as
payee, although "custom" insisted that endorsees first seek recourse against
the drawer if the drawee failed to pay. This doctrine reflects ad hoc practice
rather than juristic theory. 162
The relationships were also enforceable by what was, even at best, an
irregular cause of action. Assumpsit was the remedy against the drawer. As
we have seen, neither indebitatus assumpsit nor an action in debt was
available to the payee against the acceptor, but only an action on the case
founded on the assumpsit. 163 Curiously, however, an endorsee who had
reimbursed a subsequent endorsee was entitled to bring an action in debt.164
More puzzling still, an endorsee could not sue upon a promissory note
payable to bearer, nor could the holder, but bills of exchange payable to
order could be declared upon in special counts. "[N]otes of all kinds and
bills payable to bearer were held not to be within the custom of Mer-
chants."1 65
This mystery culminated in Holt's famous, or perhaps infamous, decision
in Buller v. Crips .166 Buller held that negotiability, in the sense that an
endorsee was free to maintain an action on a bill payable to order despite
prior defenses, was a special feature of true bills of exchange only, and not of
simple obligatory notes. 167 Even notes payable to order were only treated as
159 See infra notes 498-511 and accompanying text.
160 G. JACOB, supra note 21, under "Bill of Exchange."
161 See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 164.
162 G. JACOB, supra note 21, under "Bill of Exchange."
161 See supra note 433 and accompanying text.
164 "[Y]et an indorsee who had reimbursed a subsequent indorsee might bring
debt." Beutel, supra note 69, at 839.
165 Id.
166 87 Eng. Rep. 793 (K.B. 1704); see Cranch, supra note 21, at 78-79, 91-92.
167 Beutel has gone so far as to assert that "[t]he only type of negotiable paper
which received the approval of the common-law courts was the bill of exchange
payable to order." Beutel, supra note 69, at 839.
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evidence in an action of indebitatus assumpsit.168 This is particularly curi-
ous, since almost all of the policy and fairness issues present in true bills of
exhange were to be found in both promissory notes payable to order and
"inland" bills of exchange payable to bearer. Despite Holt's comment that
he could "remember when actions upon inland bills did first begin," 169 there
is evidence of widespread use of such instruments in England well before
Holt's lifetime. 170 The prompt passage of the Promissory Notes Act of 1704,
the so-called "Act of Anne," which made all such obligatory instruments
both fully assignable and negotiable, compounds the mystery.171 Could this
mean that despite the undeniable economic and policy pressures toward
negotiability,172 the common law could not respond with an acceptable,
pragmatic doctrine? Was legislation the only solution?
There is one purported explanation for the strange, ad hoc development of
English commerical law that will simply not suffice. That is the assertion that
the economy of England was relatively undeveloped compared to other parts
of Europe and, therefore, did not require the credit and transport advantages
represented by mercantile instruments. 173 This is complete nonsense.7 4
Credit and the use of bills of exchange were crucial to the extensive English
wool trade throughout the late middle ages.17 From 1429 to 1443, the
English government attempted to force the staple merchants to carry bul-
lion, rather than bills of exchange, back to England in the mistaken belief that
this increased national wealth. The merchants vigorously and successfully
resisted. 176 Postan has demonstrated that medieval English banking rou-
tinely included "the issue of letters of exchange payable in foreign ports to
travellers overseas."' 77 By the sixteenth century, the foreign trade of En-
1I8 Id. & n.132 and cases cited.
,69 87 Eng. Rep. at 793.
171 Cranch, supra note 21, at 78-79; 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 172; J.
HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 80-84; see infra text accompanying notes 395-413 for a full
discussion of Holt's opinions on this subject.
171 See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 172-73.
172 This included the forcible loans by Charles of the bullion in the Tower and the
infamous "Shutting of the Exchequer" in 1672. See Cranch, supra note 21, at 81-82.
173 See, e.g., 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 113 ("All through the Middle
Ages, England was economically in a backward state of development.").
174 See E. POWER, THE WOOL TRADE IN ENGLISH MEDIAEVAL HISTORY (1941); E.
POWER, The Wool Trade in the Fifteenth Century, in STUDIES IN ENGLISH TRADE IN
THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY (E. Power & M. Postan eds. 1933); C. FIFOOT, supra note
61, at 289; see also 1 E. LIPSON, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND 511-94 (12th
ed. 1959).
175 1 E. LIPSON, supra note 174, at 548-50.
176 Id. at 549-50 (describing one of these government attempts, the so-called
Partition Ordinance of 1429).
177 1 E. LIPSON, supra note 174, at 616 n.1; see M. POSTAN, PRIVATE FINANCIAL
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gland had stretched across the globe, and the need for, and reliance on,
commerical instruments was common.7 8 The widespread use of these bills
to make returns and arrange loans, and possibly the ability to assign them by
endorsement even without full negotiability, was vital to merchants,1 79 and
led to the founding of the first Royal Exchange by Sir Thomas Gresham in
1566.180 Merchants, declared Gresham, "can no more be without exchanges
* . . than ships at sea without water."181
Despite their relative prevalance, in early years both the mechanical
operation and the economic effect of bills of exchange were profoundly
misunderstood by many, including the traders. Writing in 1682, Scarlett
observed that "to many, if not to most merchants ... [exchange] remains a
mystery, and is indeed the greatest and weightiest mystery that is to be
found in the whole Map of Trade."' 82 Even Malynes believed that bills of
exchange were deliberately "undervalued" by foreign exchanges to draw
"gold and silver out of the kingdom. ' 183 He urged a forced "par of ex-
change" as a sole remedy, thus displaying a profound misunderstanding of
why exchange rates vary over time.
Common law jurists seemed equally perplexed by the "mystery" of ex-
change. Compared to the extensive treatment of bills of exchange in Ben-
venuto Stracca's De Mercatura seu Mercatore tractatus, first published in
1553, and Sigismundo Scaccis's Tractatus de Commerciis et Cambio of
1618, the English legal literature is strikingly primitive. 8 4 Prior to Malynes'
INSTRUMENTS IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND, VIERTELAHRSCHRIFT FUR SOZIAL-UND
WIRTSCHAFTRGESCHICHTE xxiii (1930); see also SELECT PLEAS AND MEMORANDA,
supra note 30, at xxxiii.
I'l See 2 E. LIPSON, supra note 174, at 184-96; 3 id. at 62-116, 232; see also id. at 80
("In the sixteenth century England's foreign trade was conducted by means of bills of
exchange .... ). The proceeds of England's lucrative triangle trade, based on native
woolens, Newfoundland fish, Portugese sugar, and Italian silk, returned to England
"either in bills of exchange or in commodities." d. at 96.
179 Some have argued that there was "a thriving discount market, in which an
assignee could have his bill cashed by a third party before it fell due." A. HARDING,
supra note 23, at 319. This was probably a later development.
180 Id.
181 Id.
1112 3 E. LIPSON, supra note 174, at 80. See generally J. SCARLETT, THE STILE OF
EXCHANGES (London 1682) (Preface); J. MARIUS, supra note 35, at 1-5 (explaining
the nature and uses of bills of exchange). According to Marius, "Exchange is by
some held to be the most mysterious part of the Art of Merchandizing and Traffic."
Id. at 5.
183 See G. MALYNES, THE MAINTENANCE OF FREE TRADE 386-91 (London 1622); 3
E. LIPSON, supra note 468, at 81 n.5.
114 See V. Piergiovanni, Courts and Commercial Law at the Beginning of the
Modern Age 4-6 (unpublished manuscript, to appear in 2 COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN
CONTINENTAL AND ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (V. Piergiovanni ed. 1987).
See generally B. STRACCA, supra note 62; S. SCACCI, supra note 62.
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treatise of 1622185 which was a layman's work, there were only a few
published sample forms, including a form "Bill of Exchange" and a form
entitled, "A protest for not accepting of a Bill of Exchange," both of which
appeared in William West's revised Symboleography in 1615.186 Indeed,
the earliest serious English commercial writers were not lawyers at all. As
John Marius, one of the most distinguished among them, put it, "The right
dealing Merchant doth not care how little he hath to do in the Common Law,
or things of that nature.' 18 7
The peculiar, ad hoc development of the English law of negotiable, mer-
cantile instruments, as well as the seemingly isolated role of the true bill of
exchange, is best explained by how the common law assumpsit remedy was
first applied to bills of exchange and how it developed in the relative absence
of a juristic literature or any major judicial explanation. It is here that
Baker's research, which concentrated on a careful study of assumpsit decla-
rations, made some challenging suggestions. 8 First, Baker revealed that the
common law courts were enforcing the obligations represented by bills of
exchange perhaps as early as 1520, considerably earlier than formal records
and conventional historical accounts would suggest. 1 9 Although the records
during this particular period rarely mention the bill of exchange, because of
the "old ground that it was a matter of evidence rather than of obligation," 19 0
explicit reference to subscribed paper secundum usum mercatorum can be
found as early as 1540. 91 Baker observed that this period of enforcement
was the result of the simultaneous expansion by the King's Bench of the use
of assumpsit, which stretched the court's jurisdiction over a wide range of
commercial transactions. 92
Because assumpsit had no set formula, its forms could be adapted "to
charge the various parties to bills of exchange," giving both the payee and
drawer considerable flexibility in obtaining relief.193 How did the common
law regard these mercantile practices? It is in answer to this question that
Baker makes his second major point:
'8 See G. MALYNES, supra note 26.
186 W. WEST, supra note 33, at §§ 660-62. The "Instruments ... concerning
Merchants' Affairs" were not in the original edition, which appeared in 1590. For
bibliographical information, see Coquillette, supra note 30, at 359 & n.234.
187 J. MARIUS, supra note 35, at To the Reader (unpaginated). For a discussion of
Marius's contribution, see Coquillette, supra note 30, at 359-60 & nn.237-38; Suther-
land, supra note 20, at 162-67.
188 See Baker, supra note 6.
I9 d. at 308.
'99 Id. at 309.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 310. As Baker discovered:
The payee could sue the drawer on an undertaking by the drawer that the drawee
would pay, or that if the drawee did not accept the bill the drawer would pay.
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The law merchant was not even mentioned in the declarations. The
King's Bench had merely removed the procedural barriers which had in
the past prevented the two benches from enforcing such transactions in
a direct way. This amounted, no doubt, to a substantial change in the
common law. But it was part and parcel of the general development of
assumpsit to enable the enforcement of all parol undertakings ....
Apart from occasional use of the phrase secundum usum mercatorum,
which falls far short of an averment of a custom, in none of the six-
teenth-century cases so far discovered was there any attempt to lay the
custom of merchants in the declaration. It is true that no one has yet
made a thorough search of the King's Bench rolls between 1550 and
1600. But enough has come to light, both from random searches and
from a study of books of entries, to show that the bill of exchange was
received into the common law without express reliance on "law mer-
chant." 19
This incorporation without "express reliance" eventually created its own
difficulties. Baker demonstrated that seventeenth-century mercantile decla-
rations actually became more complex and specific, frequently setting out in
full "the custom of merchants."' 95 Baker's explanation for this development
is convincing:
In later cases the plaintiff's allegation of custom was aimed at explain-
ing the assumpsit rather than the consideration. Thus, in the first re-
ported case, an action by the payee against the acceptor, the custom
was inserted to emphasise that the act of accepting and subscribing a bill
secundum usum mercatorum had the force of a promise. And a few
years later, in an action against the drawer, the custom was put in to
explain the liability of the drawer upon protest-the problem which had
occasioned the special verdict in Shepparde v. Becher. The customs
thereafter set out by plaintiffs are all to the effect that the defendant was
bound or liable (obligatus) or chargeable (onerabilis) to pay the plaintiff,
and in consideration of this liability or charge he promised to pay. 96
The payee could sue the acceptor on the basis that his acceptance amounted to
an undertaking to pay. And the drawer could sue the drawee on an undertaking
to accept and pay bills drawn on him.
Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 313. For example, it was held in the 1669 case of Brown v. London, 86
Eng. Rep. 104 (K.B. 1669), that indebitatus assumpsit would not lie on an obligation
"attributed to the custom of merchants, because it was not an indebtedness." Baker,
supra note 6, at 314.
The plaintiff had either to bring assumpsit on the contract, and proffer the bill of
exchange as evidence of a promise, or bring onerabilis assumpsit and set out the
custom. The latter form never became exclusive of the former, and although we
shall hereafter be chiefly concerned with the onerabilis form, it should be noticed
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Baker's third critical point was that the "custom of merchants," set out in
these declarations "was not ... trade usage in the modern sense. ' 197 It was
rather common law custom, "unchanging" and "unchangeable," delimited
by the traditional requirements of "immemorial antiquity" and "a limitation
of application, to distinguish it from the common law of the whole realm." 198
As Cowell stated, the law merchant was "a privilege or special lawe differing
from the common lawe of England, and proper to merchants and summary in
proceeding." 199
But how was this custom to be limited? Was it "local," i.e., limited
geographically, or was it to be "unlike all other customs allowed by the
common law[,] . . . limited to a class of persons rather than a particular
locality"? 200 Baker points out how difficult this issue was conceptually:
If it was truly a custom of England, then it was common law which
would be noticed by the judges and needed no mention in pleading. If
such a custom was alleged in pleading, it was to be treated as surplus-
age. It was therefore technically better to omit it altogether, but then the
plaintiff had nothing on the record and had to be sure the judges and the
jury would take notice of the principle on which he relied. The desire to
formulate the custom on the record may explain the survival of the
custom of the realm in assumpsit declarations. It was a particularly
useful device in framing extensions of the law, as when it was alleged
successfully in two cases of 1689 that the liability of the drawer ex-
tended to any persons (including non-merchants) who drew bills secun-
dum usum mercatorum in favour of other persons; or when in 1693 it
was established as the custom of England that the indorser is liable to a
subsequent indorsee. 20 1
Eventually, these problems were resolved by Hale, Holt, and Mansfield. As
Hale wrote:
[E]ither the custom or law comes in question by special pleading, and
then the court use to ascertain themselves by speech with merchants...
that the survival of the first alternative precludes any argument that the setting
out of the custom of merchants in assumpsit can by itself be equated with the
reception of a "law merchant."
Id.
197 Id. at 315.
198 Id.
199 See J. COWELL, supra note 33, under "Law Merchant." The first edition of
THE INTERPRETER had a stormy history, and was officially suppressed. See Coquil-
lette, supra note 68, at 71-87. As Baker points out, the Cowell definition was copied
almost verbatim in a number of other later English dictionaries. Baker, supra note 6,
at 316 n.80. Cf. G. JACOB, supra note 21, under "Law Merchant" (which defines
"Law Merchant" as "a special Law differing from the Common Law of England,
proper to Merchants, and become a Part of the Laws of the Realm").
200 Baker, supra note 6, at 316.
201 Id. at 317.
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or else it comes in question upon the general issue, and then . . .
merchants are usually jurors at the request of either party, and mer-
chants are produced on either side to ascertain the court and jury
touching the custom of merchants.
20 2
By 1692, it was clear that the common law took 'notice of the laws of
merchants that are general, not those that are particular."' 20 3
But could mercantile customs bind non-merchants? By the Restoration, it
became "usual to declare on the custom of one city (usually London)
operating between the merchants resident in that and in some other named
city. ' 20 4 Eventually it was held that any person in the named city who drew
or accepted a bill of exchange "became a trader for the purpose of the
custom. ' 20 5 And, as Baker pointed out, it is also likely that many plaintiffs
"did bring general actions of assumpsit or indebitatus assumpsit, using the
bill of exchange only as evidence at trial. ' 20 6
Baker's research revealed, above all, that the common law treated mer-
cantile customs "either [as] local facts or the common law of England.' '207
As he explains, "In so far as the judges took notice of such customs or
common law, they were not taking over for their own use a pre-existing body
of jurisprudence."2 It is not surprising, therefore, that "no reliance was
placed in this period on learned treaties of the law merchant or of mercantile
practice or of the laws of nature, and . . . no calls were made on the civil
lawyers for their evidence or assistance. ' 209
But did this not present a wonderful opportunity for civilian jurists? After
all, bills of exchange were a product of international communication, at least
in their classic "outland" form, and the common law doctrinal treatment
202 M. Hale, Treatise on the Admiralty Jurisdiction (1675) (unpublished manu-
script), quoted in Baker, supra note 6, at 318. Hale's treatise is currently being edited
by D.E.C. Yale. Like Baker and many others, I am very grateful for Mr. Yale's
generous assistance, which included supplying me with selections of the edited
transcript, a truly collegial act. See infra notes 322, 343.
203 Id. at 318 (quoting Lethulier's Case, 91 Eng. Rep. 384, 384 (K.B. 1692)).
204 Id. at 319.
205 Id. at 319; see also id. at 320 n.97 (providing a useful comparison of Oaste v.
Taylor, 79 Eng. Rep. 262 (K.B. 1612) and Witherley v. Sarsfield, 90 Eng. Rep. 960
(KB. 1689)). Baker correctly points out that Witherley does not represent a change in
fundamental doctrine since Oaste. In Oaste, it was objected that "the defendant was
not averred to have been a merchant at the time of acceptance." Baker, supra note 6,
at 320 n.97. As Baker notes, in "the 1612 case [Oaste] the custom was only for
merchants, whereas in the later cases [such as Witherley] it was 'for merchants and
others.' " Id.
206 Id. at 320.
207 Id. at 321.
208 Id.
209 Id.
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was rugged at best. Perhaps they could have formed an alliance with the
mercantile experts, such as Malynes and Marius, and drawn upon the rich
continental heritage of Stracca and Scaccis. Was this not the way to estab-
lish the Admiralty as the jurisdiction of the future? Why should the law
merchant suffer the conceptual indignities and vagaries of the common law
forms of action and the doctrines of special custom, when it could possess its
own jurisdiction, the Admiralty, and, through Doctors' Commons, its own
jurisprudence? It was a crucial opportunity for the English civilian jurists.
C. The English Civilian Approach to Bills of Exchange as a Matter of
Doctrine
Plucknett has stated that "the great Reception of Roman law.., provided
a scientific apparatus for the development of mercantile law. ' 210 Super-
ficially, this is an attractive thesis. After all, the first bills of exchange came
from the great Italian trading cities and were first systematically recognized
and enforced in the Admiralty Court, which was populated by civilians and
which consciously applied civil law.2 1 1 The growing use of these bills did,
after all, coincide with the cosmopolitanism of Sir Thomas Gresham's first
Royal Exchange, established in 1566, the very year before the civilian
citadel, Doctors' Commons, established itself practically next door in
Mountjoy House. 212 And the sixteenth-century common law indisputably
210 T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 59, at 659. As Sutherland put it:
The first change was in the realm of theory. For Englishmen in the seventeenth
and sixteenth centuries the Law Merchant was a theory, and a compilation of
customs, which were both of foreign growth, though there had crept into them
certain specifically English traditions. From the beginning of the century it is
noticeable that English legal theorists, and civilians in particular, begin to lay a
new stress on a theoretical systematisation of merchant customs, to give increas-
ing attention to the Merchant Law or Custom, as something known and existent
outside the Common Law.
Sutherland, supra note 20, at 157.
211 See 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 62, at lxxx.
212 See A. HARDING, supra note 23, at 319. The English exchange system devel-
oped slowly; the first London exchange was founded in only 1566 by Sir Thomas
Gresham, a civilian admirer and founder of Gresham College, which was a center of
cosmopolitan studies in London. As Sutherland observed:
The other cause of the failure of the English Law Merchant to develop, was
that English economic conditions separated sharply the trader and merchant
proper, as the distinction was recognised by the end of the sixteenth century.
The merchant was to the English essentially the exporter, with his organised
markets abroad. For this reason an English centre of exchange was slow to
develop, and when it did was only a small offshoot of the great exchange markets
abroad. Seventy years after the founding of the Royal Exchange, Lewes Roberts
in his Merchants' Mappe of Commerce points out that 'The Exchanges practised
in England, and principally in London, are confined within a narrow scantling,
being but as a Rivolet issuing out of the great streame of those Exchanges that
are used beyond the Seas.'
Sutherland, supra note 20, at 156.
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failed to accommodate bills of exchange through general rules of law or to
explicitly reconcile such bills with any common law principles.113
Regrettably, as we have seen, the sixteenth-century English Admiralty
records paid far more attention to the practical enforcement of actual mer-
cantile practices than to the task of providing any legal rationale or "scien-
tific apparatus" for these practices, be it civilian or otherwise.2 14 But what
about the jurists of Doctors' Commons? Could they do better?
Bills of exchange, as such, were not known to classical Roman law,
despite desperate attempts by some antiquarians to find them there.2 15 At
best, the Romans had only crude written money orders. 216 It was the exten-
sive commercial development in Italy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries
that first brought bills of exchange to the attention of Bartolist commentators
and some information about them can be found in civilian sources during this
and later periods. But bills of exchange presented as many theoretical
problems to civilian jurists as to common lawyers. For example, let us look
at Strahan's Domat2 17 and Ayliffe's New Pandect,21 which contain entire
sections devoted to bills of exchange.
To begin with, civilians, and particularly Domat, were great classifiers,
and a bill of exchange was simply hard to classify. It was not a sale, for, as
Domat pointed out, "nobody sells or buys in it. ' '2 19 Nor was it an "ex-
change" in the classical sense, since "he who gives his Money takes nothing
in counter-change, and does not give one Thing, that he may receive another
of a different kind; since he who received the Money may restore the same
Individual Species which he received. ' 2 0 It was not a "depositum," since
"he who received the Money remains answerable for it, altho' it be lost by
unforseen Accident." 22' It was also not a "loan," as "he who receives the
Money does not borrow it. '" 2 22 What about a "letting and hiring"? Certainly
not, for that would mean that "he who receives the Money did nothing else
but barely carry it to the place whither it ought to be remitted, having a
213 See supra notes 129-87 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 99-126 and accompanying text.
215 See, e.g., Thayer, supra note 27, at 147 (claiming that "commercial paper
payable to bearer and to order dates at least from the days of Athens"); see also 2 C.
SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 360-61 (1937). For a better view,
see sources cited supra notes 216, 252. I am indebted to Charles Donahue, Jr., for
pointing out that Ihering made a similar, and equally unsuccessful, effort to find
commercial doctrines in Roman sources.
216 See F. SANBORN, supra note 21, at 18-19. As Joseph Story observed, "As a
branch of practical jurisprudence, or as a circulating medium in trade, Bills of
Exchange were unknown to the Romans." J. STORY, supra note 21, at 8.
217 W. STRAHAN, supra note 25.
21 J. AYLIFFE, supra note 4.
219 W. STRAHAN, supra note 25, at 231.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
1987]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67: 877
certain Allowance for carrying it ... without answering for Accidents. '223
But, as Domat observed, "when he who receives the Money engages himself
by a Bill of Exchange to remit it to another place; the Money remains in his
hands, at his peril, and is no longer the Money of the person who gave it.' '224
It therefore had to be a "covenant"; but it certainly was "different from all
the other[] (covenants]. 2 15
The Covenant that passes between the person who has received the
Money, whether Banker or other person, and him to whom he gives
Order to pay it in another place, is a Partnership, if they are Partners
and Correspondents with one another: Or is it a Procuration, or Com-
mission, if the Correspondent be only the Factor or Agent of the person
who has received the Money. Thus, this Covenant hath its Rules, which
have been explained in the Title of Partnership, and in that of Proxies,
or Letters of Attorney. 226
From a civilian perspective there were two critical "covenant" relationships
involved in a bill transaction. The first involved the relationship between the
person who paid the money and needed the bill, the remitter, and he who
drew the bill, the drawer. The second was the one between the drawer and
the payee. Neither covenant relationship was easy for civilian doctrine to
describe. Was the first an "assignment" or a "procuration"? Domat took a
stab at the puzzle:
The Covenant between the person who has paid the Money, and him,
to whom he gives his Order to receive it, is either an Assignment, if he
substitutes him in his place, and transfers his Right to him; or it is a
Procuration, if he gives him barely the power to receive the Money for
his use. Thus, this Covenant hath its Rules in the Title of the Contract of
Sale, where mention hath been made of Transfers and Assignments; or
in that of Proxies.
There is lastly another Covenant, which passes between him who
paid down the Money, and the person who is ordered to answer the Bill
of Exchange, when he accepts the Bill. And this Covenant is the same
with that which passed between him who paid in the Money, and him
who received it; for it only adds the Obligation of him who accepts the
Bill, to that of the person who drew it: and it obliges the person who
accepts the Bill to pay it on the day, and in the place specified in the
Bill.227
Domat candidly concluded that bills of exchange were governed by rules
that were not universal, but "proper and peculiar to Bills of Exchange. 2
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 231-32.
228 Id. at 232.
Si certo loco traditurum se quis stipulatus sit, hac actione utendum erit. 1. 7.
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Even more candidly, he directed the reader to the "Ordinance of 1673, under
the title of Bills of Exchange." 22 9 Domat still maintained, however, that the
fundamental principles were Roman.2 30
Yet the bill of exchange was no more treated as an independent source of
legal obligation under civilian doctrine than it was at common law. It was
evidence of underlying covenants, just as it was evidence under the common
law of the underlying assumpsit. 23I But unlike the common law, under
civilian doctrine there was no need to allege the custom of merchants and
thereby tangle with the awkward common law "custom" requirements of
immemorial antiquity and limited application. The civilians had looser re-
quirements, as well as the adaptable theory of ius gentium.2 32 They also had
the practical assistance of the Ordinances of Louis XIV.2 33
Ayliffe's analysis is another good example of this civilian treatment. As
with Domat, Ayliffe encountered serious classification problems. A bill of
exchange was not really a permutation, an exchange, say, of a horse for a
garment, nor was it a mutuum, or loan, particularly if it was genuine and not
merely a front for a usurious loan. 234 A cambium, or money exchange, was
selected as the most suitable category. But cambium was a medieval beast,
§ I. ff. de eo quod cert. loc. Is qui certo loco dare promittit, nullo alio loco,
quam in quo promisit, solvere invito stipulatore protest. 1. 9 eod. v. 1. I. C. ubi
conv. qui cert. loc. d. p.
229 Id. See infra note 448.
230 Id. at n.a. (footnotes are lettered).
23 1 Baker, supra note 6, at 310.
232 See Coquillette, supra note 68, at 22-34.
233 See infra note 448. For an insightful review of the relationship of customary
commercial law, the Roman law as ius commune on the continent, and the enacted
commercial codes, see V. Piergiovanni, supra note 184, at 14-16; Coing, The Roman
Law as lus Commune on the Continent, 89 LAW Q. REV. 505, 514-17 (1973).
234 J. AYLIFFE, supra note 4, at 502. According to Ayliffe:
That I call real Exchange, whereby one Species of Money is really afid truly
exchanged for another. But dry Exchange is not a true, but afeigned Exchange,
and is a Loan or Mutuum under the Shew and Image of real Exchange, As it
happens, when the Campsor delivers Money to the Campsarius to be paid in the
same Place where delivered, by signed Letters of Bills, to a distant Place, to
which Place these Bills are not really sent; or if they are sent, they have no more
Operation or Effect than if they were not sent, because the Campsor knows the
Campsarius to have no Money there where the Bills are sent, either actually or
potentially; and, therefore, is nothing else but downright Usury. . . . 'Tis called
dry Exchange according to Navarrus; because it wants Moisture, or a just Title
of receiving any Gain thereby: Money being stiled Saliva Mecurialis by the
Poets, and others.
Id. Note that Ayliffe uses the term Campsor for drawer: "derived from Cambium, we
mean him who pays or delivers out Money by Bills for Exchange; and by the word
Campsarius, him who receives the Money by way of Exchange: that is to say, the
Drawer and Presenter." Id.
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not a Roman one,2 35 and its meaning, as Ayliffe recognized, was never clear:
"Sometimes all kind of Permutation is comprehended under the Name of
Exchange, called Cambium."I 6 But Ayliffe used it more narrowly, confin-
ing its definition to "that kind of contract, whereby Money is exchanged or
barter'd for Money in order to distinguish it from Permutation properly so
called." 237 A cambium, he observed, was begat of the ius gentium:
This way of remitting Money by Bills was invented and introduced by
the Law of Nations for many wise Reasons, viz. not only for the sake of
keeping the Species within the Territory of every State, but likewise to
prevent Robberies, and to ease People in carrying Money from one
Place to another, which might prove an Inconvenience. Trade is greatly
promoted by a local Exchange; and therefore every prudent State
encourages the same under certain Restrictions. Local Exchange is not
only lawful, if it be made to Places at a great distance, but even though it
be made to Places of the same Kingdom or Province, if such Exchange
be not specially prohibited. But the greater the Distance is, the greater is
the Stipend or Course of Exchange, generally speaking, though the
Bankers of the present Age do not much regard the distance of Places,
but are chiefly governed herein by Trade.238
Ayliffe nevertheless set out three critical rules of exchange as if they were
in the civil law. The first rule established that bills of exchange were nego-
tiable, but the drawer was the one ultimately liable, unless the drawee ac-
cepted. 23 9 This Ayliffe loosely ascribed to Digest 14.6.16.240 Ayliffe's second
rule posited that bills of exchange could be accepted for "honor," creating
an action between he who accepts and the drawer. 241 This Ayliffe ascribed,
235 See id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 504.
.239 According to Ayliffe:
Bills of Exchange are Proof against the Writer, not only in favour of him to
whom 'they are directed, but also in favour of a third Person: But they are not
proof against him to whom they are directed; nor do they produce any Obliga-
tion, unless they are accepted: for if the Person accepts of them, he remains
obliged. If Bills of Exchange are given out, they cannot be recalled, before that is
paid for which they were drawn.
Id. at 505.
240 Id. at n.e. (footnotes are lettered).
241 As Ayliffe explained:
According to the Style and Custom among Merchants, any third Person may pay
Bills of Exchange in honour of the Writer of such Bills, and by paying them, he
acquires an Action against the Drawer, and has the Writer bound to him: And
he unto whom such Bills are directed, may do the same, viz. by accepting of
them upon a Protest, saying, I will not accept of this Order or Commission, but
in honour of the Writer. I am ready to pay such Bill, and will have the Writer
bound to me. Because though the Bill be directed to a Person, who does not
accept of it; yet this does not take away the power of paying it upon a Protest. I
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even more loosely, to Digest 3.539.242 Finally, Ayliffe adopted the three
important doctrines of 1) "speedy notice" on protest, 2) interest for dis-
honor, and 3) the ten day rule for sight payment.2 43 Even Ayliffe did not have
the courage to cite the Digest for this! It was "according to the Custom of the
Place, and the Course of the Exchange," or "the style and Custom among
Merchants.'"244
Other civilian writers did not even attempt to fit bills of exchange into a
classical structure. Thomas Wood pointed out that in the classical exchange,
or "permutation," one could not "discern who is the Seller or the Buyer, or
what is the Price, and which Merchandize ... is bought or sold. ' 241 With
bills of exchange, however, "there are three Persons which may be distin-
guished[:] he that ... remit[s] his Money, he that receives it... and he that
undertakes to deliver it at the Place ... and there may be a Fourth Person,
viz. he to whom the Order is assign'd. 2 46 Wood added, "I mention this
Contract under Permutation or Exchange, because it hath the same Name,
but it hath nothing of its Nature ." 2 47 Thus, according to Wood, the relation-
ship between the drawer and drawee of a bill of exchange could be described
as a "Partnership or Society," and "he to whom the Order is given seems to
act also by Commission and Authority. ' 2 48 More to the point, Wood, like
Domat, ultimately relied on a statutory recognition, directing the reader to
"3 & 4 Ann. c. 9 Concerning Bills of Exchange." 249 Earlier civilians, such as
Wiseman and Cowell, also did not attempt an analysis of the theoretical or
say, a third Person that pays Bills of Exchange not directed to him, or drawn on
him, acquires an Action: For he who pays Money for another, discharges that
other Person, and he shall have an Action for Business done against him,
because the Debtor is so bound to him. And 'tis the same thing by a Parity of
Reason, in respect of him who pays them with a Protest, though directed to him.
Id; see supra notes 41, 141.
242 Id. at n.g. (footnotes are lettered).
243 Id. at 505.
244 Id. Ayliffe stated:
A protest made at the time of accepting of Bills of Exchange, ought, according to
the Style and Custom among Merchants, to be repeated at the time of Payment,
otherwise the Accepter shall be said to have accepted the said Billsfreely, and
without Reserve. The Writer of Bills of Exchange that are returned with a
Protest, is obliged to the Payment of the Sum or Sums contained therein with
Interest, and they are Evidence for the Benefit of him, at whose Instance they
were made or drawn. The time for paying Bills of Exchange is ten Days more or
less, according to the Custom of the Place, and the Course of the Exchange.
Id.
245 T. WOOD, A NEW INSTITUTE 239 (2d ed. London 1712).
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 240 (misnumbered 242 in original text)
249 Id.
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statutory origins. 5 ' Cowell, in his famous The Institutes of the Lawes of
England, simply observed:
Obligations by our Law arise from implyed Contracts many wayes...
as for the transacting of businesse, and the like: (a) that which is done by
the command, or for the sake of one that is absent [if Lawyers have
informed mee aright,] is rather left to the conscience and integrity of him
whose businesse it is, then to any Action to be satisfied. '2 5'
The only conclusion is that the civilian jurists had no better doctrines than
the common lawyers to accommodate bills of exchange. The bills simply did
not fit into the Corpus Juris any better than they fit into the Register of Writs.
Both the civilians and the common lawyers were desperately trying to keep
up with the realities of the market place. The civilian doctrine of customary
ius gentium was, however, less demanding than the common law doctrine of
custom. Moreover, the initially felt need to quarantine bills of exchange from
the common law of the whole realm was, in the case of English civilian
practice, neatly provided for by the jurisdictional parameters of the Admi-
ralty. The irony was that the civilians, who had endeavored to expand these
jurisdictional walls, had no desire to see them abolished altogether. These
walls may have limited the civilian practice, but they also defended the cozy
civilian monopoly. Regrettably, English civilian jurisprudence also reflected
the same limited perspective in doctrinal matters. The civilians thus failed to
capture the jurisprudence of the law merchant, and lost the key to the future.
III. SOME PECULIAR DEBTS AND DEBTORS
Nothing could, in fact, be more tempting, and nothing more dangerous,
than to treat the Bill of Exchange as the counterpart of the old Roman
literal contract .252
Edward Jenks
It is dangerous to use the acceptance or rejection of specific doctrines
as a touchstone to test the influence of the English civilians.2 53 One may be
seduced into "finding" direct doctrinal links which did not, in fact, exist, or
250 See J. COWELL, supra note 33, under "Exchange" (excambium, vel cambium);
see also J. COWELL, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 182-87, 203
(London 1651); supra note 199.
251 J. COWELL, supra note 250, at 203.
252 Jenks, The Early History of Negotiable Instruments, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS,
supra note 21, at 70.
253 See Coquillette, supra note 68, at 87-89; Coquillette, supra note 30, at 317-20,
346-71; see also Wieacker, The Importance of Roman Law for Western Civilization
and Western Legal Thought, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 280 (1981) ("The
utility of Roman law ... is not restricted to its direct effects on the content of modem
legal systems.").
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which were insignificant when compared to other evolutionary forces, such
as mercantile practices. Alternatively, one may conclude, out of despair,
that the civilians, after three hundred years of law practice and institutional
existence in the heart of London, left little behind in the living fabric of the
law. These twin pitfalls were identified by Richard Helmholz in his brilliant
Selden Society lecture. 5 4 Helmholz pointed out that "legal history is win-
ner's history, and at the end of the day the ecclesiastical courts were losers
[and]... Doctors' Commons is gone, ' 15 5 but that, nevertheless, the impor-
tance of what he called "reciprocal influence" should not be ignored.215
Helmholz restricted his analysis to canon law doctrines, focusing particu-
larly on defamation and bankruptcy.25 7 Although he rejected the position
that common lawyers were merely "receptacles for an alien and sophisti-
cated system of law," Helmholz concluded "that the canon law, as enforced
in the Church Courts, was one of the sources from which English lawyers
could and did willingly draw ideas."2 58 I regret that I do not have the
opportunity here to do the badly needed examination of the canon law.
Nevertheless, my thesis is that Helmholz's perspective of civil law as a
source of ideas for English lawyers is particularly fruitful in examining the
contribution of later secular English civilian jurisprudence, and gives a fair
picture of its lasting influence. It can also shed light on the so-called "incor-
poration" of the law merchant into common law.
I will test this thesis by examining the jurisprudence of two great and
acknowledged common law "incorporators," Sir John Holt and Lord Mans-
field. While I will continue to focus on bills of exchange and commercial
law, I will also examine some of their opinions in other areas that are
particularly revealing of their juristic method.
I also must make another important point: although the English civilian
jurists came from a narrow, self-defined professional monopoly, civilian
jurisprudence was a vast system of ideas with an accessible literature.
English civilian jurists attempted to gain influence by promoting or extolling
this vast system in an English context. This point can be illustrated by
examples of civilian influence on certain early common law jurists, namely
Francis Bacon, John Selden, and Matthew Hale, and a similar influence on
Thomas Hobbes. While this early influence had nothing to do with the law
merchant, its history assists in understanding exactly how civilian method-
254 See Selden Society Lecture by R.H. Helmholz, Professor of Law, The Univer-
sity of Chicago (July 5, 1982), in R. HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND ENGLISH COM-
MON LAW 3-4 (1983).
255 Id. at 3.
256 Id. at 4.
257 Id. at 9-11.
258 Id. at 17. Helmholz acknowledged the work of Franz Wieacker, who made
similar claims for the influence of Roman law in the development of Western legal
thought generally. Id. at 17 n.35; see Wieacker, supra note 253, at 257-81.
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ology influenced those common lawyers who did establish modem English
commercial law, such as Holt and Mansfield.
A. Some Early Examples of Civilian Influence on Common Law
Jurisprudence: Bacon, Hobbes, Selden, and Hale
1. Francis Bacon
Francis Bacon (1561-1626) would have fervently denied being a civilian, if
only as a matter of simple political expediency. Coke would have gladly
seized any opportunity to tar his rival with the brush of "foreign ideas,"
"absolutism," and Catholicism.2 5 9 Bacon held fast to the common law
citadels of Westminster Hall and Gray's Inn, and kept away from civilian
Great Knight Rider Street. Still, Bacon's writing and his attitude toward
legal authority were strongly influenced by civilian ideas.16 0
These civilian elements in Bacon's work, especially his theoretical juris-
prudence and his proposals for the scientific reform of the sources of English
law, influenced other common lawyers. Bacon's proposals for reform were
inspired by Justinian's compilers and by the civilian codification ideals
promoted in England by John Cowell and other contemporary civilians. 261
259 See, e.g., Coquillette, supra note 68, at 84-86.
260 See generally id. at 37-87 (for a discussion of the contemporary civilians).
261 Wheeler, The Invention of Modern Empiricism: Juridical Foundations of Fran-
cis Bacon's Philosophy of Science, 76 LAW LIB. J. 78, 115 (1983). Bacon promoted
these civilian codification theories in various treatises. See F. BACON, Example of a
Treatise on Universal Justice or the Fountains of Equity, by Aphorisms: one Title of
it, in 5 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 88-110 (J. Spedding, R. Ellis, & D. Heath,
eds. new ed. 1877) [hereinafter WORKS]; F. BACON, A Proposition ... touching the
Compiling and Amendment of the Laws of England, in 13 WORKS, supra, at 61-71 (J.
Spedding, R. Ellis, & D. Heath, eds. new ed. 1872); F. BACON, A Memorial Touching
the Review of Penal Laws and the Amendment of the Common Law, in 12 WORKS,
supra, at 84-86 (J. Spedding, R. Ellis, & D. Heath, eds. new ed. 1869); see also
Coquillette, supra note 68, at 9 n. 16 (observing that Bacon is i[t]he most overlooked
example of the civilian influence" and providing numerous references to his treatises
and his civilian endeavors).
Harvey Wheeler's brilliant recent work on Bacon as a social scientist has corrected
a multitude of misconceptions about Bacon. Wheeler's work suggests that the sig-
nificance of Bacon's contributions can best be appreciated by seeing it for what it
was: the cornerstone of modem social science and empiricist jurisprudence as writ-
ten by a statesman, rather than the cornerstone of "hard science" or modem
scientific doctrine. Wheeler, supra, at 78. Bacon, in fact, had made a similar observa-
tion:
All who have written concerning laws have written either as philosphers or
lawyers. The philosophers lay down many precepts fair in argument, but not
applicable to use: the lawyers, being subject and addicted to the positive rules
either of the laws of their own country or else of the Roman or Pontifical, have
no freedom of opinion, but as it were talk in bonds. But surely the consideration
of this properly belongs to statesmen, who best understand the condition of civil
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The core of Bacon's proposed reform included the codification of all the
laws, reports, and decisions of English law, "culling out all that was archaic,
irrelevant, inapplicable, and redundant, [and] preserving only those laws,
forms, and procedures representative of current juridical and social
realities. ' 262 These would then be organized into "institutes," which "like
the Institutes of Justinian would become the basis for the teaching of a new
empirico-deductive common law to facilitate adjudication. ' 263
Apart from the obvious debt of this scheme to the civilian tradition, Bacon
owed a more fundamental juristic debt to contemporary civilian legal stud-
ies. As Harvey Wheeler has observed, "Bacon leavened the rigid induc-
tivism of Coke's antiquarian empiricism with an imperative deductivism
born of his [Bacon's] Roman law and equity jurisdiction practice. ' 26 This,
Wheeler believed, "together with his [Bacon's] parallel interest in science,
gave all his legal writings a rationalist quality that startles us with its moder-
nity. ' 265 Indeed, Bacon's best professional works, particularly The Maxims
of the Law, 266 The Reading on the Statute of Uses, 267 The Ordinances in
Chancery ,268 and A Preparation Toward the Union of Laws ,269 indicate that
he anticipated two important, modern jurisprudential schools: analytical
positivism and instrumentalism. 270 His anticipation of the former is reflected
society, welfare of the people, natural equity, customs of nations, and different
forms of government; and who may therefore determine laws by the rules and
principles both of natural equity and policy. Wherefore let it be my present
object to go to the fountains of justice and public expediency, and endeavour
with reference to the several provinces of law to exhibit a character and idea ofjustice, in general comparison with which the laws of particular- states and
kingdoms may be tested and amended. I will now therefore according to my
custom set forth an example thereof in one of its heads.
F. BACON, De Augmentis, in 5 WORKS, supra, at 88.
262 Wheeler, supra note 261, at 115.
263 Id.
264 Id. at 105.
265 Id.
266 F. BACON, The Maxims of the Law, in 7 WORKS, supra note 261, at 327-93 (J.
Spedding, R. Ellis, & D. Heath eds. new ed. 1879).
267 F. BACON, The Learned Reading of Mr. Francis Bacon ... Upon the Statute of
Uses, in 7 WORKS, supra note 261, at 395-450.
268 F. BACON, Ordinances... For the Better and More Regular Administration of
Justice in the Chancery, in 7 WORKS, supra note 261, at 759-74. Parts of the
Ordinances were incorporated by Bacon from other sources. See Heath, General
Preface to the Professional Works, in 7 WORKS, supra note 261, at 304.
269 F. BACON, A Preparation Toward the Union of Laws, in 7 WORKS, supra note
261, at 731-43.
270 As to the nature of analytical positivism and instrumentalism, see Hurst, The
Unfinished Work of the Instrumentalists, 82 MICH. L. REV. 852 (1984) (reviewing R.
SUMMER, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982)). For a new
appreciation of Bacon's early legal writing, see Hogan & Schwartz, On Bacon's
'Rules and Maximes' of the Common Law, 76 LAW LIB. J. 48 (1983). See generally
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in his legal writings, which focused "on the logical implication of concepts
regarded as giving authoritative form to a system of law." The tenets of the
latter were evident in his attempts to measure the success of legal rules by
their utility in light of social and political reality, including their efficacy in
reaching particular economic or commercial goals.
Bacon's jurisprudence was also progressive. He "proclaimed the inevita-
ble enlargement of human knowledge and the resulting improvement of the
human lot." 27 ' This optimism allowed Bacon to believe not only in the need
for legal theory, but in its utility as well. As Holdsworth has observed,
"Bacon was one of the earliest common lawyers to appreciate the need for
some kind of general jurisprudence; and ... he was certainly the earliest to
show ... how it might be used to improve an existing body of law." 272 This
progressive hope captured the spirit of Justinian's compilers and the spirit of
the civilian humanists.
Bacon's rationalism and progressive temper were greatly influenced by
prior and contemporary English civilians, such as Thomas Smith, Alberico
Gentili, William Fulbecke, and John Cowell. 273 Bacon himself acknowledged
their importance:
[A]lthough I am a professor of the common law, yet am I so much a
lover of truth and of learning, and of my native country, that I do
heartily persuade that the professors of law, called civilians, because
the civil law is their guide, should not be discountenanced or discour-
aged: else whensoever we shall have aught to do with any foreign king
or state, we shall be at a miserable loss, for want of learned men in that
profession. 274
It is also clear that Bacon himself influenced later English civilians. For
example, the title of Robert Wiseman's famous civilian treatise, The Law of
Laws,27 5 was probably inspired by Bacon's definition of the legum leges in
Book VIII of De Augmentis, as "certain 'laws of laws,' whereby we may
derive information as to the good or ill set down and determined in every
law. 276
B. SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN 17TH CENTURY ENGLAND (1984); C.
WHITNEY, FRANCIS BACON AND MODERNITY (1986).
271 D. BOORSTIN, THE DISCOVERERS 645 (1983).
272 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 250.
273 For a discussion of these civilians, see Coquillette, supra note 68, at 49-86.
274 Letter From Francis Bacon to George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham (1666),
reprinted in 6 J. SPEDDING, THE LETTERS AND LIFE OF FRANCIS BACON 27, 39
(1872).
275 R. WISEMAN, THE LAW OF LAWES: OR, THE EXCELLENCY OF THE CIVIL LAW,
ABOVE ALL OTHER HUMANE LAWS WHATSOEVER: SHEWING OF HOW GREAT USE
AND NECESSITY THE CIVIL LAW IS TO THIS NATION (London 1656; London 1664;
London 1686) (citations are to the 1686 printing).
276 F. BACON, Aphorism 6, De Augmentis, in 5 WORKS, supra note 261, at 89; see
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2. Thomas Hobbes and John Selden
If Bacon would have objected to being characterized as a civilian, the
reaction of his famous acquaintance, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679),277 and
Hobbes's equally famous friend, John Selden (1584-1654), would have been
positively violent.27 8 But Bacon's civilian debts were shared by Hobbes and
Selden.2 79 Hobbes revealed his civilian bent in his famous, A Dialogue
Between A Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England,
published in 1681.280 "There the lawyer . . . defends Coke's exegetical
common law method of extrapolating the law solely from the narrowly
conceived case precedents. '2 8 1 The philosopher [Hobbes] "counters with
the argument that the law of reason, as expressed in equity and Roman law
jurisdictions (for example, the Admiralty court) is 'far superior.' "282
Hobbes's friend Selden, although an avid opponent of direct reception,
was deeply learned in civilian texts and theory.2 8 3 His understanding of the
dynamic nature of legal history, which has rightly earned him the place of
honor as our first scientific legal historian, owed more to the historical
studies of the civilian "humanist" school of Coquille, Cujas, Hotman, and
Bude, than to the gothic inquiries of Coke. 284
Selden's most important statement concerning general jurisprudence was
also Bacon, Preface to the Maxims of the Law, in 7 WORKS, supra note 261, at 320
("And therefore the conclusions of reason of this kind are worthily and aptly called
by a great civilian legum leges; for that many placita legum, that is, particular and
positive learnings of laws, do easily decline from a good temper of justice, if they be
not rectified and governed by such rules."); Wheeler, supra note 261, at 109.
27 According to Aubrey, Hobbes was Bacon's secretary in approximately 1625
and actually took dictation from Bacon. 1 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY
979 (comp. ed. 1975) [hereinafter DNB]. Aubrey further commented that Hobbes
"show[ed], as may be believed, more intelligence than other amanuenses, and helped
in turning some of the essays into Latin." Id.
278 Selden, in particular, resisted what he took to be civilian pretensions to a
monopoly on learning, but this, as with Coke, did not stop him from using civilian
sources and having an excellent knowledge of the civilian literature. See Coquillette,
supra note 68, at 84-87.
2719 1 DNB, supra note 277, at 979.
280 See A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of
England, in 6 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES 1-160 (London 1890) (1st.
ed. 1681), reprinted in T. HOBBES, DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A
STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND (J. Cropey ed. 1971).
281 Id. at 110.
282 Id.
283 2 DNB, supra note 277, at 1885-86; see J. SELDEN, HISTORY OF TYTHES
(London 1618) [hereinafter TYTHES] and J. SELDEN, TITLES OF HONOUR (London
1614) [hereinafter HONOUR] (on civilian specialties).
284 See Coquillette, supra note 68, at 34 n. 131; 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21,
at 407-12.
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his Ad Fletam Dissertatio, originally printed in 1647 as an explanatory
introduction to the first printed edition of Fleta.18 5 Denying that there was a
reception of Roman law in England, Selden believed that after the Roman
occupation had ended, "the inhabitants, restored to their own jurisdiction,
either rejected the imperial law or so neglected it that it soon disap-
peared."286 Later medieval civil law influence was "received," according to
Selden, only sparingly, and in limited circumstances:
[W]herever a principle or analogy was required for interpreting old or
new laws, or where a tradition or express enactment was lacking,
recourse might be had to it as the best and richest repository ofjurispru-
dence and because, by deduction or analogy, it might conveniently
supply a rule in matters hitherto undecided.2 87
Selden shared Bacon's appreciation of the deductive and comparative
importance of civil law sources, just as he shared Hobbes's appreciation of
the rationalist methodologies and historical sense of the new humanism of
the mos gallicus. The importance of these civilian elements in Selden's
writing, evident in his edition of Fortescue' s De Laudibus Legum Angliae ,288
his History of Tythes ,289 his Mare Clausum ,290 and his Ad Fletam Dissertatio,
has been widely overlooked. 91 Selden is partly to blame for this oversight.
His systematic repudiation of any significant, direct doctrinal reception in
Ad Fletam Dissertatio, combined with his flat assertion that no common law
rule had ever been actually displaced by the introduction of a civil law
doctrine, has given him a reputation as a chauvinist. 292 But Selden was
285 See I. SELDINI, AD FLETAM DISSERTATIO (D. Ogg ed. 1925) [hereinafter J.
SELDEN]; E. FLETCHER, JOHN SELDEN 1584-1564, at 15 (London 1969).
286 J. SELDEN, supra note 285, at 45; see also Ziskind, John Selden: Criticism and
Affirmation of the Common Law Tradition, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 22 (1975) (for a
general discussion of Selden's contributions as England's first legal historian and the
Roman law influence on his writings).
287 J. SELDEN, supra note 285, at 97.
288 J. FORTESCUE, Di LAUDIBus LEGUM ANGLIAE (London 1737).
289 TYTHES, supra note 283.
290 J. SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM SUE DE DOMINIO MAR1S LIBRi Duo .... (London
1665).
291 From his later comments in AD FLETAM DISSERTATIO, it appears that Selden's
study of Fortescue's DE LAUDIBus LEGUM ANGLIAE may have been provoked, at
least in part, by Fortescue's "remarkable statement" that "some English kings, not
satisfied with native laws, attempted to introduce the civil laws into the government
and repudiate English laws." J. SELDEN, supra note 285, at 171; see J. FORTESCUE
supra note 288, at ch. xxxiii. Selden concluded that there was no evidence for this
statement. J. SELDEN, supra note 285, at 171. For a good modern edition of this work
by Fortescue, see J. FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUs LEGUM ANGLIAE 79 (S. Chrimes ed.
1942).
292 See Ziskind, supra note 286, at 39. Selden was also a bit sensitive to criticism
from civilians, and reportedly took the infamous prank play, Ignoramus, as an attack
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actually saying little more than what Baker asserts today. English law did
not acquire foreign elements wholesale, although change from many sources
did, in fact, "percolate up" from within the system. 293 Selden himself was a
prime example of such "percolating." This included his civilian methodol-
ogy and insights deduced from civilian sources. 294 He also did not overlook
the English civilian practitioners. As he said in his famous Table Talk:
If I would study ye Canon Law as t'is used in England; I must study ye
heads herein use; Then goe to ye practisers in those Corts where ye Law
is practysed; and know their Customes. Soe flo]r all study in ye
world.' '295
Selden opposed the importation of a civilian system in the manner pro-
posed in the Dialogue between Starkey and Pole .296 Nor did he even address
the proposals of contemporary English civilians, such as Wiseman, for
specific reception of civil law rules. This was true even though Wiseman's
proposal was only to occur with the consent of the common lawyers, and
then only to correct defects in the English law, and then only "where there is
greatest need of equity and a good conscience." 297 If asked whether Admi-
ralty practices, derived in part from civil law principles and in part from
mercantile practice, constituted a "reception" of civil law, Selden, like
on himself. See Ogg, Introduction to J. SELDEN, supra note 285, at xlviii; see also
Coquillette, supra note 68, at 82 n.434 (discussing the origins of the play, Ignoramus,
and the stir it created).
293 See Baker, supra note 6, at 298.
294 As Ziskind points out, Selden "denied that the principles of natural law could
be deduced wholly from the civil law of Rome, nor could a case be made for the
universality of Roman law throughout history, a theory put forth by Gentili in De
Jure Belli, Book 1, Chapter III." Ziskind, supra note 286, at 37. But this is quite
consistent with recognizing a more limited influence. HONOUR, supra note 283, at
preface (unpaginated); J. SELDEN, TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 24 (F. Pollock ed.
1927) (1st ed. 1689) [hereinafter TABLE TALK] (concerning study of canon law).
295 TABLE TALK, supra note 294, at 24.
296 See Ogg, Introduction to J. SELDEN, supra note 285, at xlvii. According to
Pole:
There is no doubt but that our law and order thereof is over-confused. It is
infinite and without order or end. There is no stable ground nor sure stay: but
everyone that can colour reason maketh a stop to the best law that is beforetime
devised. The subtlety of one sergeant shall evert and destroy all the judgments of
many wise men beforetime received. There is no stable ground in our common
law to lean unto . . . . The statutes of kings also be overmany, even as the
constitutions of the emperors were. Wherefor I would wish that all these laws
should be brought into some small number and to be written also in our mother
tongue, or else put into Latin.
Id. at xlvii.
297 Id. at lxii; R. WISEMAN, supra note 274, at 17.
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Baker today, would simply assert that it was all really an indigenous devel-
opment. 298
But Selden appreciated the importance of civil law as a source of ideas,
whether through canon law,2 99 university legal studies, 300 diplomatic and
international practices, or commercial law. 301 While Selden could find no
"clear distinction between the exponents of civil law and of English law" in
secular legal treatises, 302 he illustrated on several occasions "the authority of
the imperial law and its function in providing the principle (or what was
thought to be the principle) by which a decision was come to." 303 He also
understood the importance of the "consultative capacity" of civilians and
canonists in matters of foreign or ecclesiastical law, although he did not
mention commercial specialties. 304
Selden's most conspicuous civilian debt was in the area of comparative
and international law, as illustrated by his Titles of Honor and his de Jure
Naturali et Gentium ,305 and particularly by his famous Mare Clausum .306 His
inductive, utilitarian approach to international problems was explicitly
influenced by the English civilians Alberico Gentili, Gentili's disciple Wil-
liam Fulbecke, Sir Thomas Ridley, and Richard Zouche. 30 7 In de Jure
Naturali et Gentium, Selden compared ancient Hebrew law with Roman law
and with the history of the actual relations among nation states. His conclu-
sion, that there is both a "primitive" or "natural" law of nations, and a
"secondary" law which arises from compacts and usages, was similar to
observations of both Gentili and Bacon. It also had clear ramifications for
international usages of trade and for the customs of war and peace. Selden
would deny that any of this involved a "reception" of foreign doctrine in the
298 Ogg, Introduction to J. SELDEN, supra note 285, at lxiii; see supra text accom-
panying notes 8-16.
299 J. SELDEN, supra note 285, at 139.
300 Id. at 141.
301 Id. at 163.
302 Id. at 141.
303 Id. at 149-51.
104 Id. at 163-65.
305 J. SELDEN, supra note 290; see A. NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
LAW OF NATIONS 93 (1947). Civilians were active in the High Court of Chivalry,
which adjoined Doctors' Commons, and titles, heraldry, and precedence were no
small part of seventeenth century foreign affairs. See G. SQUIBB, THE HIGH COURT
OF CHIVALRY: A STUDY OF THE CIVIL LAW IN ENGLAND 29-67, 81-117 (1959).
306 See supra note 290.
307 See Coquillette, supra note 68, at 54-70; Coquillette, supra note 30, at 336-46;
W. BUTLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE COMPARATIVE METHOD IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 25 (W. Butler ed. 1981); H. WHEATON,
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 100-04 (New York 1845); see also E. FLETCHER,
supra note 285, at 12 ("If the Mare Liberum [Grotius] was the inspired harbinger of
the future, the Mare Clausum was the faithful mirror of the actual .... ).
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political sense, which was true, but the process he described would ulti-
mately provide much inspiration to Holt and Mansfield." 8
As with Bacon, Selden's contact with the civilians was always a two-way
street. Not only was he influenced by the ideas and methodology of the early
English civilians, he himself was avidly read by later civilians. 309 The Resto-
ration civilians frequently addressed Selden's arguments and attempted to
shore up their own assertions by reference to his work. 10
Selden was also the link between Bacon and Matthew Hale. When Bacon
was appointed as Lord Keeper, Selden presented him with his monograph, A
Brief Discourse Touching the Office of the Lord Chancellor of England,
which appeared in 1617.311 Bacon, in turn, respected Selden's expertise and
in 1621 sought his legal advice, probably as to the legality of certain
"passages of Parliament" relevant to Bacon's personal plight at the time,
although this is not absolutely clear from Selden's surviving letter to Ba-
con.312 At least one version of Bacon's will asked that Selden be consulted
by Bacon's literary executor as to what "to publish or surpress, ' 31 3 and
Bacon certainly gave Selden some books.314 In turn, Matthew Hale was
Selden's literary executor, and Selden dedicated his famous Table Talk to
Hale. 315 It was rumored that Hobbes was at Selden's death bed, much to the
dismay of Hale, who regarded Hobbes as of suspect piety.316 Thus Selden's
life linked all these key figures.
3. Matthew Hale
Matthew Hale (1609-1676) was critically important to the development of
English jurisprudence. He was, as J. H. Baker observed, "the greatest
common lawyer since Coke, and his work was based on a first-hand knowl-
edge of the sources, allied to great ability to develop a scientific arrangement
with legal principles." 317 There can be no doubt that he read and appreciated
308 Selden's primary aversion to civil law was its political identification with
continental absolutism. J. SELDEN, supra note 285, at 165. It was political subjuga-
tion and absolutism he feared, not civilian methodology and humanism. See Ziskind,
supra note 286, at 39; Ogg, Introduction to J. SELDEN, supra note 285, at lxvi.
309 See J. AIKIN, THE LIVES OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. AND ARCHBISHOP USHER
195-96 (London 1812); H. RoscoE, LIVES OF EMINENT BRITISH LAWYERS 45 (Lon-
don 1830).
310 See Coquillette, supra note 1, at 305, 312-13, 316, 320, 337.
311 2 DNB, supra note 277, at 1885-86.
312 Letter from Francis Bacon to John Selden (Feb. 14, 1621), reprinted in 14 J.
SPEDDING, supra note 274, at 332-33.
313 Id. at 540; see Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 270, at 54 n.32, 55 n.36.
314 J. MYRES, THE BODLEIAN LIBRARY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 43-44
(1951).
315 2 DNB, supra note 277, at 1885-86.
316 Id. at 1886. As to Hale's early acquaintance with Selden, see I id. at 866.
317 SELDEN SOCIETY, SIR MATTHEW HALE 1609-1676, CATALOGUE OF AN EXHI-
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both Bacon and Selden, and was, like them, a student of Roman law. 18 Nor
can it be disputed that his "association with the school of historical jurists of
whom Selden was the chief, made him with the exception of Francis Bacon
the most scientific jurist that England had yet seen. ' 31 9 In his History of the
Common Law, 320 published in 1713, Hale asserted his belief in a scientific,
rational, and instrumentalist jurisprudence. ' He was also prominent during
the critical civilian struggle for the Admiralty. 322
Like Bacon, Hobbes, and Selden, Hale would certainly not have identified
himself with the English civilians. He was a stalwart common lawyer, 32' and
actually attacked the civilians directly in his famous Preface to Rolle's
Abridgement,324 published in 1668. It was not that he identified with Hobbes
either, whom he regarded as being a totalitatian and of doubtful piety.
Indeed, one of his most interesting juristic pieces was a sharp attack on
Hobbes's Dialogue, entitled "Reflections by the Lrd. Cheife Justice Hale on
Mr. Hobbes his Dialogue of the Lawe." 325 Although deeply religious, Hale
debated Hobbes "on his [Hobbes's] own ground," asserting that "law should
be tested by reason." 3'2 6 But Hale's test of reason was distinctly instrumen-
talist:
BITION 1 (1976). For Hale's life, see G. BURNET, LIFE AND DEATH OF SIR MATTHEW
HALE (London 1682); 7 E. Foss, THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND 105-16 (London 1864); E.
HEWARD, MATTHEW HALE (1972); THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE HON. ROGER
NORTH 94-103 (A. Jessopp ed. 1887); H. ROSCOE, supra note 309, at 59-83; J.
WILLIAMS, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE, CHARACTER AND WRITING OF SIR MATTHEW
HALE (1835); Holdsworth, Sir Matthew Hale, 39 LAW Q. REV. 402 (1923).
8 See 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra 303, at 483; 6 id. at 574-75.
31-1 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 581; see also E. HEWARD, supra note
317, at 178.
320 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (London 1713).
321 See Wheeler, supra note 261, at 111; Shapiro, Law and Science in 17th Century
England, 21 STAN. L. REV. 727, 729 (1969).
322 D.E.C. YALE, HALE AS A LEGAL HISTORIAN 9-10 & n.19 (London 1976)
[hereinafter HALE AS LEGAL HISTORIAN]; Yale, A View of the Admiral Jurisdiction:
Sir Matthew Hale and the Civilians, in LEGAL HISTORY STUDIES 1972, at 87-109 (D.
Jenkins ed.) [hereinafter Admiral Jurisdiction]; Yale, Introduction to M. HALE, THE
PREROGATIVES OF THE KING ix-lviii (Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 92, 1979) [hereinafter
PREROGATIVES]. Eagerly awaited is M. Hale, Treatise on the Admiralty Jurisdiction
(D.E.C. Yale ed.) (unpublished manuscript). See supra note 202.
323 Hale, Preface Directed to the Young Students of the Common-Law to H.
ROLLE, UN ABRIDGEMENT DES PLUSIEURS CASES ET RESOLUTIONS DEL COMMON
LEY (6th page, unpaginated) (London 1668); see J. COWLEY, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
ABRIDGEMENTS . . . TO THE YEAR 1800, at 77-78 (1932).
324 Hale, supra note 323.
325 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 500-13.
3.. Id. at 482; see also E. HEWARD, supra note 317, at 26-27.
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[W]e must remember, that lawes were not made for their own sakes, but
for the sake of those who were to be guided by them; and though it is
true that they are and ought to be sacred, yet, if they be or are become
unusefull for their end, they must either be amended, if it may be, or
new lawes be substituted .... 327
Hale was a systematizer and a moderate, yet optimistic, advocate of
scientific reform. He also "seems to have grasped the idea of comparative
legal history, and in so doing moved away decisively from the introspective
and insular intellectual tradition of the Common Law. ' ' 8  Yale suggested
that Hale got this emphasis from Selden, which was certainly true, but Hale,
like Selden, was influenced by the comparative work of the civilian
humanists as well. 329 He certainly "does appear to have borrowed the basic
framework [of his General Analysis] from the Roman Law. ' 330
Further, while "Hale had a great admiration for Roman law academically
considered; his attitude to its contribution in practical, jurisdictional terms
was much less cordial.- 331 In his unpublished Jurisdiction of the Admiralty,
Hale insisted that "the rules of the civil law ought not to be applied to the
common law, nor to be cited to perplex the proceedings therof."3 32 Hale was
no more accommodating to the civilian lawyers themselves; during the 1652
debate over the probate jurisdiction, Hale accused the civilian practitioners
of demanding "what is unreasonable, to have civil [law] compulsory more
than common law." 333
Hale explained his resistance to civil law doctrine in his anonymous
327 Hale, Considerations touching the Amendment or Alteration of Lawes, in F.
HARGRAVE, A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND FROM
MANUSCRIPTS 269 (Dublin 1787)). According to Hale,
He, that thinks a state can be exactly steered by the same laws in every kind, as
it was two or three hundred years since, may as well imagine, that the cloth that
fitted him when a child should serve him when he was grown a man. The matter
changeth the custom; the contracts the commerce; . . . As manufactures,
mercantile arts, architecture, and building, and philosophy itself, receive new
advantages and discoveries by time and experience, so much more do lawes,
which concern the manner and customes of men.
Id. at 269-70.
328 HALE AS LEGAL HISTORIAN, supra note 322, at 7.
329 See Coquillette, supra note 68, at 35-70.
330 HALE AS LEGAL HISTORIAN, supra note 322, at 8. The General Analysis was
appended to M. HALE, supra note 320; see also M. HALE, THE ANALYSIS OF THE
LAW (LONDON 1713) (reprinted in facsimile, 1978); G. BURNETT, supra note 317, at
192.
331 HALE AS LEGAL HISTORIAN, supra note 322, at 10.
332 Id. at 17 n.20 (There are two manuscripts: B. Hargrave MS 93 and MS 137)
(available in the British Museum).
333 Id. at 17 n.20; see Cotterell, Interregnum Law Reform: the Hale Commission of
1652, 83 ENG. HIST. REV. 685, 689 (1968).
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Preface to Rolle's Abridgement, a short piece "directed to the young stu-
dents of the common-law. ' 334 First, Hale distrusted any "Modells of
Laws," and any analytical theorist, be he Bodin or Hobbes, who advocated
them. 335 He preferred incremental legal development, forged and refined by
the test of utility, and this he saw represented in the evolving common
law.336 Second, he distrusted the motives and experience of the civilian
practitioners. The civilians, he observed, "though otherwise of good parts
and possibly well acquainted with University learning, pretend two great
prejudices and exceptions against the study of the Common Law." 3 37 The
first, according to Hale, was "[t]hat it [the common law] wants clear evi-
dence of reason, and that the conclusions and resolutions of it are not
deducible by such evident rational consequence as is or may be done in other
sciences. ' 338 The second was "[t]hat it [the common law] wants method,
order, and apt distributions. ' 339
These "prejudices" were, in Hale's view, based on the civilians' failure to
recognize that, although "reason is the common faculty and instrument of
mankind," the common law consisted of rules borne of "great Wisdom,
Experience, and Time. ' 340 Such rules were needed "to settle that variety
and inconstancy of particular Applications and Conclusions, which without
some established rule would be found in most men, though of excellent parts
and reason, and agreeing in Common Notions. ' 3 41 Responding to the civil-
ians' complaint about the common law's order and method, Hale insisted
that although "it is true that all the particulars . . . are not easily reducibie
into a Scholastick method, . . . they recompence that Inconvenience by their
particularity and useful Application to particular Occasions. ' 342 In short,
Hale believed that what the common law lacked in superficial theoretical
elegance, it more than compensated for in its practical development, which
was constantly being tested by utility and concrete application. Civilians
who failed to perceive this were, to Hale's thinking, either caught up in
academic fantasies or had their own hidden political agenda.
Hale's unpublished manuscript on Admiralty jurisdiction 343 was written
334 Hale, supra note 323 (1st page, unpaginated).
335 Id. (3d page).
333 id. (3d and 4th pages).
337 Id. (6th page).
338 Id.
339 Id.
340 Id. (7th page).
341 Id.
342 id.
343 See supra notes 202, 322. I am most grateful to D.E.C. Yale for kindly provid-
ing me with sections of the edited manuscript. See also Admiral Jurisdiction, supra
note 322, at 87, 102. His labor, together with that of M. J. Prichard, have this
important manuscript ready for publication.
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about 1675 at a critical time for the civilians. 4 4 It indicated that Hale's
reservations about civilian conceptions extended to the Admiralty as well.
Due to its private nature, and because of Hale's temperate disposition, it did
not have the polemical tone of some of the debates at the time. It was, one
might say, a balanced document, and it acknowledged the usefulness of civil
law jurisprudence in specific areas: "That law is best," wrote Hale, in one of
the manuscript's more colorful passages, "that is best for the people whose
law it is, as the shell of an oyster is better for an oyster than the shell of a
periwinkle or scallop, although this look finer and be fitter for that fish whose
shell it is.'' 345
Hale did not emphasize the inadequacies of the Admiralty, but exalted the
capacity of the common law courts to resolve matters typically reserved to
the Admiralty.3 46 He did not, for example, object to applying foreign law "or
indeed general maritime law," including bottomry, where it was appropriate
in a common law context, and he was willing to use "foreign," rather than
local, juries where "justice and convenience" required it.3 47 Hale's op-
timism caused him to overlook a series of difficulties with the common law in
such cases, and it was from this "unconscious bias" that he belittled some
practical advantages of the Admiralty process.3 48 But these forgivable over-
sights do not detract from Hale's generally expansive, pragmatic, and cos-
mopolitan attitude toward the development of the law.3 49
There is irony in all of this. Yale has correctly stated that, because the
civilians failed to achieve legislative relief, the jurisdictional battle was
fought between lawyers.3 10 The common lawyers had the edge in numbers,
professional strengh, and doctrinal weapons, which were backed by the writ
of prohibition.3 5 ' The losers, according to Yale, were the litigants, who lost
the advantages of useful Admiralty doctrines and process, as well as the
specialist expertise of the civilian practitioners.3 5 2 But surely Hale's juris-
prudence had already pointed to the ultimate means for consolidating the
common law "conquest": testing the validity of doctrines and procedures by
their ultimate usefulness to English society. This is what would ultimately
lead to progressive common law reform. Was the ultimate legacy of the early
English civilian jurists to provide the most able common lawyers with the
344 Id. at 102.
345 Id. (quoting from the unpublished manuscript, B. Hargrave MS 93, supra note
332); see also id. at 109 n.45.
34i Id. at 104-05.
-47 Id. at 105.
348 Id. at 105-08.
349 In this, Hale owed no small debt to Selden. See infra text accompanying notes
283-310.
3" Admiral Jurisdiction, supra note 322, at 108.
351 1d.
352 1d. at 103-08.
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very juristic insights and tools by which the ultimate conquest of the civil-
ians' beloved Doctors' Commons would be achieved?
B. Debtors of a Different Stripe: Sir John Holt (1642-1710) and William
Murray, Lord Mansfield (1705-1793)
The jurisprudence of Holt and Mansfield presents an entirely different
kind of problem from that posed by the jurisprudence of Bacon or Hale.
Neither Holt nor Mansfield ever published a legal institute or treatise.3 5 3
Bacon wrote incessantly on abstract juristic issues, as did Selden and
Hobbes. Hale was also a prolific essayist, although much of his work was left
incomplete. But when his legal writings were published, they were spectacu-
larly successful.3 54
353 For an excellent analysis of Mansfield's recently discovered trial notebooks,
which were found in an attic in Scone Palace in 1967, see E. HEWARD, supra note
317, at 57-59. Professor James C. Oldham is currently editing selected cases from
these trial notebooks, which were kept by Mansfield of jury trials he conducted
during his tenure on King's Bench. Professor Oldham is working from a complete
micro-film copy of the 56 surviving notebooks provided by the generosity of the
current (eighth) Earl of Mansfield. I am grateful to Professor Oldham for freely
sharing the insights he has gained in this most important study. See Oldham, The
Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 140 n.13 (1983).
Insights into Mansfield's intelligence, wit, and broad interests can be gleaned from
his speeches and surviving correspondence. See, e.g., Speech of the Right Hon.
Lord Mansfield in the House of Lords, in the Cause between the City of London and
Dissenters, reprinted in AN INTERESTING APPENDIX TO SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES 142-55 (Phil. 1773); 1 DNB, supra note 277, at 1452 and sources
cited; E. HEWARD, LORD MANSFIELD 182 (1979) (collecting sources); LETTERS FROM
ANDREW STUART, ESQ. TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD MANSFIELD (London
1773). Professor Oldham has also pointed out to me that Mansfield was a major
influence on W.D. Evans' (1767-1821) translation and revision of Pothier's famous
treatise on obligations. See 13 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 466-67; see M.
POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS (W. Evans
trans. London 1806).
354 See 1 DNB, supra note 277, at 866 ("He gave express direction that nothing of
his own composition should be published except what he had destined for publication
in his lifetime, an injunction which has been by no means rigorously obeyed."). For
examples of recent new editions of Hale's work, all of which was published
unfinished and posthumously, see M. HALE, supra note 320 (C. Gray ed. 1971);
PREROGATIVES, supra note 322. The works Hale clearly intended for publication
were not on legal subjects. See, e.g., M. HALE, AN ESSAY TOUCHING THE GRAVITA-
TION OR NON-GRAVITATION OF FLUID BODIES, AND THE REASONS THEREOF (Lon-
don 1673). But see Hale, supra note 323 (although anonymous, it was intended for
publication); E. HEWARD, supra note 317, at 183 & n.597. For a full list of early
published works and unpublished manuscripts, see 1 DNB, supra note 277, at 866-67;
G. BURNETT, supra note 317, at 90-93.
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By contrast, Holt and Mansfield left only reported decisions, 55 which are
inherently ad hoc, fragmented, and retroactive: a poor medium for develop-
ing a coherent jurisprudence. Reported decisions were also vulnerable to the
distortions of private reporters, which was a source of great consternation to
Holt.35 6
Of course, the medium of responsible, reported decisions was also un-
available to Bacon and Hale. There were no Lord Randolph's Reports or
Burrow's Reports in their day. 357 But Bacon was not compelled to write his
Maxims or Hale his History of the Pleas of the Crown and his History of the
Common Law by the absence of accurate reporters; rather, they possessed a
systematizing, compiling spirit, a spirit that would have found the walls of a
stated case confining and the reporting of one's ideas in another's words a
severe and inhibiting imposition.
Developing notions of legal authority account for part of this difference.
Bacon believed that a legal principle stood alone; its inherent rationality and
fairness was its ultimate test. Citing a past case was hardly adequate to
support a principle.358 He also rejected the notion that the judge, acting as a
lawmaker within the confines of the stated case, speaks with enhanced
authority. Judges, admonished Bacon, "ought to remember that their office
lus dicere, and not lus dare. 3 59 Hale's fear of a priori systems of legal
reasoning gave him more respect for the test of historical usage, although
this was less a theory of precedent than it was a belief that repeated use often
reflected merit.360
355 See 1 DNB, supra note 277, at 1452 (Mansfield); id. at 993 (Holt). For Holt's
only published effort, see J. HOLT, A REPORT OF DIVERS CASES IN THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN ADJUDGED AND DETERMINED IN THE REIGN OF THE LATE KING
CHARLES II (collected by Sir John Kelyng, Knt. London 1708). For Mansfield's
published efforts, see supra note 353.
356 See J. WALLACE, THE REPORTERS 393 (1882). It was, perhaps, for this reason
that Holt's only literary endeavor was editing part of J. Kelyng's Reports. Id. at
626-28.
357 Id. at 446-52 (Burrow), 401-07 (Raymond). Mansfield was even doubtful about
Lord Raymond. See id. at 401.
358 See F. BACON, Of Judicature, in 6 WORKS, supra note 261, at 506-10; F.
BACON, De Augmentis, in 5 WORKS, supra note 261, at 88-109.
359 F. BACON, Of Judicature, in 6 WORKS, supra note 261, at 506. For a discussion
of the use of precedent in equity, see Winder, Precedent in Equity, 57 LAW Q. REV.
245, 246 (1941).
360 The modern theory of precedent was still undeveloped in Hale's time. See R.
CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 19-32 (2nd. ed. 1968). In Hale's words:
It is true, the Decisions of Courts of Justice, tho' by Virtue of the Laws of this
Realm they do bind, as a Law Between the Parties thereto, as to the particular
Case in Question, 'till revers'd by Error or Attaint, yet they do not make a Law
properly so called, (for that only the King and Parliament can do); yet they have
a great Weight and Authority in Expounding Declaring, and Publishing, what the
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The absence of a formal system of precedent justice may have encouraged
powerful judges, such as Holt and Mansfield, to use the reporters as a
medium for their legal ideas. As Mansfield said, "as useages of society alter,
the law must adapt itself to the various situations of mankind." 3 61 Confined,
as they were, by the strictures of case-by-case decisionmaking, Holt and
Mansfield might seem far removed from the civilian jurist tradition of the
universities and Doctors' Commons. 362 The task of resolving stated cases
was very different from the discipline of codification, treatise writing, com-
piling maxims and institutes, organizing university courses, and defending
principles of jurisdiction or doctrine through a systematic use of legal history
and comparative law techniques. This difference in format inevitably led to
Law of this Kingdom is, especially when such Decisions hold a Consonancy and
Congruity with Resolutions and Decisions of former Times; and tho' such
Decisions are less than a Law, yet they are a greater Evidence thereof than the
Opinion of any private Persons, as such, whatsoever.
M. HALE, supra note 320, at 45 (C. Gray ed. 1971).
Of course, these juristic attitudes cannot be isolated from the historical develop-
ment of the doctrine of stare decisis and ratio decidendi. The earliest arguable
distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter dictum was contained in a case
decided in about 1633, well toward the end of Hale's judicial career. R. CRoss, supra
note 360, at 37; see T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 59, at 349; 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *69-72 (Oxford 1765); Re, Stare Decisis and the Judicial Process, 22
CATH. LAW. 38, 40-41 (1976); Winder, supra note 359, at 246-79. In fact, I it is to the
nineteenth century that we must look for the final stages of the present system."
T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 59, at 350. The "tendency" toward precedent in
Chancery dated to approximately the same period. Winder, supra note 359, at 245.
It was not too long before Hale's time that Coke had argued that "two or three
precedents" of modern vintage could not prevail against older authority. Slade's
Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1074 (K.B. 1602); see 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at
414; see also J. BAKER, supra note 24, at 171-75. In theory, this restrained judges
from introducing binding new ideas through judicial decision-a point that was not
lost on Common'wealth radicals such as John Warr. See J. WARR, THE CORRUPTION
AND DEFICIENCY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (London 1649), noted in 6 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 414. One could, perhaps, trace the practice of
critically discussing earlier cases to Fitzherbert, and of reporting cases with "most
firmness and surety of law" to Plowden. Id. at 173; see E. PLOWDEN, THE COMMEN-
TARIES OR REPORTS iii-vi (London 1761) (1st ed. London 1571). But "the doctrine of
the binding force of precedent did not appear for another three centuries or more." J.
BAKER, supra note 24, at 173.
361 Johnson v. Spiller, 99 Eng. Rep. 702, 703 (K.B. 1784), quoted in J. BAKER,
supra note 24, at 174 n.18.
362 As to whether Holt believed that some matters should more appropriately be
resolved by the legislature, see infra text accompanying notes 409-19. As to the
history of English legal treatises as sources of authority, see Simpson, The Rise and
Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U.
CHI. L. REV. 632-68 (1981).
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differences in substance. In this sense, the "pure" heirs of the seventeenth-
century civilian jurists were Jeremy Bentham and Joseph Story, not Holt or
Mansfield. 363 On the other hand, Holt and Mansfield learned one lesson well,
Hale's lesson of effective, pragmatic use of legal ideas from many sources.
This was to have a direct effect on the development of commercial law. Let
us begin with Holt.
1. John Holt
John Holt (1642-1710), as with so many great English jurists, lacks a
scholarly biographer .3 64 He was said to have a really fearsome wife, who
supposedly promoted Holt's career by keeping him hiding in terror at his
office all his life, but we actually know little about his personal life.3 65 Much
more is known about his political tightrope walking during the "Troubles,"
which earned him the respect of both factions. 366 But studying Holt's juris-
prudence requires the ultimate sacrifice of scholars: full immersion into the
shifting swamp of late seventeenth-century reporters. Holt had warned of
their shortcomings, and he feared that the "skimblescamble stuff" which
they published would "make Posterity think ill of his understanding, and
that of his brethren on the bench. ' 367 All made some mistakes, and a few
simply did not understand what they were reporting. 368 But if we are to test
Holdsworth's sweeping generality that "Holt was the first judge to ap-
preciate the modern conditions of trade, and the importance of moulding the
doctrines of the common law to fit them," 3 69 then into the swamp we must
go.
Holt's opinions, as found in the likes of Salkeld and Lord Raymond's
Reports, certainly reflect the importance of Holt's idea of custom. In a dozen
cases, Holt emphasized the difference between pleading on a bill of ex-
change in assumpsit and pleading on a local custom. 37° Holt thus reaffirmed
the fundamental common law principle that pleading generally in assumpsit
3'3 See infra note 562.
3" See 2 J. CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 118-78
(London 1849); 1 DNB, supra note 277, at 993; 7 E. Foss, supra note 317, at 386-95; 6
W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 516-18; W. HOLDSWORTH, SOME MAKERS OF
ENGLISH LAW 153-60 (1st ed. 1938).
'- See I DNB, supra note 277, at 993.
3'" 2 J. CAMPBELL, supra note 364, at 124-31; 1 DNB, supra note 277, at 993; 7 E.
Foss, supra note 317, at 388-89.
367 See 2 J. CAMPBELL, supra note 364, at 136-37. Holt was particularly critical of a
series called The Modern Reports. See J. WALLACE, supra note 356, at 349-90.
311 See J. BAKER, supra note 24, at 156-58; 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at
555-73; J. WALLACE, supra note 356, at 347-90, 401-07. According to Baker, one of
Mansfield's contributions was to attract "reporters of high calibre," such as Burrow.
J. BAKER, supra note 24, at 157.
369 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 464, at 159.
31" See inira text accompanying notes 387-439.
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permitted a plaintiff to omit "all mention of custom, and at trial ask the judge
and jury to notice a mercantile custom as warranting the implication of an
undertaking, the 'assumpsit,' in the circumstances. ' 3 ' Local custom, on the
other hand, had to be proven as a fact. 37 2 A third mode of declaration,
pleading on a specific "custom of the realm" used by merchants,3 7 3 was
really just a more specific version of the first option, and again the judge and
jury would be asked to find an implication of an undertaking warranted by
such a custom.
It is clear from Holt's reported decisions that these three options, and
particularly the first two, provided a vehicle for extensive reference to
mercantile practice. The first two also permitted a good deal of judicial
lawmaking, particularly where new issues were presented. 374 But these
pleadings long predated Holt, as Baker has demonstrated. 375 The question is
"What use did Holt actually make of these preexisting procedures?"
The answer is a bit like the parable of the drinking glass; the glass can be
half full or half empty, depending on your expectations. On the one hand, it
was Holt, not Mansfield, who forged most of the law of bills of exchange,
37' Baker, supra note 6, at 321.
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 See, e.g., Hawkins v. Cardy, 91 Eng. Rep. 1137 (K.B. 1698) (declaring on the
"custom of merchants" that an "apportional Bill of Exchange cannot be indorsed
over for a part only of the money due upon"). According to the court:
And though it was objected by Mr. Northey for the plaintiff, that the plaintiff has
made payment of a part to be part of the custom, and therefore it was well
enough by the custom. Holt Chief Justice answered, that this is not a particular
local custom, but the common custom of merchants, of which the law takes
notice; and therefore the Court cannot take the custom to be so.
Id. at 1137-38.
In Mutford v. Walcot, 91 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1701), it was recorded that Holt, in
determining whether a bill of exchange had been properly accepted, invited "all
eminent merchants in London with him at his chambers ... they held it to be very
common, and usual and a very good practice." Id. at 1284.
In Starke v. Cheeseman, 91 Eng. Rep. 1259 (K.B. 1700), there was an action on a
bill of exchange against a drawer where the drawer refused to pay:
Northey said, that the action was founded upon the custom, and that the
obligation arose by that, and therefore the action is maintainable, without shew-
ing a promise.
Holt said that the notion of promises in law was a metaphysical notion, for the
law makes no promise, but where there is a promise of the party.
Afterwards ... judgment was given for the plaintiff, because the drawing of
the bill was an actual promise.
Id. at 1260. See Pinkney v. Hall, 91 Eng. Rep. 118, 118 (K.B. 1697); Anon., 91 Eng.
Rep. 119, 119 (K.B. 1699); Hodges v. Steward, 91 Eng. Rep. 117, 118 (K.B. 1692).
... See Baker, supra note 6, at 308-22.
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agency, bills of lading, and bailment.3 76 Holden has demonstrated that ninety
percent of the law merchant developed by the common law was in place
when Holt retired in 1710. Some of Mansfield's leading commercial deci-
sions were merely an explication or rationalization of an existing legal
structure that had been erected by Holt. As Holden observed, although "it
has been suggested from time to time that Mansfield was the founder of
commercial law," it was Holt who laid the foundation, without which
Mansfield's work would have been impossible.3 7 7 On the other hand, if one
reviews Holt's decisions expecting to find galaxies of learned citations to
mercantile experts such as Molloy, Malynes or Marius, or references to
civilians such as Ridley, Godolphin, or even references to Holt's civilian
relative, Thomas Wood, or to any of the great mercantile theorists of the
continent, one will be greatly disappointed. 37
Of course, there was the much admired decision in Coggs v. Bernard,379 in
which Holt demonstrated a pretty good understanding of the Roman law of
bailment, at least that Roman law found in Bracton, and an even better
understanding of the early English common law. Further, it was, for its time,
a very long and systematic exposition, prompting Holt to explain that "I
have said this much in this case, because it is of great consequence that the
law should be settled in this point. ' 38 0 In "settling" the law, Holt elaborated
six categories of responsibiity and care for bailed goods.3 8 1 They were
constructed partly from the works of Bracton and other early common law
authorities, but they were also based on "good reason," which Holt called
"by reason of the necessity of the thing. ' 3 8 2 Holt's justification for the
various categories rested upon a determination of the relative benefits of the
transaction: the degree of benefit determined the degree of risk.3 83 Although
there were some citations to Vinnius' commentaries on Justinian, Holt felt it
necessary to explain that he used these references, as well as those to
Bracton and the early common law treatises, because they were based on
"good reason and authority. ' 3 4 There were no references to contemporary
376 See J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 30. According to Holden:
[Holt] displayed deep learning in dealing with cases arising out of mercantile
transactions and deserves almost as honoured a place in the history of commer-
cial law as Lord Mansfield. 'By the end of the seventeenth century the law
merchant was practically absorbed into the legal system of the country,' and the
largest single contribution to this end was made by Holt.
Id. (quoting 1 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 344 (1906)).
377 J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 30 n.1.
378 See infra text accompanying notes 385-441.
379 See Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703).
380 Id. at 114.
381 Id. at 109-10.
382 Id. at 113.
383 Id.
384 Id.
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continental rules, or to contemporary civilians, even though the common
law precedent was far from clear and Coke's report of Southcote's Case
was, in large part, disapproved. 3 5 As Fifoot has observed about Holt's
opinion, "The attempt to mark the degrees of carelessness was neither
happy nor successful, but the judgement as a whole settled the law of
bailment upon the basis of negligence and isolated the common carrier and
innkeeper as persons who exercised special trades and owed special
duties.' ' 386
So, in many ways, Coggs v. Bernard was remarkable for what it did not
do, as well as for what it did. Holt did not go outside the common law
tradition in any significant way, though he knew that some substantial new
law, or at least a major new exposition of principles, was needed. He
demonstrated deep learning, but he eschewed a comparativist perspective,
even where the civil law was highly developed.
Holt's knowledge of commercial- rules and practices was derived mainly
from the common law process: from the assumpsit pleading on the custom of
merchants and, to some extent, from the jury. True, the reporters refer to
Holt seeking the advice of merchants directly, as in Mutford v. Walcot.38 7
This, however, was the exception, not the rule, and Holt often took a very
different tack toward the commercial world. For example, in Ward v.
Evans ,388 Holt was asked to decide whether a servant's acceptance of a
goldsmith's note in payment of a bill of exchange would bind the master
when the goldsmith had declared insolvency. 38 9 According to Holt, "I am of
opinion, and always was (notwithstanding the noise and cry, that it is the use
of Lombard Street, as if the contrary opinion would blow up Lombard
Street) that the acceptance of such a note is not actual payment." 390
In Clerke v. Martin ,391 a simple promissory note to "plaintiff or his order"
was declared "upon the custom of merchants, as upon a bill of exchange." 391
Holt held:
385 C. FIFOOT, supra note 61, at 174-76; see Southcote's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1061
(K.B. 1601).
386 C. FIFOOT, supra note 61, at 164.
387 91 Eng. Rep. 1283. In Mutford, the issue was whether the plaintiff could bring
an action on an acceptance to pay a bill of exchange after the time appointed for its
payment. Id. at 1284. Holt said "that he remembered a case where an action was
brought upon a bill of exchange, and the plaintiff declared upon the bill, where it was
negotiated after the day of payment." Id. "Holt said that he had all the eminent
merchants in London with him at his chamber at Serjeant's Inn in the long vacation
about two years ago, and they all held it to be very common, and usual, and a very
good practice." Id.
388 92 Eng. Rep. 120 (K.B. 1704).
389 Id. at 120.
390 Id. at 121.
39, 92 Eng. Rep. 6 (K.B. 1703); see J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 77-78.
392 92 Eng. Rep. at 6.
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that this note could not be a bill of exchange. That the maintaining of
these actions upon such notes were innovations upon the rules of the
Common law; and that it amounted to the setting up a new sort of
speciality, unknown to the Common law, and invented in Lombard
Street, which attempted in these matters of bills of exchange to give
laws to Westminster Hall. That the continuing to declare upon these
notes upon the custom of merchants proceeded from obstinacy and
opinionativeness. 393
Perhaps the best example of Holt's characteristic concern for commercial
practice, as well as his esteem for the integrity of common law doctrine
relating to custom, was the famous case of Buller v. Crips.39 Again the issue
was whether an endorsee of a simple promissory note could sue the drawer
"declar[ing] upon the custom of merchants as upon a bill of exchange.' 39
Holt was doubtful:
I remember when actions upon inland bills of exchange did first begin;
and there they laid a paticular custom between London and Bristol, and
it was an action against the acceptor. The defendant's counsel would
put them to prove the custom; at which Hale, C.J., who tried it,
laughed, and said they had a hopeful case of it. And in my Lord North's
time it was said that the custom in that case was part of the common law
of England; and these actions since became frequent, as the trade of the
nation did increase; and all the difference between foreign bills and
inland bills is, that foreign bills must be protested before a public notary
before the drawer can be charged, but inland bills need no protest, and
the notes in question are only an invention of the goldsmiths in Lombard
street, who had a mind to make a law to bind all those that did deal with
them; and sure to allow such a note to carry any lien with it were to turn
a piece of paper, which is in law but evidence of a parol contract, into
specialty. And, besides, it would impower one to assign that to another
which he could not have himself; for since he to whom this note was
made could not have this action, how can his assignee have it? And
these notes are not in the nature of bills of exchange; for the reason of
the custom of bills of exchange is for the expedition of trade and its
safety; and likewise it hinders the exportation of money out of the
realm .396
The court stayed judgment. The report of the case continued:
At another day, Holt, C.J., declared that he had desired to speak with
two of the most famous merchants in London, to be informed of the
mighty ill consequences that it was pretended would ensue by obstruct-
ing this course; and that they had told him it was very frequent with
them to make such notes, and that they looked upon them as bills of
393 Id.
"1 87 Eng. Rep. 793 (K.B. 1704).
395 Id. at 793.
396 Id.
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exchange, and that they had been used for a matter of thirty years, and
that not only notes, but bonds for money, were transfered frequently,
and indorsed as bills of exchange, Indeed, I agree, a bill of exchange
may be made between two persons without a third; and, if there be such
a necessity of dealing that way, why do not dealers use that way which
is legal? And may be this; as, if A. has money to lodge in B.'s hands, and
would have a negotiable note for it, it is only saying thus, "Mr. B., pay
me, or order, so much money value to yourself," and signing this, and
B. accepting it; or he may take the common note and say thus, "For
value to yourself, pay me (or indorsee) so much," and good.
And the court at last took the vacation to consider of it. 397
Ultimately Holt refused to recognize the note as transferable.
This mode of proceeding was typical of what Fifoot, in another context,
would call Holt's "curious common sense and pedantry. ' 3 98 On the one
hand, Holt was not reluctant to test notice of the general custom of mer-
chants, and to test it directly. But while this looks like the utilitarianism of
Hale, the test was applied within rigid doctrinal walls.
For example, why should one distinguish, under these circumstances,
between a bill of exchange and a promissory note? Why the magic in the
formula when either form could so easily be manipulated to the same
purpose? Holt's answer would most assuredly be the one he gave in Hodges
v. Steward,399 which was an action on an inland bill of exchange "upon a
special custom in London ."400 There, Holt explained that "for though the
Courts take notice of the law of merchants, as part of the law of England, yet
they cannot take notice of the customs of particular places" unless specially
proved or confessed. 41 The goldsmiths could not make local London law,
nor, apparently, could the courts. Only those elements of the law merchant
that were incorporated as part of the common law of the realm were subject
to judicial notice, but that process of incorporation was inherently limited
and slow. This accounts for Holt's statement in Clerke v. Martin, that a
promissory note "is not within the custom of merchants, and, being no
specialty, no action can be grounded on it." '40 2 And it explains Holt's
warning in Carter v. Palmer: 40 3 "We will take such a note prima facie for
evidence of money lent; and though they have declared on the custom, yet
we must take care that by such a drift the law of England be not changed by
making all notes, bills of exchange. ' 40 4
"I Id. at 794.
398 C. FIFOOT, supra note 61, at 364; see also City of London v. Goree, 86 Eng.
Rep. 192, 192 (K.B. 1677) ("an assumpsit lies upon a bill of exchange accepted").
"1 91 Eng. Rep. 696 (K.B. 1694).
400 Id. at 696.
401 Id.
402 91 Eng. Rep. at 6.
403 88 Eng. Rep. 1393 (K.B. 1702)
404 Id. at 1393.
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Thus, Holt maintained that the bill of exchange, although "in law no
specialty," was given validity by universal custom of merchants. 4 5 As he
stated, "the custom of merchants made the acceptor, drawer or indorser of a
bill of exchange liable. ' 40 6 The simple promissory note was different. In
Clerke v. Martin, Holt said that making a simple promissory note transfer-
able within the custom of merchants "amounted to the setting up of a new
sort of specialty, ' 40 7 and he refused to do it. Although Holdsworth has
405 Holdsworth mistakenly believed that Holt thought that a bill of exchange was a
specialty, "in the nature of a contract under seal." See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 21, at 168. But Holt specifically held in a 1694 case that "A bill of exchange is in
law no specialty." See J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 62; Anon., 90 Eng. Rep. 962,
(K.B. 1694).
406 See Clerke v. Martin, 92 Eng. Rep. at 6-7.
407 Id. at 6; see also Cutting v. Williams, 87 Eng. Rep. 1160 (K.B. 1702); see supra
note 33 (discussing the nature of a "specialty").
In Cutting v. Williams, Holt said "that a declaration upon the custom of merchants
upon a note, subscribed by the defendant for so much money, or promising so much
money, was void; for it tended to make a note amount to a specialty." 87 Eng. Rep.
at 1161. See also Buller v. Crips, 87 Eng. Rep. 793, 793-94 (K.B. 1704) ("to allow
such a note to carry any lien with it were to turn a piece of paper, which is in law but
evidence of a parol contract, into a specialty").
Merely declaring upon a "custom of England," to say "that if any person sign a bill
to pay money at a day, he ought, by this custom, to pay it upon that day" was not
enough. Woolvil v. Young, 87 Eng. Rep. 710, 710 (K.B. 1703). "[D]eclaring so
generally will exclude all consideration which must be averred. Every man is nego-
tians in the kingdom, and if the plaintiff would have brought his case within the
custom of merchants, he ought to have said commercium habentes, or have shewn
that the bill signed was a bill of exchange." Id. An earlier case, Sanfield v. Witherly,
86 Eng. Rep. 447 (K.B. 1688), was distinguished. "It is true, in the case of Sanfield v.
Witherly, the declaration was that the defendant Witherly was residens et negotians
at London, etc. without saying commercium habens; but it appeared upon the whole
frame of the declaration that it was a bill of exchange." Id. at 367. See also
Cramlington v. Evans and Percival, 86 Eng. Rep. 456, 458 (K.B. 1691) ("[In]
Sansfield v. Witherly-that a person, not being a Merchant, drawing a bill of ex-
change, was bound according to the useage of it amongst merchants, and in declara-
tion upon bills of exchange, the whole matter is to be set forth specially.").
A close examination of Sansfield shows that Holt was right. In answer to the
proposition that the plea was insufficient "in the matter of it; for the custom is laid for
merchants and other persons resident and negotiating at Paris," it was held that "the
very drawing of the bill of exchange is a negotiating in itself, and the practice so
frequent between all persons, as well as merchants, to negotiate by bills of exchange,
that it would prove a great inconvenience, if they should not be of the same effect
between others as well as merchants." 86 Eng. Rep. at 449. The court concluded that
"the plea of the defendant was insufficient, and that he having drawn this bill was
obliged by it, according to the course of bills of exchange." Id. Thus it was the bill of
exchange itself, not the allegation of the custom, that established the special law.
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argued that Holt's view was not progressive, it was consistent with the slow
common law development of the assumpsit remedy. 40 8
Holdsworth believed that Holt was "wrong headed" over promissory
notes, 40 9 and he argued that "Holt considered that the law had gone far
enough. One form of negotiable instrument should suffice.' 410 Holt's treat-
ment of promissory notes, however, may have been consistent with his
perception of the judicial function and his awareness of legislative remedies.
Indeed, it is now known that he was ordered before the House of Lords in
connection with the famous Act of 1704,411 which abolished the holding of
Buller v. Crips and extended the negotiable features of the bill of exchange to
promissory notes. 412 Some have speculated that Holt may have actually
408 See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 168, 173. Cf. Baker, supra note 6, at
308-22.
409 See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 173, 175.
410 Id. at 176.
"I The statute read:
An act for giving like remedy upon promissory notes, as is now used upon bills of
exchange, and .for the better payment of inland bills of exchange. Whereas it
hath been held, that notes in writing, signed by the party who makes the same,
whereby such party promises to pay unto any other person, or his order, any sum
of money therein mentioned, are not assignable or indorsible over, within the
custom of merchants, to any other person; and that such person to whom the
sum of money mentioned in such note is payable, cannot maintain an action, by
the custom of merchants, against the person who first made and signed the
same; and that any person to whom such note shall be assigned, indorsed, or
made payable, could not, within the said custom of merchants, maintain any
action upon such note against the person who first drew and signed the same:
therefore to the intent to encourage trade and commerce, which will be much
advanced, if such notes shall have the same effect as inland bills of exchange,
and shall be negotiated in like manner; be it enacted by the Queen's most
excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and
temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the
authority of the same, that all notes in writing, that after the first day of May, in
the year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and five, shall be made and
signed by any person or persons, body politick, or corporat, or by the servant or
agent of any corporation, banker, goldsmith, merchant, or trader, who is usually
intrusted by him, her or them, to sign such promissory notes for him, her, or
them, whereby such person or persons, body politick and corporate, his, her, or
their servant or agent, as aforesaid, doth or shall promise to pay to any other
person or persons, body politick and corporate, his, her or their order, or unto
bearer, any sum of money mentioned in such note, shall be taken and construed
to be, by virtue thereof, due and payable to any such person or persons, body
politick and corporate, to whom the same is made payable; and also every such
note payable to any person or persons, body politick and corporate, his, her, or
their order, shall be assignable or indorsible over, in the same manner as inland
bills of exchange are or may be, according to the custom of merchants;
3 & 4 Anne., ch. 9 (1704).
412 See J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 83 & n.5 (citing Lord's Journal, xvii, 653, 664,
676 for the order that Holt attend).
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drafted the act. 41 3 Holt, therefore, may have felt that the method of ex-
panding judicial notice of the general custom of merchants-as opposed to
proving the local custom-had gone far enough, and that legislation creating
negotiability for promissory notes was a more suitable solution.
Holt would not have been alone in looking to legislation. The early
eighteenth century saw several commercial statutes directed at bills of
exchange. The Payment of Bills Act of 16984 14extended protest of dishonor,
previously reserved as part of "the custom" for foreign bills of exchange,
41 5
to inland bills. This made "the drawer liable for interest and damages in the
event of the dishonor of an inland bill by nonpayment," as was the case for
foreign bills. 4 16 Other statutes enacted during this period provided for protest
for non-conformance for inland bills, 41 7 made false endorsement of a note a
forgery and a felony without benefit of clergy, 4 18 and made false acceptance
of a note a forgery and a felony. 419 Far from being a reactionary, Holt may
simply have recognized the need for certainty and generality in the law of
negotiable instruments. If the result was to require legislative action, it was a
fairly modem solution!
This is not to belittle Holt's achievements within the confines of the
assumpsit remedy. His decision in Hussey v. Jacob ,420 which protected the
413 See J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 84; 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 173.
414 9 & 10 Will. 3, ch. 17 (1698).
415 See J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 54-55; see Brough v. Parkings, 92 Eng. Rep.
161, 162 (K.B. 1704) (in which Holt observed that for inland bills, "no protest was
necessary by the common law, but by this statute").
416 J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 54-55.
41 An Act for Giving Like Remedy Upon Promissory Notes, as is Now Used
Upon Bills of Exchange, and for the Better Payment of Inland Bills of Exchange, 3 &
4 Ann., ch. 9 (1704).
411 An Act for the More Effectual Preventing and Further Punishment of Forgery,
Perjury and Subornation of Perjury; and to Make it Felony to Steal Bonds, Notes or
Other Securities for the Payment of Money, 2 Geo. 2, ch. 25 (1729).
9 An Act for the More Effectual Preventing the Forging the Acceptance of Bills
of Exchange, or the Numbers or Principal Sums of Accountable Receipts for Notes,
Bills, or Other Securities for Payment of Money, or Warrants or Orders for Payment
of Money, or Delivery of Goods, 7 Geo. 2, ch. 22 (1733).
420 92 Eng. Rep. 929 (K.B. 1697). In Hussey, plaintiff declared upon the custom of
merchants that "if a bill of exchange is drawn upon a person, and he accepts... he is
liable to pay it." Id. at 930. Holt held that this is true when the bill is accepted to a
stranger "for just debt," although this was not the case here. Id; see also Anon., 91
Eng. Rep. 118, 119 (K.B. 1704) (holding that "trover for a bank bill will lie against a
person finding it, but not against his assignee"). Such decisions caused Holden to
remark that "[a] chariot had been driven through the hitherto impregnable lines of the
common law maxim nemo dat quod non habet [no one gives what he does not
possess]. That chariot was driven by Holt C.J.... and the motive power was simply
'the course of trade'; in other words, 'the custom of merchants." J. HOLDEN, supra
note 21, at 64-65.
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bona fide purchaser for value "by reason of the course of trade," was the
cornerstone of the modern negotiable bank note. His requirement of reason-
able notice to protect the drawer, 421 his protection of the endorser in the
absence of the drawer's default, 422 his articulation of the theory of endorser
liability, 423 and his definition, in Lambert v. Pack,42 4 of precisely what must
be proved to charge an endorser, 42 5 were central to the development of a
complete law of negotiable instruments. Outside of the assumpsit remedy,
Holt developed the modern principle of an employer's liability for em-
ployee's torts,426 and freed the law of bailment from the mire of medieval
cases. 42 7 Holt also developed the modern notion of the apparent authority of
an agent in business matters, 428 rationalized "bearer" bills, and articulated
precise reasons for treating "to order" bills differently from other bills in
order to treat endorsees more fairly. 429 He even developed the assignability
of bills of lading.430
421 Anon., 91 Eng. Rep. at 118-19.
422 See Brough v. Parking, 92 Eng. Rep. 161 (K.B. 1704). As Holt stated:
In this case, as well as upon a foreign bill of exchange, the plaintiff must give
convenient notice to the drawer, of the non-payment of the bill, for if the drawer
receive prejudice by the plaintiff's delay, the plaintiff shall not recover. A
protest on a foreign bill is part of the custom, on an inland bill no protest was
necessary by the common law, but by this statute [9 & 10 Will. 3 ch. 17].
Id. at 162.
423 According to Holt, "the indorsement is quasi a new bill, and a warranty by the
indorser, that the bill shall be paid and the party may bring his action against any of
the indorsers, if the bill be not paid by the acceptor." Anon., 90 Eng. Rep. 962 (K.B.
1694). See J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 127.
424 91 Eng. Rep. 120 (K.B. 1700); see Lambert v. Oakes, 91 Eng. Rep. 1194 (K.B.
1700); J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 58-59.
425 91 Eng. Rep. at 120.
426 See Boson v. Sandford, 91 Eng. Rep. 382 (K.B. 1691); A. HARDING, supra note
23, at 307; see also 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 474.
427 See Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703); Plunkett, The Relations
Between Roman Law and English Common Law Down to the Sixteenth Century: A
General Survey, 3 U. TORONTO L. J. 24, 44 (1939); see also 8 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 21, at 452.
428 See Sir Robert Wayland's Case, 91 Eng. Rep. 797 (1701); Middleton v. Fowler,
91 Eng. Rep. 247 (1699); see also Boulton v. Arlsden, 91 Eng. Rep. 797, 797 (1701) (in
which Holt held that "a note under the hand of an apprentice shall bind his master,
where he is allowed to deliver out notes though the money is never applied to the
master's use").
429 See Nicholson v. Sedgwick, 91 Eng. Rep. 1016, 1016 (K.B. 1703):
[F]or there can be no great inconvenience, because the indorsement of the party
must appear upon the back of the Note, or some other thing sufficiently intimat-
ing his assent; but where it is payable to the party or bearer-if lost by accident,.
• .any one who finds the Note by accident may bring the action.., and though
this last has been frequently attempted, it has never yet prevailed.
Id.
430 See Evans v. Marlett, 91 Eng. Rep. 1078 (K.B. 1703). According to Holt, "the
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Holt accomplished this doctrinal renaissance practically without direct
reference to any mercantile treatises, civilian sources, or foreign laws. He
was also relatively inflexible, even unreasonable, in issuing prohibitions to
the Admiralty in technical matters, such as whether hypothecation se-
cured a ship captain's wages, 431 or where the pleadings were careless, i.e.,
failed to mention that a ship's "capture was super altum mare," although
they implied it.
432
Holt was not ignorant of civilian doctrine or unable to obtain civilian
sources, as his treatment of the occasional civil law matter that touched on
his jurisdiction demonstrated. 433 The observation that "[tihere is no evi-
dence that [Holt] was learned, as Lord Mansfield was learned, in the civil
law or in foreign systems of commercial law, ' 434 is only true if Holt is
contrasted with Mansfield, an acknowledged master. More significantly,
however, Holt was a true student of Hale, and like Hale, Holt appreciated
the need to demonstrate the utility of legal rules.435
Holdsworth has argued that "[i]f Holt had been more learned in foreign
systems of law, he might have been tempted to introduce their principles in
bulk. ' 436 Holdsworth then suggests that this would have resulted in a
"commercial law, though administered by the common law courts, [that]
would have remained a very separate branch of the common law." 437 Both of
these propositions are doubtful. In fact, Holt proceeded as he did because of
his understanding of the way custom was recognized by judges as a source of
the common law. Mercantile customs, observed Baker, "were either local
facts or they were the common law of England. In so far as the judges took
notice of such customs as common law, they were not taking over for their
own use a pre-existing body of jurisprudence." 438 This is why Holt relied so
little on mercantile treatises or civilian authority. And this is why Baker is
right in his observation that "[tjo the extent that there was a law merchant
before Lord Mansfield, it was not an importation from the ius gentium ."1439
consignee of a bill of lading has such a property as that he may assign it over." Id. at
1078.
431 See Clay v. Snelgrave, 91 Eng. Rep. 1285, 1286 (K.B. 1706).
432 See Shermoulin v. Sands, 91 Eng. Rep. 1078 (K.B.); Jones v. Stone, 91 Eng.
Rep. 1286 (K.B. 1706).
431 See, e.g., Rex v. Raines, 91 Eng. Rep. 1281, 1283 (K.B. 1706) (in which Holt
discusses the civil law as it pertains to which representatives are entitled to a
distributive share of an intestate's estate).
434 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 521.
435 See supra text accompanying notes 317-45.
436 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 522.
437 id.
438 Baker, supra note 6, at 321.
139 Id. According to Holdsworth, "Coke had conquered large commercialjurisidic-
tion for the common law. Holt made good progress in the settlement of this domain
on common law principles." 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 522.
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It is wrong, however, to characterize Holt's jurisprudence as uninformed
by international commercial custom.44 0 Because the English civilian jurists
offered little improvement over the common law treatment of mercantile
instruments, including bills of exchange, 441 there was little reason to seek
their aid. But the civilians' comparativist and humanist spirit, which had
influenced Hale, was not lacking from Holt's jurisprudence. Constantly
looking to the utility and fairness of commercial rules, Holt was alert to the
need for a progressive and principled commercial law. The author of Coggs
v. Bernard and Buller v. Crips was no Mansfield, but he was certainly no
Coke, either.
2. William Murray, Lord Mansfield
William Murray, Lord Mansfield (1705-1793), was Chief Justice of the
King's Bench from 1756 until 1788. Holt was Chief Justice from 1689 to 1710.
Their combined tenures represent over half a century in the most influential
legal position in England. They both esteemed that office over any other
available, and to keep it both declined invitations to become Lord Chancel-
lor, as well as other powerful positions. 442 They shared a faith in judge-made
44 As Baker points out, "without doubt internationally current moral views and
economic practices informed this branch of the law as they informed others." Baker,
supra note 6, at 321.
44 See supra text accompanying notes 210-51 (discussing civilian "bills of ex-
change" theory).
442 See supra note 364 and sources cited (discussing Holt's career). As with Holt,
there is no modern comprehensive scholarly biography of William Murray. For the
best modern accounts, see C. FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD (1936); E. HEWARD, supra
note 353. Fifoot has more extensive doctrinal coverage, but Heward had available to
him the newly discovered notebooks. See supra note 353. For earlier accounts, see 2
J. CAMPBELL, supra note 364, at 302-584; 1 DNB, supra note 276, at 1452; 12 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 464-605 (1st ed. 1938); W. HOLDSWORTH, SOME
MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAW 160-75 (1966); J. HOLLIDAY, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM,
LATE EARL OF MANSFIELD (London 1797).
Some of the best materials on Mansfield can be found in law review articles. See,
e.g., Arnold, Lord Mansfield, 15 TENN. L. REV. 687 (1939); Fiddes, Lord Mansfield
and the Sommersett Case, 50 LAW. Q. REv. 499 (1934); Holdsworth, Lord Mans-
field, 53 LAW Q. REV. 221 (1937); Nadelhaft, The Somersett Case and Slavery: Myth,
Reality, and Repercussion, 51 J. NEGRO HIST. 193 (1966); Nathan, Lord Mansfield, 5
S. AFRICAN L.J. 207 (1936); Schreiber, Lord Mansfield-The Father of Insurance
Law, 1960 INS. L.J. 766 (1960); Shaw, Enlightment of Lord Mansfield, 8 J. COMp.
LEG. 1 (3d series 1926); Shientag, Lord Mansfield Revisted-A Modern Assessment,
10 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (1941); Waterman, Mansfield and Blackstone's Commen-
taries, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 549 (1934); Wiecek, Somersett: Lord Mansfield and the
Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86 (1974);
Paper by Kenneth M. Holland, The Jurisprudence of Lord Mansfield, delivered to
the American Society for Legal History (Oct. 24-25, 1980). I believe that the new
IDEOLOGY AND INCORPORATION IV
law, using the reported judicial case as a vehicle for reform, and, despite
some evidence of corruption on Mansfield's part, their dedication to the rule
of law was such that both faced either impeachment or angry mobs in its
name. 443 Even their jurisprudential achievements were similar; both made
major contributions to the laws of personal freedom, the law of business and
trade, and to the critical legal status of English law in the colonies. 4 44
Mansfield's reported cases show, as one would expect, an intimate knowl-
edge of Holt's decisions. 445
In spite of their similarities, their juristic styles were in sharp contrast.
Holt was a focused problem solver, and Mansfield, a bold, free-ranging
theorist. On the issue of incorporation of mercantile practice and foreign
legal ideas, this difference in style became one of substance.
First, Mansfield was a Scot with a classical English education. While some
have doubted Holt's familiarity with Roman law and foreign legal systems,
Mansfield's knowledge is indisputable. A younger son of a poor, Jacobite
Scottish peer, Mansfield studied, through the charity of friends, at Christ
Church, Oxford. There he attended lectures on Justinian's Digest and trans-
lated Cicero into English and back into Latin. 446 Surviving scraps of his
student exercises show that Mansfield was, even as a young man, a genuine
classicist. This is all quite apart from his portentous defeat of the young
William Pitt for the Latin poetry prize on the death of George I, which
earned him a lifelong enemy. Years later, the influence of this curriculum
emerged in Mansfield's famous outlines of recommended study, prepared for
the heir to the Duke of Portland. These displayed a profound and rich
research now undertaken by James C. Oldham will be of particular signficance. See
Oldham, supra note 353, at 140 n.13.
Mansfield also had his literary associations, and is noted in the contemporary
literature by the likes of Samuel Johnson, Alexander Pope, and James Boswell. See,
e.g., E. HEWARD, supra note 353, at 13-16; 4 A. POPE, IMITATIONS OF HORACE 151,
175, 237-39, 374 (J. Butt ed. 1961) (1st ed. London 1737); Rice, Samuel Johnson,
LL.D., on Law, Lawyers, and Judges, 63 A.B.A. J. 1217, 1219 (1977); see also supra
note 353.
443 See 2 J. CAMPBELL, supra note 364, at 124-29; 1 DNB, supra note 276, at 993,
1452.
414 For Holt's contributions, see 2 J. CAMPBELL. supra note 364, at 139 (discussing
one of Holt's opinions concerning an action for the price of a slave). As Holt stated in
Smith v. Gould, 92 Eng. Rep. 338, 338 (K.B. 1707), "Trover does not lie for a black
man more than for a white. By the common law no man could have a property in
another man." Id. at 338. As for Mansfield, see Shientag, supra note 442, at 358-59
(describing the effect of Sommersett's Case and quoting Mansfield's great statement
that "[t]he air of England has long been too pure for a slave, and every man is free
who breathes it"). See generally Fiddes, supra note 442; Nadelhaft, supra note 442;
Wiecek, supra note 442.
115 See infra text accompanying notes 468-75.
446 See 1 DNB, supra note 277, at 1452; C. FIFOOT, supra note 442, at 27-30.
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understanding of both classical and humanist legal studies. 447 Mansfield's
interests, however, were not limited to Roman law. His outlines and per-
sonal studies included many modern civilians, such as Grotius, Pufendorf,
Vinius, and Burlamaqui, and he was familiar with France's attempt to ra-
tionalize commercial custom by the Ordonnance de la Marine in 1681.448
Mansfield's Scottish connections, and the patronage of Talbot and Yorke,
secured him a Scottish appeals practice before the House of Lords. This
further developed his learning. His early Scottish appellate cases "enabled
him to display his culture and gratify the court by judicious selections from
the law of nations, of Scotland and of Moses.' 449 His Scottish origins may
have been a major social and professional handicap in some respects, but
those origins led him to the unusual opportunities of this early law practice.
Scottish appeals practice included explaining issues of Scottish law, with all
of its civilian underpinnings, to English jurists. It practically forced Mans-
field to be a comparativist, and led to professional success. Later, this
success would attract bitter political attacks, including accusations that
Mansfield was a secret Jacobite, a Catholic, and an absolutist. He was also
charged "with the black offense of corrupting the ancient simplicity of the
common law with principles drawn from the corpus juris. "450 Ironically,
these vicious attacks were identical to the libels suffered by the earlier
English civilians. 45
1
Did Mansfield's civilian learning affect his jurisprudence? Again, we turn
to our chosen "litmus test," commercial law and particularly bills of ex-
change. Shientag attempted to summarize all of Mansfield's contribution to
the law of negotiable instruments in just one rather remarkable sentence!
In Negotiable Instruments, he [Mansfield] harmonized the rules relating
to the foreign bill of exchange, the inland bill of exchange, and the
promissory note; he insisted on the rights of the innocent holder for
value; he reiterated the principle that negotiable instruments were cur-
rency; he laid down the rule that the holder of a bearer note could
maintain an independent action; he upheld the negotiability of bearer
notes by delivery; he ruled that an acceptor who accepted a forged bill
and paid it to a bona fide holder, could not recover the payment from
117 Mansfield's outlines covered the study of ancient and modem history (for the
"Use of the Duke of Portland") and legal study. See J. HOLLIDAY, supra note 442, at
12-13 (reprinting the letters on ancient and modem history); see generally A
TREATISE ON THE STUDY OF THE LAW, CONTAINING DIRECTIONS TO STUDENTS
WRITTEN BY . . . THE LORDS MANSFIELD, ASHBURTON, AND THURLOW (London
1797).
448 See supra note 75; 2 J. CAMPBELL, supra note 364, at 327-28; C. FIFOOT, supra
note 442, at 30; R. VALIN, NOUVEAU COMMENTAIRE SUR L'ORDONNANCE DE LA
MARINE, DU MoIs D'AOUT 1681, in (Legier 1760)
449 C. FIFOOT, supra note 442, at 35.
450 1 DNB, supra note 277, at 1452.
451 See Coquillette, supra note 68, at 84-87.
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such holder; he emphasized the necessity for certainty in determining
what was a reasonable time for presenting a bill or giving notice of
dishonor and the advisability of having the court determine that ques-
tion, where possible, and he invoked the doctrine of equitable estoppel,
where one placed in the hands of a broker a bill of lading so endorsed
that the broker could deceive an innocent third party into believing that
the broker owned the goods. 452
For the most part, Shientag accurately describes Mansfield's achievements,
but he also claims too little and too much in terms of Mansfield's contribu-
tions to the law merchant. And he hides a major controversy. Let us start
with the controversy.
Much of our view of Mansfield derives from Mr. Justice Buller's great
tribute in Lickbarrow v. Mason,45 3 one year before Mansfield's retirement:
Thus the matter stood till within these thirty years; since that time the
commercial law of this country has taken a very different turn from
what it did before .... Before that period we find that in Courts of Law
all the evidence in mercantile cases was thrown together; they were left
generally to a jury, and they produced no established principle. From
that time we all know that great study has been made to find some
certain general principles, which shall be [made] known to all mankind,
not only to rule the particular case then under consideration, but to
serve as a guide for the future. Most of us have heard these principles
stated, reasoned upon, enlarged, and explained, till we have been lost in
admiration at the strengh and stretch of the human understanding. And I
should be very sorry to find myself under a necessity of differing from
any case on this subject which has been decided by Lord Mansfield,
who may be truly said to be the founder of the commercial law of this
country. 4
54
Buller's opinion has been reinforced by Fifoot, Mansfield's most extensive
legal biographer, who considered Mansfield "the founder of commercial
law,' 5 and by Beutel, who described Mansfield as "the founder of modern
English Commercial law.' 456
Our examination of Holt has demonstrated that these accolades of Mans-
field claim too much. Buller was simply wrong that Holt left everything to
juries and produced "no established principles." While the notice of mer-
cantile custom was limited, it was not always put to juries as a question of
fact, as with a local custom. Holt, in fact, settled a great deal of law.
457
452 Shientag, supra note 442, at 352 (citations omitted).
41 100 Eng. Rep. 35 (K.B. 1787).
454 id. at 40.
4. C. FIFOOT, supra note 442, at 239.
456 Beutel, supra note 69, at 545.
457 See, e.g., J. HOLDEN,supra note 21, at 113 (" [It] was Holt who commenced to
take judicial notice of some of the more important mercantile customs, but it was
Mansfield who finally adopted this policy as a general practice.").
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Not surprisingly, therefore, a rival group has emerged, consisting of such
diverse bedfellows as Baker and Lord Campbell, who have challenged some
of the claims made for Mansfield as a creative genius. Campbell insisted that
Mansfield "cannot be considered a man of original genius. With great good
sense, he adapted, he improved-but he never invented. ' 458 Holden, a
moderate member of this faction, correctly observed that Holt "commenced
to take judicial notice of some of the more important mercantile customs,"
but that "Mansfield's work was certainly not confined to the re-definition of
existing principles. '459
Both of these warring groups focus too much on doctrine and not enough
on the judicial process. Mansfield certainly did not invent the modern law of
negotiable instruments. As we have seen, it was largely in place at Holt's
death. 460 Yet Mansfield was the father of the modern judicial attitude toward
commercial law, and in this he owed a great deal to civilian jurisprudence-a
debt he candidly acknowledged.
Because Mansfield was not a treatise writer, law teacher, or publisher of
legal tracts, we must, as we did with Holt, accept the fragmented, ad hoc
evidence of reported cases. But we have an advantage here: the quality and
modern format of Sir James Burrow's Reports, in which many of Mansfield's
opinions appear. Burrow's Reports have a high reputation and have even
been described, rather floridly, as "works of art. '461 Their careful division of
the case into facts stated, argument of counsel, and judical opinion, gave
Mansfield one more advantage over Holt: we know what he really meant to
decide. Rather ungenerously, Mansfield was quoted as saying that "Sir
James Burrow's Reports were not always accurate." '462
But even Burrow's Reports cannot remedy the problem of deciding prin-
ciples ad hoc, in isolated cases. Thus, to understand the evolution of Mans-
field's judicial philosophy, we will have to look at two lines of case devel-
opment. Not only will we look at cases relating to a specific topic in
chronological order, focusing again on bills of exchange and negotiable
instruments, but we will examine some doctrinally unrelated cases that
nevertheless illustrate relevant points about Mansfield's use of the judicial
458 Id. at 113; 4 J. CAMPBELL, supra note 364, at 576; Baker, supra note 6, at
290-91, 315, 320-22.
459 J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 113.
460 See supra notes 420-25, 429-30 and accompanying text.
461 J. WALLACE, supra note 356, at 449.
462 Id. at 451. Lord Campbell was reported to have stated, "As Lord Mansfield
himself has said, Sir James Burrow's Reports were not always accurate." Id. (citing
Regina v. Newton, 30 Eng. L. & Eq. Rep. 367, 368 (K.B. 1855)). Wallace believes
that this statement, ironically, is a misquote and that an accurate report of
Campbell's remark is contained at 4 Ellis & Black. Rep. at 869, which quotes
Campbell as follows: "I may say of that, as Lord Mansfield himself said, when
speaking of Sir W. Blackstone, that what is reported is not always accurate." J.
WALLACE, supra note 356, at 451.
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process. The latter will not enlighten us much about commercial law doc-
trine, but will illustrate how civilian methodology became a part of Mans-
field's judicial style. This had a great impact on his commercial cases, and
on many of his decisions unrelated to commercial law.
For example, Mansfield demonstrated his remarkable knowledge of
Roman law in Windham v. Chetwynd, 463just one year after his appointment
to the bench. The case had nothing to do with law merchant, but it did
demonstrate the determination of the new judge to appeal to universal and
comparative standards in defending a decision, as well as to practical princi-
ples of utility and fairness. A will was being disputed. A creditor had been
one of the three witnesses to the will. At issue was the meaning of the
requirement, under the Statute of Frauds, of "three credible witnesses.' 464
Mansfield traced the Roman law of testament from the Twelve Tables to
Justinian's Digest, demonstrating a genuine familiarity with Roman law and
an extraordinary willingness to apply Roman standards to interpret an En-
glish statute. 465 Finding no historical bases for disqualifying a creditor from
being a subscribing witness, Mansfield concluded that to presume witnesses
were not credible because they had an "interest at the time of subscription"
due to a charge "to pay debts" would be "against Justice and Truth." 466 He
then turned to a practical consideration, observing that "[t]he Persons
attendant upon a dying Testator ... are generally in some Degree Creditors.
• .Servants, Parson, Attorney, Apothecary, etc; And the disallowing such
Persons to be Witnesses can not answer Ends of public Utility." 6 7 Roman
law and appeal to public utility; the message was plain: Mansfield intended
to give opinions that not only established rules, but persuaded with their dual
appeal to universal reason and practical fairness.
Mansfield decided his first important negotiable instrument case one year
later, in Miller v. Race .468 There, he reasserted the rights of the innocent
holder for value. A mail coach had been robbed. The thief had taken a bank
note, which ended up in the hands of the plaintiff "for a full and valuable
consideration, and in the usual course... of his business." 4 9 Of course, the
owner of the note had stopped payment. The bearer, citing Holt, argued that
the owner of a bank bill would have trover against a stranger who found it,
except when the finder transferred it for a valuable consideration, which "by
41 97 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1757).
464 Id. at 379.
465 Id. at 384. As to Mansfield's familiarity with Roman and Continental sources,
see Rodgers, Continental Literature and the Development of the Common Law by
the King's Bench c. 1750-1800, in 2 COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN CONTINENTAL AND
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (to be published, 1987).
466 97 Eng. Rep. at 387
467 Id.
461 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
469 Id. at 398.
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reason of the Course of Trade creates a Property in the ... Bearer.' '470 The
owner, however, argued that the note "remains in the Man's Hands, and is
not come into the Course of Trade, ' 47 because the theft could not be
regarded as wilfully introducing the note into the "Course of Trade." Reject-
ing this argument, Mansfield observed that "Ld., Ch. J. Holt could never
say That an Action [in trover] would lie against the Person who, for a
valuable Consideration, had received a Bank-Note which had been stolen or
lost, and bona fide paid to him." 47 2 He noted that Holt had decided oth-
erwise just two years before the case cited by the bearer. Bank notes,
concluded Mansfield, "are not like Lottery-Tickets, but Money ... paid and
received as Cash: And it is necessary, for the Purpose of Commerce, that
their Currency should be established and secured.' 473 Mansfield didn't in-
vent the notion of negotiable bank notes, but Mansfield restated the principle
of negotiability in modem terms that could not be misinterpreted.
That same year, in Heylyn v. Adamson ,474 Mansfield did more than merely
restate Holt. In that case, Mansfield reexamined the legal differences be-
tween the three major classes of mercantile instruments: foreign bills of
exchange, inland bills of exchange, and promissory notes. In so doing, he
reaffirmed the different treatment of foreign bills of exchange and promis-
sory notes, but held that foreign and inland bills should be treated identi-
cally, characterizing as erroneous a number of decisions allegedly to the
contrary "quoted" to "My Ld. Ch. J. Holt. ' 47 1 According to Mansfield, the
difference between foreign bills and promissory notes was required by
practical considerations. Whereas the holder of a promissory note was
required to make a demand on the original drawer before suing an endorser,
the same requirement would be impracticable under a foreign bill of ex-
change, since the drawer often lived abroad, "perhaps in the Indies." 476
Applying these same practical considerations, Mansfield saw no reason to
distinguish between foreign and inland bills of exchange, observing that
"except as to Degree of Inconvenience; All the Arguments from Law and
the Nature of a Transaction, are exactly the same in both cases.''477 Al-
though Mansfield drew heavily from an earlier foreign bill case of 1713, it
was the exposition in Heylyn that settled the law.
In the next three years, Mansfield gave three of his most important
470 Id. at 399.
471 Id.
472 Id. at 402.
473 Id.
4 97 Eng. Rep. 503. (K.B. 1758).
5 Id. at 507 (citing Bromley v. Frazier, 93 Eng. Rep. 662 (K.B. 1722)). James S.
Rogers has suggested to me that Mansfield might have thought that Holt's cases may
have actually involved notes, and not bills.
476 Id.
477 Id.
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opinions: Luke v. Lyde, 478 Moses v. Macferlan,4 9 and Edie v. East India
Company .480 Luke and Edie were important commercial cases. Moses, while
a case on quasi-contract and not a commercial case, clearly illustrates
Mansfield's mode of juristic analysis. Taken together, they illustrate
Manfield's still young judicial philosophy.
Luke v. Lyde, the now famous story of privateering, salvage, and freight,
is a study in Mansfield's attention to the ius gentium. After hearing extensive
argument citing Malynes and Molloy, the great popularizers of the law
merchant, 48 ' Mansfield canvassed the Rhodian Laws, the Consolato de
Mare, the Laws of Oleron, the Laws of Wisby, and the "Ordinance of Lewis
the fourteenth' '482-- all to determine ratable freight on a cargo of Newfound-
land fish. Mansfield explained his comprehensive survey in one sentence:
"the Maritime Law is not the Law of a particular Country, but the general
Law of Nations: 'Non erit alia Lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia
posthac; sed et apud omnes gentes et omni tempore, una eademque Lex
obtinebit.' "483 Such universal standards were needed "[n]ot only for the
greater Satisfaction of the Parties in the particular Cause, but to prevent
other Disputes, by making the rules of the Law and the Ground upon which
they are established certain and notorious."" It could have been Zouche,
Gentilis, or Ridley speaking, but it was Mansfield.
If Luke v. Lyde established Mansfield's attention to the ius gentium,
Moses v. Macferlan established his interest in moral obligation, unjust
enrichment, and actions "ex aequo et bono." 485 The issue was whether the
plaintiff could recover for unjust enrichment directly through an action upon
the case for money had and received, instead of having to bring "a special
action upon the contract. ' 486 Holding that the special action was not re-
quired, Mansfield stated:
One great benefit, which arises to suitors from the nature of this
action, is, that the Plaintiff needs not state the Special Circumstances
478 97 Eng. Rep. 614 (K.B. 1759).
'19 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
480 97 Eng. Rep. 797 (K.B. 1761).
481 See Coquillette, supra note 30, at 356-70.
482 97 Eng. Rep. at 619.
483 Id. at 617.
494 Id. at 617-18.
411 97 Eng. Rep. at 679. See the very helpful article by P. Birks, English and
Roman Learning in Moses v. Macferlan, 1984 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1:
We have seen that Lord Mansfield used the Roman learning to settle the answer
to the question, when does a man have and receive money to another's use? It is
well known that the English root which, so to say, he brought to Roman flower,
was the action of account.
Id. at 22.
486 Id. at 676.
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from which he concludes "that, ex aequo & bono, the Money received
by the Defendant, ought to be deemed as belonging to him:" he may
declare generally, "that the Money was received to his Use;" and make
out his Case, at the Trial. 487
If one Man takes another's Money to do a Thing, and refuses to do it;
it is a Fraud: And it is at the Election of the party injured, either to affirm
the Agreement, by bringing an Action for the Non-performance of it; or
to disaffirm the Agreement ab initio, by reason of the Fraud, and bring
an Action for Money had and received to his Use.
The Damages recovered in that Case, shew the Liberality with which
this kind of Action is considered: for though the Defendant received
From the Plaintiff £262 10s. yet the Difference Money Only, £175 was
retained by him against Conscience: And therefore the plaintiff, ex
aequo et bono, ought to recover no more; agreeable to the rule of the
Roman law-"Quod condictio indebiti non datur ultra, quam locu-
pletior factus est, qui accepit. 488
This kind of equitable Action, to recover back Money, which ought
not in justice to be kept, is very beneficial, and therefore much encour-
aged. It lies only for Money which, ex aequo et bono, the Defendant
ought to refund[.] 489
In one Word, The Gist of this kind of Action is, that the Defendant,
upon the Circumstances of the Case, is obliged by the Ties of natural
Justice and Equity to refund the Money.4911
If Luke v. Lyde reads like it was decided by Godolphin in the Admiralty,
Moses v. Macferlan sounds like a case in the Chancery decided by an
extraordinary chancellor. Indeed, it sounds as if it were decided by Francis
Bacon.
One year after deciding Moses v. Macferlan, Mansfield encountered di-
rectly the theoretical problems of incorporation in Edie v. East India Com-
pany. The issue was whether a bill of exchange endorsed by a payee to "pay
A," but which did not include an "or order" clause, could be transferred by
A. Mansfield allowed evidence of mercantile usage to be put to the jury, who
found that the form of the endorsement precluded transfer. On motion for a
new trial, Mansfield learned of two prior cases to the contrary. 491 In setting
aside the verdict, Mansfield explained: "Since the trial I have looked into the
cases .... I ought not to have admitted any evidence of the particular usage
487 Id. at 679 (quote is in original form used by Lord Mansfield in 2 Burrow's
Reports *1010-* 1012).
488 Id. at 680.
489 Id.
490 Id. at 681.
411 See J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 118. The cases were More v. Manning, 92
Eng. Rep. 1087 (K.B. 1718) and Acheson v. Fountain, 93 Eng. Rep..698 (K.B. 1722).
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of merchants in such a case. Of this, I say I am now satisfied; for the law is
already settled." 49 2
This, of course, represented the conceptual "end of the line" for growth in
the commercial law through evidence of mercantile usage. Mansfield's de-
sire to do practical justice in accordance with commercial utility conflicted,
not with any slavish adherence to legal precedent, but with another demand
of commercial utility-certainty, which Mansfield later recognized to be the
"great object" in "all mercantile transactions. '4 93 It was an inherently
irreconcilable conflict: the practical cost of incorporation of mercantile prac-
tice into rigid law as opposed to leaving it as a factual issue. As Mansfield
would later say in Buller v. Harrison :494 "I desire nothing so much as that all
questions of mercantile law be fully settled and ascertained; and it is of much
more consequence that they should be so, than which way the decision
is.' '4"5 Later, in Hankey v. Jones ,496 Mansfield confirmed his preferences:
I desired a case to be made for the opinion of the Court, for the sake of
that, which perhaps is more important than doing right: to bring all
questions upon mercantile transactions to a certainty. General verdicts
do not answer the purpose: but when a case is made, the profession
know the result, the merchants know the result ..... 491
In Grant v. Vaughan ,498 decided three years after Edie v. East India
Company, Mansfield again undertook to clarify the law of Holt. The case
involved an inland bill of exchange payable to the "Ship Fortune or Bearer."
It had been lost by the defendant and passed by an unknown finder to a bona
fide plaintiff for good consideration (five pounds worth of tea). The defen-
dant had stopped payment. The issue was whether a bearer could possess by
delivery without endorsement. The defendant argued that Holt's opinion in
Nicholson v. Sedgwick 499 controlled, but Mansfield was not impressed,
believing that case to be "upon general Principles ... not agreeable to Law
and Justice."°50 Mansfield had originally put to the jury the question whether
4' 97 Eng. Rep. at 800. Later in Ancher v. Bank of England, 99 Eng. Rep. 404
(K.B. 1781), Mansfield would further refine the law of restrictive endorsements, and
hold that an endorsement consisting of the words, "The within must be credited to
D., value in account" constituted a restrictive endorsement. Id. at 404; see J.
HOLDEN, supra note 450, at 118-21.
"' Vallego v. Wheeler, 98 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1017 (K.B. 1774) ("[I]n all mercantile
transactions the great object should be certainty."). See J. HOLDEN, supra note 450,
at 119 n.4.
"' 98 Eng. Rep. 1243 (K.B. 1777).
495 Id. at 1244.
491 98 Eng. Rep. 1339 (K.B. 1778).
497 Id. at 1342.
411 97 Eng. Rep. 957 (K.B. 1764).
4," 91 Eng. Rep. 1016 (K.B. 1703).
500 97 Eng. Rep. at 960.
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"such Draughts as this . . .were, in the course of Trade, Dealing and
Business, actually Paid away and negotiated, or In Fact and Practice nego-
tiable." 501 The jury, a" special jury of merchants," 0 2 came in for the defen-
dant. Mansfield put this verdict aside, explaining that "I ought not to have
left the latter Point to them: For it is a Question of Law, 'whether a Bill of
Note be negotiable, or not.' "503 The bill, he observed, came "bonafide and
in the Course of Trade, into the Hands of the present Plaintiff, who paid a
full and fair Consideration for it."5 °4 Mansfield concluded that both parties
were innocent and "by Law" the loss falls on the defendant, rather than on a
bona fide purchaser for good consideration. 05
The holding in Grant v. Vaughan, which remains good law in many
jurisdictions, was later reinforced in Peacock v. Rhodes .506 There, an inland
bill with a blank endorsement had been stolen and later negotiated. The
innocent endorsee recovered against the drawer. Striving to develop a uni-
form holding with respect to the negotiability of bearer bills, Mansfield
permitted only the issue of the endoresee's innocence to go to the jury:
I see no difference between a note indorsed blank, and one payable to
bearer. They both go by delivery, and possession proves property in
both cases. The question of mala fides was for the consideration of the
jury. The circumstances, that the buyer and also the drawers were
strangers to the plaintiff, and that he took the bill for goods on which he
had a profit, were grounds for suspicion, very fit for their consideration.
But they have considered them, and have found it was received in the
course of trade, and, therefore, the case is clear, and within the princi-
ple of all those Mr. Wood has cited, from that of Miller v. Race,
downwards, to that determined by me at Nisi Prius.507
The decision in Grant v. Vaughan reveals that Mansfield was undeterred
by either adverse prior judicial precedent or adverse factual determination
by a special jury of merchants. His desire to achieve uniformity in like cases
was equally obvious in Peacock v. Rhodes. Both cases reflect deliberate,
conscious judicial lawmaking, as systematic and principled as the case law
format permitted.
The stage was now set for Mansfield's ultimate mercantile case, Pillans v.
Van Mierop. 08 The facts are familiar to generations of law students. Plain-
tiffs, Dutch merchants, sought a confirmed credit on a London banking
501 Id. at 961.
502 Id. at 957. For a good discussion of Mansfield and "special juries," see
Oldham, supra note 353, at 140 n.13.
503 97 Eng. Rep. at 961.
504 Id. at 962.
505 Id.
506 99 Eng. Rep. 402 (K.B. 1781).
507 Id. at 403.
508 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1765).
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"house of rank" as a condition for accepting a bill of exchange drawn on
them by one White. White named the defendants, London merchants, and
the plaintiffs honored the bill. At this point there had been no contract
between the plaintiffs and defendants, but later the defendants agreed in
writing to accept a bill for the same amount to be drawn on them in "a
month's time" by plaintiffs on White's credit. White failed, and the defen-
dants gave notice to the plaintiffs not to draw upon them. The defendants
obtained a verdict at the trial, and on a motion for new trial, defendant's
counsel argued that his client's undertaking was either a "naked promise"
unsupported by any consideration, or that all the consideration was past,
and this would not support an assumpsit.
Here was the opportunity to sweep the involved and complex doctrine of
consideration away from commercial transactions. Mansfield seized it:
This is a Matter of great Consequence to Trade and Commerce in every
Light.
If there was any kind of Fraud in this Transaction, the Collusion and
mala Fides would have vacated the Contract. But from these Letters, it
seems to Me clear that there was none.
If there be no Fraud, it is a mere Question of Law. The Law of
Merchants and the Law of the Land is the same: A Witness cannot be
admitted, to prove the Law of Merchants. We must consider it as a
Point of Law. A nudum Pactum does not exist, in the Usage and Law of
Merchants.
I take it that the ancient Notion about the Want of Consideration was
for the Sake of Evidence only: For when it is reduced into Writing, as in
Covenants, Specialties, Bonds, etc., there was no Objection to the
Want of Consideration. And the Statute of Frauds proceded upon the
same Principle.
In Commercial Cases among Merchants, the Want of consideration is
not an Objection.
This is an Engagement 'to accept the Bill,['] if there was a Necessity to
'accept it; and to pay it, when due:' And they [defendants] could not
afterwards retract. It would be very destructive to Trade and to Trust in
Commercial Dealing, if They could. There was Nothing of nudum
Pactum mentioned to the Jury; nor was it, I dare say, at all in their Idea
or Contemplation.5 0 9
Only after wading through hundreds of earlier mercantile cases can one
really appreciate the boldness of this decision. The radical step was not the
statement that "The law of Merchants and the law of the Land is the same."
Holt had recognized that, as did many before him. 510 Nor was it the unqual-
ified statement that "a witness cannot be admitted to prove the Law of
519 Id. at 1038 (quote is in original form used by Lord Mansfield in 3 Burrow's
Reports 1669-1670).
510 See supra text accompanying notes 6-16, 369-408, 420-41.
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Merchants." There were roots of that as well in the earlier notion of general
mercantile usage a.5 1 The truly courageous step was Mansfield's flat abolition
of the doctrine of consideration in mercantile dealings, in the face of an
adverse jury verdict and much precedent to the contrary, all in the name of
"trade and . . . trust in commercial dealing." It was a bold, utilitarian
principle.
Experts have argued endlessly about the ratio decidendi of Pillans v. Van
Mierop. There were four judges. While all four unanimously set aside the
verdict and ordered a new trial, the reasons given by the other three were far
less clear. It has been said that the holding establishes the principle that the
bill of exchange was a "specialty." As Judge Yates explained in his opinion,
"bills of exchange are considered, and are declared upon as special con-
tracts; though legally, they are only simple contracts: the declaration sets
forth the bill and acceptance specifically: and that thereby the defendants, by
the custom of merchants, become liable to pay it." 512
But there was no such accepted bill, drawn without consideration, in the
case, but just "a gratuitous promise to accept" a future bill.-1 3 In any event,
Rann v. Hughes and the House of Lords would put an end to such a heresy
in thirteen years. 51 4 Mansfield's opinion contained the seeds of another
proposition, simpler and equally heretical. Unless the practicalities of evi-
dence required otherwise, moral obligation should be equated with consid-
eration. As Mansfield stated approximately fifteen years later in Hawkes v.
Saunders :515
Where a man is under a legal or equitable obligation to pay, the law
implies a promise, though none was ever actually made. A Fortiori, a
legal or equitable duty is a sufficient consideration for an actual prom-
ise. Where a man is under a moral obligation, which no court of law or
equity can enforce, and promises, the honesty and rectitude of the thing
is a consideration. ''516
This thesis would be continued in the context of bankruptcy.5 17
Mansfield's determination to establish a certain and principled law of
negotiable instruments eventually brought him into a series of conflicts with
Guildhall juries. For example, in Medcalf v. Hall, 18 the issue was whether
the plaintiff had presented a bill for payment within a "reasonable time"
when, having received a draft at one o'clock in the afternoon, he had failed
to get it accepted at the appropriate address one-half mile distant by five
511 See Coquillette, supra note 30, at 346-63.
512 97 Eng. Rep. at 1040.
513 J. HOLDEN, supra note 21, at 136 n.1.
514 Id.
."1 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 (K.B. 1782).
516 Id. at 1091.
511 See Trueman v. Fenton, 98 Eng. Rep. 1232 (K.B. 1777).
518 99 Eng. Rep. 566 (K.B. 1782).
IDEOLOGY AND INCORPORATION IV
o'clock that evening. 519 The jury held that the plaintiff had acted reasonably,
but Mansfield ordered a new trial.520 A second and third jury held for the
plaintiff, and each time Mansfield brushed the verdict aside, recoiling at "the
great inconvenience which it would occasion in the circulation of paper." 52 1
Finally, the plaintiff gave up.
In Appleton v. Sweetapple ,522 which involved the similar question of what
constituted reasonable notice of dishonor before suing an endorser, Mans-
field again ordered a new trial, prompting Justice Buller to observe:
In a question of law, however unpleasant it may be to us, we must not
yield to the decision of a jury. I do not doubt if a special jury in London
will, if desired, find a special verdict. The usage is to be considered, but
such usage must be reasonable, and it is for the Court to say whether it
is good or bad.5 2 1
Later, in Tindal v. Brown 5 14 Mansfield came just short of holding that
"reasonable notice" was a question of law; although he ultimately retreated
to the safer yet equally bold proposition that it was "partly a question of fact
and partly a question of law. ' 52 5 Was this Mansfield's last effort at establish-
ing commercial certainty while retaining some input for usage as a matter of
fact? If so, he was clearly attempting to keep the question of usage within the
control of the court. Eventually, frustrated with the commercial jury and
wanting "bright line" uniformity in commercial dealings, Mansfield moved
closer in his last years on the bench to the ultimate modern solution: a
codified commercial law containing carefully restricted "elastic" clauses for
the trier of fact.5 2 6
It would be too much to say that Mansfield "invented" English commer-
cial law, but Joseph Story was correct in saying that Mansfield "was one of
those great men raised up by Providence, at a fortunate moment he became
what he intended, the jurist of the Commercial World. ' 527 As Shientag
observed, Mansfield "created a body of systematic legal principles, in con-
formity with the realities of business needs .... His decisions in this field
amounted to judicial legislation of the first order. ' 5 2 8
51 Id. at 566.
520 Id.
521 Id. at 567; see C. FIFOOT, supra note 442, at 112.
522 99 Eng. Rep. 579 (K.B. 1782).
523 Id. at 580; see C. FIFOOT, supra note 442, at 113.
524 99 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1786).
525 Id. at 1034; see C. FIFOOT, supra note 442, at 113.
52- See C. FIFOOT, supra note 442, at 110-15; Oldham, supra note 353, at 210. But
the form of modem commercial statutes has delegated much back to the courts. See
Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27
STAN. L. REV. 621, 626-35 (1975); Schlesinger, The Uniform Commercial Code in
Light of Comparative Law, I INTER-AM. L. J. 11, 36-58 (1959).
527 J. STORY, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 262 (Boston 1835).
528 Shientag, supra note 442, at 351.
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Mansfield was a jurist in the finest sense. While he may not have invented
the law of negotiable instruments or other commercial doctrines, his deci-
sions gave English commercial law a far more systematic and rational
structure. Mansfield also sought to make these principles persuasive and
self-evident by demonstrating their utility, and he strove for consistency,
certainty, and universality. Here Mansfield drew deeply on the com-
parativist and rationalist tradition of the English and continental civilian
jurists. His decisions contain hundreds of citations to their treatises and
sources. 5 9 Like Bacon, Selden, and Hale, the character of Mansfield's
juristic thought testified to this influence.530 Yet, unlike Bacon, Selden, and
Hale, Mansfield's sole juristic vehicle was the reported decision-the case
law tool of today's judiciary.
As young men, both Edmund Burke and Jeremy Bentham sat at the back
of Mansfield's courtroom. It was, in Bentham's words, like visiting "the
chief seat of the living idol." '5 3 1 Both the inventor of conservative modem
constitutional theory and the pioneer of the modem codification movement
learned from Mansfield what modem adjudication could mean. 3 2 Those that
influenced Mansfield, influenced the entire future of the Anglo-American
law.
IV. CONCLUSION: "RECEPTION" AND "INCORPORATION"
The English civilian jurists were at a nexus between two systems of ideas
about law. Their legal ideology, which "found expression in the rediscovery,
in a spiritual more than a literal sense, of the great heritage of the Roman
classical jusists," 53 3 was also the product of the scientific and humanistic
studies of the great continental jurists of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, to which the English civilians looked for leadership. 5 4 Despite
529 See Rodgers, supra note 465, at 728; see also 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note
21, at 549-60 (observing that Mansfield incorporated the customs and principles of the
times into the common law, thus demonstrating to future jurists how common law
could adapt to the problems of a new age).
530 See C. FIFOOT, supra note 442, at 230-53; Shientag, supra note 442, at 382-88.
Fifoot spoke of Mansfield's juristic thought as having a "scientific spirit." C.
FIFOOT, supra note 442, at 233. This would have struck a chord in Bacon's soul!
531 Bentham stated: "From the first morning on which I took my seat on one of the
hired boards, that slid from under the officers' seat in the area of the King's Bench
... at the head of the gods of my idolatry, had sitten the Lord Chief Justice ....
Days and weeks together have I made my morning pilgrimage to the chief seat of the
living idol." 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 554-55 (citing I J. BENTHAM,
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHEM 247 (J. Browning ed. London 1843)). As to the
influence on Burke, see id. at 554; E. HEWARD, supra note 353, at 165, 178.
532 See supra note 526 and accompanying text.
533 Wieacker, supra note 253, at 275-76.
514 See Coquillette, supra note 68, at 22-35.
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their common law surroundings, the English civilians maintained and de-
fended their own institutional forums: the university curriculum, the Doc-
tors' Commons, and their specialist court jurisdictions. They also tena-
ciously asserted their own ideas about the proper sources of law and the
proper methods of resolving legal disputes.
It was these collective legal ideas, this legal ideology, which was the most
important historical fact about the English civilians. We are all familiar with
the controversies over the jury trial, which the English civilians resisted.
They preferred conceptualized authority, as manifested in treatises, maxims,
and codes. They had a reciprocal aversion to incremental lawmaking by ad
hoc judicidal decisions, despite the importance of case law to the consilia
and responsa of the classical jurists.535
Their most important ideas, however, related to their method of legal
problem solving. As Wieacker has observed, it was "decision-making not on
the basis of precedents, but by the way of subsuming a case under the terms
of an abstractly formulated authoritative text or statute."5' 36 The civilian
search for abstractly formulated authority, to achieve "control of legal
decision-making by means of a consistent system of cognitive principles," 53
7
was at the heart of the humanist civilian renaissance of the sixteenth century
and had a profound impact on the early English civilian jurists. It made them
rationalists and legal scientists, committed to an objective study of the utility
of legal rules in history and practice. This, in turn, made them the pioneers of
comparative law and modern legal history. 538 Some, even more daring,
sought to discover "a universal concept of law," one universal legal order of
principles common to the canon and civil law, the ius utrumque .5 9
Coke and other great common law jurists were quick to attack the pre-
sumptions of the "Roman Idea." They argued that its emphasis on ra-
tionality and on a jurist elite that was "neither legislators nor judges; neither
advocates nor prosecutors, ' 540 invited absolutist monopolies on truth and
justice. Further, the search for the "universal law" seemed to Coke danger-
ously linked to the universal legal claims of the Catholic Church, and it was
inconsistent with his strong sense of nationalism and his belief, limited but
sincerely held, in English populism and localism.5 41 Coke also feared any
encroachments on what he saw as the ultimate guardian of private English
rights, the Inns of Court.
The explosive growth of international commerce during this period
535 See J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 100-47 (1968); Wieacker, supra
note 253, at 267-68.
536 Wieacker, supra note 253, at 258.
537 Id. at 262.
518 See Coquillette, supra note 68, at 87-89.
539 See Wieacker, supra note 253, at 275, 278, 280.
540 Id. at 283.
141 For more detail on Coke, see Coquillette, supra note 68, at 76-87.
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brought into sharper focus this ideological schism. Of course, international
trade was not new to England, but its coexistence with legal nationalism was
at best uneasy. The growing scope and importance of this new commercial
wealth, beginning in the late sixteenth century, threatened to displace land
as the focus of English law.5 42
One would have thought that this provided the English civilians with an
unmatched opportunity. Their Doctors' Commons was firmly established by
this key period. It was a vital professional center backed by formidable
intellectual resources in the universities. In addition, they held the crucial
Admiralty jurisdiction as a professional monopoly. Further, the very nature
of international commerce would seem to favor cosmopolitanism and a belief
in universality-a belief symbolized by the Latin language itself. These were
cornerstones of the civilian juristic faith. The universal needs and problems
of an international commerce seemed to demand self-justifying cosmopolitan
principles, firmly erected upon the "universal language" of the civilian legal
heritage .543
But, as this paper and its predecessors have demonstrated, this promise
was never realized. We have described the final stages of this struggle: the
ideological battles of Duck, Wiseman, and Zouche during the Interregnum,
and the gallant political attempts following the Restoration by Exton,
Godolphin, and Sir Leoline Jenkins to save the all important commercial
jurisdiction for the Admiralty. The civilians failed, and retreated to the
professional specialties and the university scholasticism whence they first
emerged in the days of Henry VIII.5 44
Why did they fail? My thesis, set out extensively above, does not rely on
the slings and arrows of outrageous political fortune, nor does it hypothesize
a professional conspiracy of common lawyers. Levack's empirical studies of
the period from 1603 to 1641 demonstrated that the English civilians were
not the legal arm of Stuart absolutism, nor of any religious party. 545 Later
events confirmed this conclusion. Some of the greatest civilian jurisdictional
assertions were actually made during the Commonwealth, and their greatest
political reversal was at the hands of a Restoration House of Lords. 546
Rather, the civilians' failures were, in the last analysis, largely due to the
limitations of what they had to offer the new commercial classes in competi-
tion with the common law. The common lawyers, reinforced by the prohibi-
tion, had demonstrated their ability to meet the practical needs of English
commerce well before the Restoration, and the civilians simply failed to
offer any convincing rival advantages. An examination of the development
542 See 1 E. LIPSON, supra note 174, at 511-94.
5"I Wieacker, supra note 253, at 280.
544 See Coquillette, supra note 68, at 11-22.
545 See W. LEVACK, THE CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLAND 1603-1641, at 50-157 (1973).
546 See Coquillette, supra note 1, at 300-42.
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of one crucial legal instrument of the new commerce, the bill of exchange,
confirms this thesis.5 47
But this should not be the end of the story. Before the English civilians
lost their final professional challenges to the common lawyers, they made a
fundamental contribution to the development of English jursprudence. This
was not due to specific, incorporated civil law doctrines, although there were
a few examples of these.5 4 Nor was this limited to the Anglo-American
codification movements that came a century later, although I will have more
to say about this in another article. 549 Rather, their most important contribu-
tion was, ironically, to the methodology of English common law judicial
decisionmaking.
This occurred in two stages. The first consisted of the strong influence of
the new civilian legal humanism on early modern common lawyers and on
intellectual leaders such as Bacon, Selden, Hobbes, and Hale. 5 0 While com-
mon law jurists certainly learned directly from continental sources, they
also learned from their English civilian contemporaries. Although Hobbes
was always somewhat suspect to common lawyers, Bacon's legal work was
extremely popular during the Restoration, and Selden and Hale were virtual
saints to a new professional generation .5 5 The professional loyalties of such
517 See supra text accompanying notes 210-51.
54s See R. HELMHOLZ, supra note 254, at 8-15, 18. An extensive review of canon
law doctrine from this perspective is badly needed.
549 I intend to focus on the juristic thought of John Adams, Joseph Story, and
Jeremy Bentham. See Coquillette, Justinian in Braintree: John Adams, Civilian
Learning, and Legal Elitism, 1758-1775, in LAW IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS
1630-1800, at 359-418 (D. Coquillette, R. Brink & C. Menand eds. 1984).
5.' See supra text accompanying notes 259-352. As Wilfred Prest observed:
Both those who unashamedly borrowed from the methodolizingjurisprudence of
the civil law and those who sought to devise a more rational order for the
common law without explicit reference to the Corpus Juris had necessarily
acquired more than a passing acquaintance with Roman law. Indeed, there is
much evidence to suggest that early modem common lawyers were far less
hostile towards, or ignorant about, the civil law than has hitherto been generally
supposed.
W. PREsT, THE RISE OF THE BARRISTERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR
1590-1640, at 191 (1986).
551 For a good discussion of Bacon's contributions, see generally Wheeler, supra
note 261. Bacon's writings were very much in print following the Restoration. See,
e.g., RESUSCITATIO OR, BRINGING INTO PUBLICK LIGHT SEVERAL PIECES OF THE
WORKS ... HITHERTO SLEEPING OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE FRANCIS BACON (W.
Rawley ed. London 1671). See generally R. GIBSON, FRANCIS BACON: A BIBLIOG-
RAPHY OF HIS WORKS AND OF BACONIANA TO THE YEAR 1750 (1950) (providing a
complete list of Bacon's Restoration printings). As to Selden, see E. FLETCHER,
JOHN SELDEN 1584-1654 (1969); Ziskind, supra note 286, at 22-29. As to Hale, see
Gray, Introduction to M. HALE, supra note 320, at xi-xxxviii (C. Gray ed. 1971); E.
HEWARD, supra note 317, at 168-78.
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jurists were beyond doubt, and their popular treatises were widely circu-
lated.
These jurists had a fundamental message for their successors, and it was
explicitly indebted to civilian humanism. To them, the law was a rational
science, fully knowable only by an emprical appreciation of its historical
context. Distinguishing good from bad law involved testing the utility of the
rule or doctrine in practice, as well as its clarity and certainty as a matter of
theory. The comparative and historical studies of both the English and
continental civilians had convinced them of the "essentially progressive,"
as well as universal, nature of legal science. 52 Bacon's Maxims of the Law
and his The Eighth Book of De Augmentis Scientiarum5 53 were vivid demon-
strations of this faith. Selden's Ad Fletam Dissertatio and Hale's Preface to
Rolle's Abridgment and History of the Common Law of England powerfully
communicated this spirit to a new generation of common lawyers andjudges, just at the time that improved law reporting gave common law judges
a better vehicle for a progressive case law jurisprudence. 554
The second stage of this juristic indebtedness came with Holt and Mans-
field. They were the ones who actually incorporated the new methodology
into the judicial process. Some scholars have characterized Holt as the last
disciple of Coke, and described Mansfield as the first flower of some com-
mercial enlightenment. It is true that, compared to Holt, Mansfield's civilian
debt was explicit and was reflected in hundreds of citations to civilian
sources of all kinds. But a close examination of any commercial doctrine,
including those relating to bills of exchange, demonstrates that most of the
doctrinal content of the new commercial law was already in place well before
Mansfield's time. 555 Holt's dour style and his terrible reporters require that,
with a few exceptions such as Coggs v. Bernard, we must look to what he
did, rather than what he said, if we are to appreciate the scope of his learning
and his judicial philosophy. And, of course, as a pioneer of legal instrumen-
551 Wieacker, supra note 253, at 261, 266; see Coquillette, supra note 68, at 27-29;
see also R. WISEMAN, supra note 571, at Epistle to the Reader (unpaginated) (stating
that his intention in writing his treatise was "to make known to the people of this
Nation . . . how excellent it [civil legal science] is in itself, how rational; what a
general approbation it has had with other Nations, and how very usefull it may be to
the publick welfare of this Nation divers ways, it is a work so seasonable and
necessary ... and it is no more than the present state of things calls for").
51 For Bacon's Maxims of the Law, see 7 WORKS, supra note 261, at 307-87. The
most relevant section of De Augmentis is F. BACON, Example of A Treatise of
Universal Justice or the Fountains of Equity, by Aphorisms, in 5 WORKS, supra note
261, at 88-109; see supra text accompanying notes 261-76.
551 See I. SELDENI, AD FLETAM DISSERTATIO (D. Ogg trans. 1925); M. HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (C. Gray ed. 1971); supra text
accompanying notes 285-310, 317-45.
555 See supra notes 369-439 and accompanying text; Baker, supra note 6, at 320-22.
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talism, Holt was working one half century before Mansfield's earliest
cases. 556 Making due allowance for these facts, Holt's progressive contribu-
tion, as well as his debt to the spirit of Selden and Hale, cannot be over-
looked.
Still, it seems natural to conclude this survey with Lord Mansfield. More
than any other single individual, Mansfield established the prominence of the
judge in Anglo-Amercan jurisprudence. He was also a pioneer of scientific
methodology in judicial decisionmaking. This article has discussed his civil-
ian debts, but it is Wieacker who provides the best description of what would
have interested Mansfield most. Wieacker noticed that his most "practi-
cal-minded students" were the ones who ultimately became enthralled with
the classical civilian texts: 557
[The "practical student'] can learn the Roman jurist's method of clearly
distinguishing legal issues and making those issues precise-an exercise
which is essential for the objectification of social and political conflicts.
Similarly, he can try to develop their sure instinct for the reality and
practicability of legal solutions. He can, moreover, observe how they
arrived at new and elegant solutions through the disciplined use of legal
imagination. Even today, nothing develops the ability to discover the
underlying legal issue in statutes or precedents more than the study of
the casuistry of the classical jurists. 55
Mansfield was just such a "practical student." His interest in civilian
comparativist studies, in civilian juristic methodology, and even in the
civilian appeal to the universality of legal reasoning, was inherently practical
and utilitarian. It helped him to establish the authority of the common law
and the common law bench by judicial decisions that were self-justifying,
useful, and principled. The civilian methods offered him a progressive model
of legal reasoning and decisionmaking, and a vehicle for logical realism.
These, in turn, were the tools which enabled Mansfield to attempt to escape
from the worst strictures of precedent justice, jury trial, and formulaic
pleading, while retaining their benefits. 59 Mansfield, of course, was not
entirely successful. Nevertheless it is fair to say that his judicial style and
method was the first substantial anticipation of the American utilitarian and
instrumentalist approach to the judiciary. It was no accident that Bentham
faithfully attended Mansfield's courtroom, or that Mansfield was one of the
first to praise the Fragment on Government.560
.56 See supra text accompanying notes 420-40. For an excellent work on "legal
instrumentalism," see R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL
THEORY (1982); Hurst, supra note 270, at 852-55 (1984).
155 Wieacker, supra note 253, at 280.
558 Id.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 474-532.
560 See supra note 531; C. FIFOOT, supra note 442, at 47, 49.
19871
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67: 877
Mansfield hardly concludes the story of civilian influence on Anglo-Amer-
ican jurisprudence, and I remain at work on some specific problems relating
to the last generation of civilian specialists, including William Scott, Lord
Stowell (1745-1836), and Stephen Lushington (1782-1873).561 I am also con-
cerned about some peculiarly modern aspects of civilian jurisprudence,
particularly as manifested by the works of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832),
Arthur Browne (1756?-1805), and Joseph Story (1779-1845).62 But Mans-
"' See Coquillette, supra note 1, at 354 n.262 and sources cited. For a standard
account of this civilian "generation,'.' see 13 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at
668-99 (1st ed. 1952).
562 See Coquillette, supra note 68, at 1-10; Coquillette, supra note 30, at 319
nn.12-15; Coquillette, supra note 549, at 359 n.3, 416-48.
Bentham's debt to continental sources and his dedication to systematic analysis
and rationalism is well known. See, e.g., Alfange, Jeremy Bentham and the Codifica-
tion of Law, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 58, 65-67 (1969); Hart, Introduction to J.
BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL xxxi-xxxv (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970); Harrison,
Introduction to J. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION vii-lxiv (W. Harrison ed.
1967); D. LYONS, IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNED: A STUDY IN BENTHAM'S
PHILOSOPHY OF UTILITY AND LAW 107-37 (1973); Book Note, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1029, 1030-32 (1984).
Joseph Story (1779-1845) was certainly the greatest American legal educator before
1870. Appointed as Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court in 1811 at
the age of thirty-two, Story also served as a professor at Harvard Law School from
1829 until his death. He published a score of major treatises, including J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Boston 1834); J. STORY, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE (Boston 1843); and J. STORY, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES (Boston 1845). He made major contribu-
tions to maritime and private international law. See Dunne, Joseph Story: 1812
Overture, 77 HARV. L. REV. 240, 255-56 (1963); 9 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOG-
RAPHY 102-08 (1935); A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 92-139 (1967); G.
CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (77th ed. 1965). "[T]he extent of the
influence which Story has exercised over the modern system of private international
law can scarcely be overestimated." Id. at 33.
Story's attention to civilian sources was so extensive that he has been criticized in
more recent times for paying "excessive respect to the Continental writers." Id.
He probably was the one who persuaded Samuel Livermore of cosmopolitan New
Orleans to bequeath, in 1833, an extraordinary collection of books to a young
Harvard Law School. This was a "whole library of foreign law, consisting of the
works of the leading civilians and jurists of continental Europe, and amounting in
number to upwards of three hundred costly volumes. . . [and] is probably not
exceeded, and perhaps not equalled by any other collection of the same size in
America, if it be in Europe." 2 J. QUINCY, THE HISTORY OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY
424-25 (1st ed. Cambridge 1840). This collection, in fact, was barely equalled by the
Library of Doctors' Commons in London, soon to be tragically dispersed, or by any
other collection in the Anglo-American world. See Coquillette, supra note 68, at 7, 11
n.22. See generally CATALOGUE OF THE BOOKS IN THE LIBRARY OF THE COLLEGE OF
ADVOCATES IN DOCTORS' COMMONS (London 1818).
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field, as a case law jurist, is a superb example of my fundamental conclu-
sion-that the English civilian heritage made a special methodological con-
tribution to English law, quite apart from incorporating specific doctrines
and quite apart from the later codification movements.
In his brilliant inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Civil Law in
Cambridge University, Peter Stein stated:
If we search the Roman legal texts for an express theory of law and its
growth, we will be disappointed. But if we look at the way the Roman
jurists reached their decisions, the way they g'athered those decisions
into rules, the way they related one rule to another and extended some
rules and restricted others, we can find much that is relevant for our
problems today. For in these respects Roman law itself is closer to the
common law than is any modern codified system based on Roman law.
It is capable of offering yet again a basis of comparison for English
lawyers and of thus fulfilling its traditional role of providing a stimulus
for English jurisprudence. 563
This was the most important aspect of the "incorporation" of civilian legal
ideas into modern English common law. If we look for express, specific
doctrinal examples, we shall be disappointed. We will come away im-
pressed, instead, with the actual flexibility and innovativeness of the com-
mon lawyers, in spite of the facade of conservatism they so frequently
adopted for political reasons. On the other hand, if we look to legal method-
ology and legal process, "the way the ... jurists reached their decisions, the
way they gathered these decisions into rules, the way they related one rule to
another and extended some rules and restricted others," 56 4 the story is
Arthur Browne (1756?-1805) was an Irish jurist and Regius Professor of Civil and
Canon Law at Trinity College, Dublin, from 1785-1805. In 1798, he wrote the
extremely influential A COMPENDIOUS VIEW OF THE CIVIL LAW. See 1 DNB, supra
note 277, at 234. The similarites between Browne and Story are extensive: both were
born in New England (Browne nearly went to Harvard instead of Trinity College);
both held judgeships and endowed professorships-combining scholarship and prac-
tical experience; both were deeply concerned with legal education; and both wrote
bad poetry. Bentham, Browne, and Story were all dedicated to the rationalization of
commercial law, to legitimation by utility of legal doctrine, and to the expression of
legal principles in a comprehensive and clear manner, whether by statute or treatise.
My future intention is to examine the letters and writings of Bentham, Browne, and
Story in detail, and to carry my analysis of the study and application of civilian
sources forward into the "life of the mind" of nineteenth century, with a particular
emphasis on Benthamite and American jurisprudence. Cf. P. MILLER, THE LEGAL
MIND IN AMERICA 285-95 (1962); P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA
239-65 (1965).
563 p. STEIN, ROMAN LAW AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE YESTERDAY AND
TODAY 27 (1969).
511 Id. As J.A.C. Thomas put it:
Roman law was, in its prime, characterised by a conservatism that resulted in the
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very different. It was here that the English civilian jurists excelled in juristic
writing, and where their contribution to English law was genuinely impor-
tant. In Wieacker's words, "They made the timeless problems the texts
posed their own concern. 565
retention of old forms long after their intrinsic usefulness had disappeared and
astute reinterpretation was necessary to make them work in changed social
circumstances. Yet, indeed, it is in this that there lies the greatness of the
achievement of the Roman jurists and this which makes them a model for every
student of jurisprudence: the ability to retain the form while modifying the
substance, the mastery of the art of interpretation which effected a harmonising
of the opposing claims of justice in the individual case with the certainty that is
an essential ingredient of any legal system worthy of the name and the ability to
put existing institutions to wholly new uses as new situtations developed.
J. THOMAS, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 55 (1976); see A. WATSON, THE MAKING OF
THE CIVIL LAW 190-91 (1981).
565 Wieacker, supra note 253, at 276.
